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This research attempts to explore the complexities of the issues underlying the instability 
in the South African minibus-taxi industry. Presented in this dissertation is a detailed 
account of the growth and development of the industry and the conflict and violence that 
has plagued it since the late 1980s. A review of the apartheid government's attempts to 
address the problems in the taxi industry, is followed by an examination of the 
democratic government's strategies to bring about the industry'S stability through 
transformation, formalisation and regulation. Of particular interest is the nature of the 
relationships that exist both within the taxi industry and between the industry and 
government, more specifically, law enforcement agencies. The challenges facing future 
regulation of the industry are then highlighted. In addition to an extensive literature 
review, 72 interviews were conducted in the Cape Town area. The interviews were 
intended to provide an in-depth view of the respondents' opinions and perceptions of 
issues relating to the crisis in the minibus-taxi industry. A qualitative data collection 
technique was utilised in the form of a semi-structured interview. The questionnaire 
contained both closed and open-ended questions. Interviews were conducted with 
members from the taxi industry namely, taxi drivers, owner-drivers, and taxi association 
executive committee members; law enforcement officials from the South African Police 
Service and the Traffic Department; and members from U Managing Conflict, a non-
governmental organisation that has been involved in the minibus-taxi industry in a 
conflict resolution and mediation capacity. In the analysis of the findings the process of 
quantification was utilised as a means of making sense of the data and extracting the 
general trends that emerged. The findings revealed that little has changed regarding the 
conditions within the taxi industry. The industry remains in a self-regulated state, with 











industry and between the industry and government structures remain volatile. 
Government attempts to restructure the industry through the Recapitalisation programme 
are severely hampered by the lack of effective communication between the relevant 
parties which affects not only their perceptions of each other, but also the manner in 
which they address the issues and choose to resolve them. While the government has 
succeeded admirably in identifying strategies for resolving the crisis in the taxi industry, 
the success has been mainly on paper, as implementation on the ground has been less 
impressive. The failure of government to put into practice comprehensive strategies to 
stabilise the industry, brings to the fore the weaknesses of the democratic government 
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Following the deregulation of transport in South Africa in 1987, the South African 
minibus-taxi industry carved for itself a permanent place in the transport sector of the 
country, as minibus-taxis quickly became the preferred mode of public transportation for 
millions of black South Africans. However, where the industry was once regarded as a 
success story of black economic empowerment, it has in the last decade become 
synonymous with lawlessness, conflict, violence and death. The use of violence has 
become the means of protecting economic interests in a market that is overcrowded and 
has limited resources. Many people have been killed in the bloody battles that erupted 
between rival taxi associations, and hired assassins have come to playa prominent role in 
the violence. There have also been numerous allegations of corruption and collusion 
within government structures up to the highest levels. While there was a visible decline 
in political violence following South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy in 
April 1994, violence pervading the taxi industry not only persisted, but in fact increased 
around the country. Herein lies the purpose of this research. 
The aim of this research is to better understand why in post-apartheid South Africa, seven 
years after the transition, the minibus-taxi industry has continued to be unstable when 










democratic government's agenda. This research thus revolves around the following 
themes: 
• the history of the minibus-taxi industry, with emphasis on major 
events which contributed to the manner in which the industry 
developed; 
• the conflict and violence that has plagued the industry virtually 
since its inception; 
• the attempts by both the apartheid government and the 
democratic government to address and resolve the problems in 
the taxi industry; 
• the nature of the relationships that exist within the industry and 
between the industry, government and law enforcement 
agencIes; 
• the challenges facing the regulation of the taxi industry in the 
near future. 
To help shed light on these themes a review of available literature was conducted as well 
as interviews with relevant parties. The aim of the literature review was not only to 
detennine what research had already been completed with regard to the minibus-taxi 
industry, but also to better understand the causative factors which contribute to the 
industry'S instability. The review facilitated the identification of crucial time periods and 
contexts, internal and external conditions which existed, and the impact they had on the 
taxi industry and its development. The fieldwork section of the research was confined to 
the Cape Town area. A total of 72 interviews were conducted with members of the taxi 
industry, drivers, owners and taxi association executive committee members; members of 











Department; and members of U Managing Conflict (UMAC), a Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) that has been involved with conflict resolution and mediation 
processes within the taxi industry. The aim of the interviews was to gain an in-depth look 
at the respondents' perceptions, views and opinions on issues relevant to the major 
themes of the research. For this reason a qualitative method of inquiry in the form of a 
semi-structured interview schedule was favoured. The flexibility that this approach 
offered allowed for issues to be thoroughly explored and examined through probing, 
which enabled the respondents to elaborate and clarify their responses. 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters and is structured in the following manner: 
This introductory section, Chapter 1, briefly outlines the aims of the research, the themes, 
the methodology utilised and the general findings. 
Chapter 2 deals with the history of the South African minibus-taxi industry. The focus is 
on the manner in which the industry has developed since its inception. The role of the 
Welgemoed Commission, the National Transport Policy Study (NTPS), the Competition 
Board, and the policy of deregulation will be examined, along with governmental 
regulation of the transport sector during the apartheid era. 
Chapter 3 examines the conflict, violence and general instability in the taxi industry with 
the focus particularly on the history of taxi violence in the Western Cape between first 
the Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga Taxi Association (LAGUNY A) and the Western Cape 
Black Taxi Association (WEBTA), and then later the Congress of Democratic Taxi 
Associations (CODETA) and the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (CATA). The 











close look at corruption within law enforcement agencies and the utilisation of contract 
killers or 'hit-men'. Concluding the chapter is a discussion on the apartheid government's 
response to the conflict with the appointment of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry in 
the early 1990s. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the manner in which the democratic government has chosen to deal 
with the instability in the minibus-taxi industry. Of particular interest is the formation of 
the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT), their investigations and their recommendations 
regarding restructuring the industry. This is followed by an examination of the 
government's latest initiative namely the Recapitalisation programme and the reactions 
to the programme, particUlarly the strong opposition to the implementation of the 
programme from members within the taxi industry. 
Chapter 5 deals with the research methodology utilised. There is a brief discussion on 
both quantitative and qualitative research, followed by a discussion on the approach 
adopted in this research namely a semi-structured interview schedule, a qualitative 
method of inquiry. The chapter further deals with the selection of, and access to the 
respondents, the context in which the research was conducted, the ethical considerations, 
and issues relating to data analysis. 
Chapter 6 is a presentation and description of the findings of the fieldwork section of the 
research. It takes a closer look at the views and perceptions of the respondents on the 
following issues: working conditions within the taxi industry; conflict and violence in the 
industry and the government's response to it; the regulation of the taxi industry and the 











industry and between the industry and other parties; and the difficulties and challenges 
with regard to resolving the problems that exist within the industry. 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, presents an analysis of the overall research findings. 
In this chapter issues relating to competition and regulation facing the South African 
urban public transport sector are viewed from a more comparative angle by drawing on 
the experiences of public transport sectors in other developing countries. The crisis in the 
minibus-taxi industry and government's failure to bring about the successful 
transformation of the industry is then viewed in light of the success of the greater process 
of transformation occurring in the country, post-1994. Finally the chapter briefly 
considers the challenges facing future regulation of the minibus-taxi industry. 
The findings of this research suggest that the conditions which existed within the taxi 
industry which in the past have proven to be contributory factors to its instability, 
continues to exist today. This is despite the many attempts by government to introduce 
measures to alter those conditions. Relationships within the industry and between the 
industry and government and law enforcement agencies remain volatile, with effective 
communication between the parties virtually non-existent. What emerges from this 
research is that the success of government's attempts to restructure and regulate the 
minibus-taxi industry is severely hampered by the nature of the relationships that exists 
within the industry and between the industry and government. There is a general feeling 
of hostility, fear, and lack of trust among all the parties, and the fragile nature of these 
relationships threatens to adversely affect the formalisation, restructuring and regulation 
processes. With regard to stabilising the minibus-taxi industry significant progress has 











successful as significant change m operations within the taxi industry has not yet 












THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
MINIBUS-TAXI INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
Transportation is a vital part of any country's economy. All 
other sectors are dependent on the availability of adequate 
transport. It is therefore generally accepted that an effective 
and efficient transport infrastructure (from both an 
economic and a technical point of view) is a prerequisite 
for general economic growth and development (Ferreira, 
1992:1-1). 
The South African minibus-taxi industry emerged during a period when lucrative 
employment opportunities for black South Africans l were virtually non-existent, as they 
were denied the opportunity of effective participation in the professions, in business and 
in the economic life of the country (Minister of Transport, 2000/2001 Budget Speech). 
An attractive prospect for people in a segregated society with little or no skills, education 
or training, and little prospect of acquiring any, the taxi industry quickly became the hope 
for economic success for people in disadvantaged communities. 
Railway trains and buses had for many years dominated the transport industry in South 
Africa. Receiving substantial government subsidies, they had the largest shares of the 











commuter markets. However, failure to adapt their methods of operating to the needs of 
the commuters resulted in them losing their monopoly in the transport sector. The 
minibus-taxi, being a flexible mode of transport, soon replaced the bus and train as the 
major mode of transportation for black commuters. In the process it provided an 
opportunity for disadvantaged citizens to actively participate in the economy of the 
country. 
Emerging in the late 1980s the taxi industry quickly became an integral part of the 
transport system. It was celebrated as a beacon of hope and seen by many as the success 
story of black small business. Celebrations however quickly ceased since, as Khosa 
(1996:24) explains: 
... by the early 1990s it had started to show signs of decline: 
profit rates plummeted, violence in the industry became 
endemic, and several taxi operators who had accumulated 
huge profits in the 1980s were forced out of the business in 
the 1990s. 
In this chapter the path the minibus-taxi industry has travelled since its emergence will be 
traced. Attention will particularly be paid to the impact that the Welgemoed Commission, 
the National Transport Policy Study (NTPS), the Competition Board and the 
Deregulation policies of the 1980s had on the industry. Included in the section on 
deregulation is a discussion on governmental regulation of transport in apartheid South 
Africa with a focus on the manner in which the segregation policies of the apartheid era 












At the start of the 1900s there existed no control over road transportation since the 
railway was the only existing means of public transport (Smith, Dehlen, de Haan, Mare 
and Naud6, 1994). This made the volume of traffic simply too small to warrant any 
legislative intervention (cited in Nustad, 2000). Following the introduction of the first 
road passenger service of the South African Railways in the form of two small dual-
purpose vehicles which catered for goods and passengers in the Northern Transvaal in 
1920 (Smith et aI, 1994), motor transport quickly replaced the railway as the dominant 
mode of transportation in the country. 
In 1929, the Le Roux Commission, in the Report of the Road Motor Competition 
Commission, stated that experiences in other countries ' ... showed that unregulated and 
uncontrolled competition led to an undesirable and uneconomic multiplication of services 
in certain areas and the neglect of the services in other areas' (cited in Competition 
Board, 1986:19). It was therefore argued that such unregulated and uncontrolled 
competition would not be in the best interest of the country. The recommendations of this 
Commission were then incorporated in the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, Act 39 of 
1930, which was the first piece of legislation that affected road transportation in South 
Africa (Smith et aI, 1994). This Act then established a Central Road Transportation 
Board as well as Local Road Transportation Boards (LRTB's) which were then given the 
authority to issue Motor Carrier Certificates, ' ... without which it would be illegal to 
provide transport within any proclaimed transportation areas or on any proclaimed 
transportation routes' (Competition Board, 1986:19). The issuing of permits was thus 
strictly controlled with the purpose of regulating entry into the transport market and 











(Vorster and Britz, 1994). In March 1932 the Road Transportation Board called for the 
amendment of the 1930 Act so that taxi operators who engaged in unlawful activities 
could be brought within the ambit of the law (Competition Board, 1986). The 
Amendment Act (The Motor Carrier Transportation Amendment Act, Act 31 of 1932) 
therefore extended regulation to all taxis. 
In the 1970s sedan taxis were operating in South African cities. These sedan taxis 
operated mainly in the townships, transporting black South Africans who lived long 
distances from their places of employment. This was due to the segregation policies like 
the Group Areas Act, which imposed 'residential segregation on the country', forcing 
black people to live far outside city centres away from what the government declared 
white areas (McCaul, 1990:vi). Thus forced to live separated from the whites, yet 
needing to travel to white areas to seek employment, black people were faced with huge 
transport costs which cut heavily into family budgets (McCaul 1990, cited in Nustad, 
2000). The sedan taxis soon started offering shared services, especially between lower 
income residential areas and suburban railway stations (Moving Ahead Discussion 
Document, 1998). Buses and trains were no longer found to be adequate, considered to 
be unreliable, irregular, and overcrowded as well as being seen as a symbol of the 
oppressive apartheid regime. There was thus a demand for 'faster, more adequate and 
more convenient transport ... ', and this demand then 'paved the way for the emergence of 
the black taxi industry' (Moolman and Kgosimore, 1998:33).The taxi industry at this 
pOInt however, still did not feature prominently in the transport sector of the country 












A change occurred with the introduction of the Road Transportation Act of 1977. The 
Act presented the taxi industry with a loophole (McCaul, 1990), enabling it to move from 
the six-seater sedans to ten-seater combis, with a capacity to carry up to eight passengers. 
The loophole was found in the failure of the Act to legally define 'taxis'. Buses were 
defined as motor vehicles which could transport more that nine passengers. This meant 
that black taxi operators were now able to operate legally as long as the number of 
passengers they conveyed did not exceed eight (Nustad, 2000). There was an immediate 
increase in the number of taxis operating on the roads. Registered minibuses by blacks 
increased nation-wide from 12 400 in 1979, to 22 300 in 1982 (Rapp, 1993). Permits 
were still required for the legal operation of taxis, and even though regulations were now 
somewhat more relaxed, they remained restrictive (Nustad, 2000). 
Along with the growth of taxi operators in the legal sector came growth of illegally 
operating, pirate taxis, since it quickly became clear that there was an opportunity to 
make economic gains in the taxi industry without having to operate in accordance with 
the law. Despite the heavy penalties that existed for these pirate operators should they be 
identified by the authorities [such penalties included heavy fines and the confiscation of 
vehicles which could possibly mean eviction from the industry since many did not have 
the financial means to survive such confiscation], the pirate taxi industry continued to 
grow. Evans and Cook (1985) attributed this growth to not only the restriction placed on 
the routes legal taxis could operate on, which resulted in ' ... freedom of movement...' for 
illegal taxis allowing them to operate over longer distances, but also the shortage of law 
enforcement officials assigned the task of policing the taxi industry. They argued that 
there existed only one traffic officer for every 65 registered taxis. This put the odds of 











Bus operators, soon concerned about the challenge the emerging taxi industry posed for 
them, lobbied government for consideration of the position they were now placed in 
(Fieldwick and Cadle, 1992), with their profit rates dropping despite heavy subsidisation 
by the government. Their concerns contributed to the establishment of the Welgemoed 
Commission of Inquiry. 
2.3 The Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry 
The Welgemoed Commission, under the chairmanship of Dr. P.l Welgemoed, was 
established with the purpose of investigating bus passenger transport in the country and 
to make recommendations on the following issues: 
• Bus tariffs 
• Subsidies 
• Future policies 
• The effect of the taxi industry on the bus industry 
• The security of the bus industry in the interest of South Africa 
• The desirability of co-ordinating bodies for Metropolitan Areas 
and, 
• The desirability of the establishment of a National Bus 
Corporation (Interim Report no. 1 of the Commission of Inquiry 
into bus passenger transportation in the Republic of South 
Africa, 1982). 
The Commission met for the first time on September 28, 1981 to commence its activities. 
In its final report, published in May 1983, the Commission dealt with the effect of the 
taxi industry on the bus industry (Smith et aI, 1994). Overall, the Commission did not see 











(Essig, 1985), and called for the phasing out of taxis over a four year period. The 
Commission further stated that 'taxis', should by definition be metered vehicles with a 
carrying capacity of four passengers (Vorster and Britz, 1994). Thus the focus of the 
Commission in its final report was essentially on making the bus industry more viable 
financially and protecting it against 'unfair' competition from the taxi industry (Ferreira, 
1992). Said the Commission in their report: 
Excessive taxi activity is symptomatic of shortcomings in 
the service offered by other modes, and bus services can do 
much to combat the problem by rendering better quality 
services (quoted in Smith et aI, 1994:2-27). 
The report by the Welgemoed Commission calling for the phasing out of taxis was not 
welcomed. The taxi industry, motor, and oil companies lobbied extensively to prevent the 
implementation of the Commission's recommendations. In addition to this, some local 
authorities as well as some influential commercial organisations, including South 
Africa's Chamber of Mines, were against the report (Rapp, 1993). Ferreira (1992), argues 
that the proposals'by the Welgemoed Commission regarding the taxi industry, were 
contradictory to the deregulation and privatisation policies of the government and its 
intention to stimulate small business development in the country. Browning (1989) 
explains that by .the time the report was made public, the taxi industry was already firmly 
established and thus, fortunately for the industry, a number of events contributed to the 
impracticability of the call for the eradication of the taxi industry. Among these were: the 
opposition to the recommendations by many members of government; the fact that the 
industry had captured a large percentage of the African commuter market; and the growth 











SABT A was a national association founded with the purpose of not only promoting 
solidarity within the taxi industry, but of addressing problems within the industry and 
dealing with government and its policies as a united front (Khosa, 1990; Matilja, 1990, 
cited in Rapp, 1993). Unofficially SABTA started in 1978 when 21 taxi operators formed 
the Association. Following the expansion of the taxi industry, the need for a national 
representative body was recognised and thus in 1981 SABT A was formally constituted. 
The association had considerable 'consumer clout' which it used in negotiations with 
suppliers to the taxi industry (McCaul, 1990:viii). By 1990 the national body had 
approximately 400 local taxi associations affiliated to it, making it the dominant 
organisation in the taxi industry (McCaul, 1990). SABTA lobbied vigorously to prevent 
the implementation of the Welgemoed Commission's recommendations (Zimmerman, 
1988). In addition some members of government were also opposed to the 
recommendations, instead being in favour of the ' ... move away from regulation and 
protection of vested interests and to free the industry of entry restrictions' (McCaul, 
1990:vii). It therefore appeared that the recommendations made by the Commission were 
about to be discarded. Postponing the decision to tum the report by the Commission into 
formal legislation (Rapp, 1993), the government opted to wait for the recommendations 
made by the National Transport Policy Study (NTPS). 
2.4 The NTPS. the Competition Board and the White Paper on 
National Transport Policy 
The National Transport Policy Study (NTPS), established in 1982, was aimed at 











This was an open inquiry responsive to a broader range of 
interests than the Welgemoed Commission, and it investigated 
transport in terms of general trends in government policy 
(McCaul, 1990:vii). 
The NTPS, operating through advisory committees, not only included the Southern 
Africa Bus Operators' Association in the Study, but it also included SABTA (Fieldwick 
and Cadle, 1992). This marked one of the first occasions that government acknowledged 
the importance of minibus-taxis in the transport sector. The recommendations of the 
NTPS report of 1986 were less harsh on the taxi industry. The Study recommended 
mainly that restricted and phased deregulation occur (Ferreira, t 992). Included in the 
recommendations with specific regard to taxi operations, were the following: 
• 16 seater taxis should be allowed to operate legally with 15 
passengers; 
• the minimum number of taxis each Regional Services Council 
(RSC) could allow was to be determined by central 
government; 
• each RSC should control the number of taxis by means of a 
quota system, taking into consideration existing road space and 
the availability of facilities; 
• a Road Transport Quality System (RTQS), for ensuring that 
safety standards were not jeopardised through deregulation, was 
to be implemented (Ferreira, 1992; Vorster and Britz, 1994). 
In March 1986, the Minister of Transport announced that the Department of Transport 
and the NTPS steering Committee, as well as other interested parties were drafting a 











At approximately the same time the NTPS was in progress, government called on the 
Competition Board to investigate 'pirate taxis' in the taxi industry. Upon conclusion of 
this investigation, the Board found that the existence of pirate taxis highlighted the fact 
that the permit system was not working and that entry into the market by illegal operators 
could not be controlled through regulation (Ferreira, 1992). Recognising the inevitability 
of the existence of pirate taxis in the industry, the Competition Board proposed complete 
deregulation of the industry (McCaul, 1990). 
SABT A was fiercely opposed to the recommendations made by the Competition Board, 
recognising that the opening of the industry'S doors to new entrants would seriously 
threaten the industry's economic viability (Race Relations Survey, 1989/90). SABTA 
accused the government of not only deliberately wanting to weaken the industry through 
its deregulation policy, but also of wanting to influence the leadership of the Association 
(Ferreira, 1992). Another concern SABTA had with regard to the deregulation process 
was the increase of white ownership in the taxi industry (Servas and Miller, 1992)2. 
SABT A feared that the gains of black entrepreneurs would be lost if they had to compete 
with better financed, better educated and better business skilled rivals, who as it was seen 
by SABT A, would manipulate the industry in their favour. The recommendations by the 
Competition Board were however appealing to government, and complete deregulation 
became the policy of choice, in place of the restrictive, phased deregulation as was 
proposed by the NTPS. The White Paper on National Transport Policy was subsequently 
2 The issue of white ownership in the minibus~taxi industry was a hotly debated topic with SABT A arguing 
in 1989 that 50% of the market belonged to whites. According to the Central Statistical Service (CSS), 
more whites than blacks bought taxis, with new registered taxis in 1989 totalling 786, 386 were said to be 
registered by whites while only 68 had been registered by blacks. And with used taxis registered totalling 
1152, only 368 were allegedly registered by Africans, while 624 were said to be registered by whites (cited 
in Race Relations Survey, 1988/89). While SABT A continued to estimate white participation in the 
industry in an ownership capacity to be between 50% of the entire industry to about 30% in certain areas, 











approved by Cabinet in November 1986 and published and presented in January of the 
following year (cited in Smith et aI, 1994). As Bassier (1989) explains, it ~ucceeded in 
adding tremendous force to the growth and development of the minibus~taxi industry in 
the country, with an almost overnight change from a taxi with a carrying capacity of 
eight passengers to the present fifteen passenger taxi. The White Paper on National 
Transport Policy mainly suggested: 
• the devolution of power to the lowest levels of government; 
• the furtherance of private initiative; and 
• the removal of regulatory constraints which prevented free 
competition (White Paper, 1987). 
SABTA however, having been involved in the NTPS inquiry and agreeing with and 
supporting the recommendations made by the NTPS, was not supportive of this White 
Paper which now included the recommendations made by the Competition Board. This 
led to a resurfacing of antagonistic relationships between the government and the taxi 
industry. A compromise of sorts was reached by the government and SABTA in 1989, 
allowing for a three year transitional period during which the distribution of permits 
would be restricted, illegal taxis would be made legal, and Local Taxi Liaison 
Committees (LTLC's) would be established in metropolitan areas to deal with issues 
regarding the taxi industry at local level (Ferreira, 1992). This was so that the industry 
would be able to adapt to the deregulation process. But, as will be seen, the industry has 












The South African government's acceptance of the deregulation process, should be seen 
in light of the developments that were occurring both internationally and within the 
borders of South Africa with regard to economic growth and development, and effective 
competition. A key issue that came into play in the South African context with regard to 
deregulation was the political climate in the country. The 1976 and 1977 rebellions in 
the townships made it clear - to both the government and the business sector - that reform 
was required to prevent further unrest and political instability (Argue, Van Waldbeeck, 
Green and Pretorius, 1992). However, to get a clear understanding of what is meant by 
deregulation and especially deregulation of transport, there must first be an 
understanding of what regulation, and for the purposes of this research, transport 
regulation, meant in a South African context. 
2.5.1 Governmental re{iulation of transport under apartheid 
As was shown earlier in this chapter, until the decision for deregulation was made, the 
public transport system was a highly regulated system. Dugard (2001:8) argues that the 
regulations were used by the apartheid government as a means of enforcing racial 
segregation of transport and ' ... to protect the near-monopoly held by the South African 
Transport Services (SATS), which incorporated railways and, through a complex subsidy 
system, the emerging bus industry.' According to Browning and Smith (cited in 
Competition Board, 1986), there are three types of transport regulation namely, 
technical; traffic and trade regulation. They argue that technical regulation deals with 
issues such as road safety and driver competence, whereas traffic regulation deals with 











applied to taxis in tenns of the Road Transportation Act of 1977, as trade regulation, 
since this type of regulation was aimed at protecting the rail and bus transport modes 
from competition and in effect restricted the entry of taxis into the market. Essentially 
then the taxi industry was • ... burdened by a system of restriction and regulation' 
(Competition Board, 1986:3), a system that was based on race discrimination against 
black people and in favour of white people. The government thus played a major role in 
the transport system through • ... direct participation, subsidisation and regulation' 
(Competition Board, 1986:2). 
Despite this strict regulation however, the illegal entry of taxi operators into the transport 
market could not be stopped. In 1986 the Competition Board cited that there existed 
approximately 20 000 to 25 000 licensed taxi operators, and between 30 000 and 90 000 
unlicensed operators on South African roads. Stated the Board (1987:7): 
An overregulated system will not prevent entry by "illegal" 
taxi owners - only make criminals of them. If the demand is 
there, experience teaches that entry will occur despite 
restrictive overregulation. 
Thus the growth of the taxi industry, despite restrictive regulations, had a major impact 
on the profitability of the buses and trains, the very modes of transport the restrictive 
regulations were meant to protect. Consequently the social and economic costs associated 
with continuous attempts to protect these modes against competition, coupled with the 
increasing demand for subsidies to counter the negative impact the growth of the taxi 
industry had on profitability of buses and trains, forced the South African government to 
review its stance with regard to transport regulation (Ferreira, 1992). According to 











deregulation of the economy and the privatisation of state assets. The government was 
looking for new ways to ensure economic growth in the country compelled by not only 
the impact of economic stagnation, the spiralling unemployment in the country, inflation, 
and fiscal bankruptcy, but also the political crises that was arising from a sustained 
assertiveness of the black working class (Miller, 1990). 
The political uprisings which started in Soweto in 1976 and which spilled over into the 
following year, coupled with fears that the continued intervention by government in the 
transport sector would result in both heightened politicisation and sustained bus and train 
boycotts by blacks (cited in Dugard, 2001), led to the establishment of a Commission of 
Inquiry into deregulation in the transport sector. The Commission, the Van Breda 
Commission of Inquiry into the Road Transportation Bill, 'reflected the growing 
realisation that passenger transport was an unattractive government investment due to its 
escalating politicisation and economic inefficiency' (Dugard, 2001:9). However, 
deregulation of the transport sector would only occur ten years later. 
International experiences influenced developments in South Africa. In the United States, 
the positive relationship between small business development and economic development 
emerged by showing that small business proved to be the main source of employment 
opportunities and job creation (Tager, 1988). Many therefore argued that economic 
development in South Africa was closely linked to the emergence of small business and 
that the informal black business sector would be a major source for future developmenf. 
Taking this into account, it then became of vital importance for the informal black sector 
to be legitimised so that it could be more fully developed. Tager (1988:7) argued that the 
3 By 'informal' sector it was meant that business activities were being conducted ' ... without the requisite 











environment for such development would then have to be, ' ... relatively free from the 
many regulations and administrative burdens ... ' thus facilitating the transition from the 
informal sector to the formal sector. The minibus-taxi industry was one of the areas 
identified where such development would be possible. 
A thriving business in the 1980s, Tager (1988) explains that the industry could only 
claim one third of the then approximately 120 000 taxis in the country as being part of 
the formal sector. The other two thirds were unlicensed and thus operated in the informal 
sector. This informal sector however, had a very positive impact on the economy of the 
country in that it affected the sale of petrol, tyres and spare parts and the panel beating 
industry, generating millions of Rands of business. Removing the restrictions of entry 
into the taxi industry, which in reality were ineffectual anyway, would therefore 
stimulate economic growth and development through the participation of many more 
black people in the economy (Tager, 1988). It would also result in free competition. The 
recommendation by the Competition Board that these entry restrictions imposed by the 
Road Transportation Act of 1977 be abolished, since their practical consequences were 
not consistent with the government's broader policy of deregulation, was therefore 
accepted by the government who now had the furthering of private initiative and 
effective competition as the cornerstone of their strategy (Competition Board, 1986). 
2.5.2 Deregulation of the South African Transport Sector 
The policy of deregulation has its roots in the Report of the Committee for Economic 
Affairs of the President's Council published in 1985 and titled, 'A Strategy for Small 











argues that the report recognised the extent to which the discriminatory laws in the 
country restricted the participation of the black business community in the economy. 
Deregulation therefore, was to begin with the repeal of legislation which ' ... applied 
different measures or standards to businessman on the basis of race' (Tager, 1988:2). In 
1986, a formal framework for the deregulation policy was contained in a Cabinet 
decision. The framework, issued in a news release on July 2, indicated the basic policy 
objectives. It specified the management of the deregulation process and identified 
particular problematic areas. Two key issues emerging under the 'management of 
deregulation policy' were that the Competition Board was to be given the responsibility 
of ' ... conducting investigations into specific priority areas for deregulation', and that 
Departments and Regulatory Agencies were to critically assess ' ... existing and proposed 
new regulation ... ' and determine ways of reconciling such regulation with the 
deregulation policy goals (Competition Board, 1987: 1). The licensing of taxis in the 
black taxi industry was one of the areas 'earmarked' for attention with regard to the 
proposed deregulation policy (Tager, 1988). 
Deregulation was not intended to mean 'no regulation' (Competition Board, 1987). The 
process of deregulation essentially involved the redesigning of the system of regulation 
with a view to simplicity where only 'clearly justified restrictions' were left in place or 
introduced (Competition Board, 1987). The regulations would then promote economic 
growth and development, instead of inhibiting it. Deregulation was therefore to be seen 
as ' ... the mechanism to cure unemployment and stimulate economic development' 
(Tager, 1988:2). Furthermore, the deregulation programme would significantly reduce 
the role the government had played in the lives of black people in the country. This 











Control Act of 1986 which restricted the movements of black people, and the Group 
Areas Act which prohibited black people from operating in white Central Business 
Districts as well as ' ... competing with white businesses in white residential areas' (May 
and Schacter, 1991 :53). The process of deregulation thus involved the removal of racial 
provisions in the law and the dismantling of socio-economic apartheid (Tager, 1988). 
Therefore, as Tager argued, the history of apartheid in South Africa made the 
deregulation policy ' ... more meaningful, more complicated, far reaching and very much 
more important than deregulation in other parts of the world' (1988:2). For Dugard 
(2001:8) however, the implementation of deregulation in the transport sector was not 
only ' ... a means of strengthening the economy by giving enough blacks a stake in the 
system to dilute the revolutionary climate', but also at the same time it was a way for the 
apartheid government ' ... to complement its political strategy of destabilisation: the 
economic stratification of black society in the open market. ' 
2.5.3 The effects of derelmlation on the minibus-taxi industry 
Almost immediately following the White Paper of 1987, there was a dramatic rise in the 
issuing of permits by the Local Road Transportation Boards (LRTB's), from 3 752 in 
1985/86, to 16 800 in 1986/87, and 39 604 in 1987/88 (Ferreira, 1992). Permits were 
handed out indiscriminately since, as Dugard (in Steinberg, 2001) explains, permit 
enforcement following the deregulation process, ceased to be a priority. Transport 
authorities thus failed to curb the growth and development of the industry. 
By the end of 1987 the uncontrolled influx of new taxis was causing enormous problems 











competing with the bus industry, to members within the industry now competing with 
each other. The growth of the number of operators on the road immediately resulted in 
the market being flooded, causing a rapid decline in profitability in the industry. This 
then further resulted in a deterioration of operating standards since in order to save 
money, many operators resorted to unsafe and cheap methods of maintaining their 
vehicles (Ferreira, 1992). The lack of proper maintenance led to an increase in 
unroadworthy vehicles operating on South African roads and has resulted in the existing 
fleet being a 'serious safety hazard which imposes significant costs on the country' 
(Statement by Minister of Transport, 23 June, 1999). Unroadworthy minibuses are often 
involved in accidents with high fatality and injury rates. 
With the rapid increase of operators in the taxi industry and the absence of effective state 
regulation, groups of operators joined together and attempted regulatory measures 
themselves. Forming local taxi associations, these operators started regulating loading 
practices and prices. As competition for lucrative routes intensified as more operators 
started plying the same routes, more and more taxi associations began emerging. As 
Dugard (2001) explains, it was not long before these associations began using their 
organisational strength to extract income from the industry through the use of violence. 
Law enforcement agencies failed to properly address and curb the conflicts which were 
soon on the increase. For Dugard (2001), this failure by the police to positively intervene 
in and resolve the issue of taxi violence during the apartheid era, was so widespread that 
it suggested a deliberate strategy on their part. 
At best, police behaviour during the late-apartheid period 
was negligent, ... At worst, police used their authority to 
promote rifts between associations, resulting in widespread 











tenns of the broader political agenda of destabilising and 
dividing black communities and undennining the ANC 
(Dugard, 2001: 12). 
Thus, with the expansion of taxi associations around the country, and the absence of 
effective and efficient law enforcement, taxi wars between associations were soon on the 
increase, as associations which had been established for some time did not welcome the 
intrusion of the newly established associations on what they considered to be 'their' turf. 
Chaos soon reigned in the taxi industry leading it into a conflict and violence riddled 
1990s, an era that saw many innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire of the many 
bloody battles. It had become very clear that the deregulation policies had an extremely 
negative effect on the minibus-taxi industry. Free competition and economic 
development as envisaged prior to the implementation of deregulation, never 
materialised. Instead, the once flourishing taxi industry became an industry where 
violence and intimidation were the methods employed to maintain or improve economic 
standing. The next chapter will deal with the instability in the taxi industry with 
particular attention being paid to the Western Cape, the scene of many taxi wars. There 
emerges a tangled web of conflict, corruption and murder in an industry once regarded as 












CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN THE 
MINJBUS-TAXIINDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
According to Dressel and Neumann (2001:23), conflict is a natural and unavoidable part 
of human interaction. They describe it as 'a process during which two or more conflicting 
parties come into opposition over differences or perceived differences regarding 
positions, interests, values or needs.' Laue (1991, quoted in Dressel and Neumann, 
2001:23) argues that in many cases the origins of conflict are found in the nonfulfillment 
of fundamental human needs, and that in such instances 'conflict may then be defined 
empirically as escalated natural competition of two or more parties who believe they 
have incompatible goals, and whose aim is to neutralise, injure, gain advantage over the 
other party or parties.' Laue further contends that struggles over values, identity, power 
and scarce resources are found to be at the heart of all social conflicts. 
For Dressel and Neumann (2001) conflict is a healthy expression of tensions or injustices 
in social systems. They argue that if conflict is viewed constructively it offers the 
opportunity for change and development. Meyer, Van der Merwe and Kawa (1986) 
believe that the problem does not lie in the presence of conflict, but in fact in the manner 











negative, destructive way, it may end in violence, the extreme manifestation of conflict' 
(quoted in Dressel and Neumann, 2001:22). 
In the overcrowded environment of the South African minibus-taxi industry, lack of 
proper law enforcement and intense competition for the limited number of lucrative 
routes saw conflicts between rival taxi associations ending in eruptions of violence. The 
violence has been characterised by fierce gun battles and bombings, which have resulted 
in many people being injured or killed. In the period leading up to South Africa's first 
democratic elections in 1994, incidents of violence in the taxi industry increased 
dramatically throughout the country and continued to rise following the elections. 
Political affiliations came to play a key role in the ongoing conflicts in many areas 
around the country, and there emerged instances during the clashes between taxi 
associations where assassins were hired to eliminate competitors. As the death toll, along 
with the number of injuries kept rising it soon became apparent that the taxi industry had 
spiralled out of control. 
Minnaar and Pretorius (1995b: 1) argue that the continuation of the conflict in the 
minibus-taxi industry points to not only ' ... deeply entrenched antagonisms but also to 
underlying problems .. .' which had not been addressed or resolved. These included the 
many accusations of corruption, false licences and permits, pirate taxi operators, an 
overcf(~wded market, the intense competition for lucrative routes and the increasing input 
costs, all of which threatened the taxi industry's viability. In this chapter the ongoing 
conflict in the minibus-taxi industry in the 19905 will be examined. Since the fieldwork 
section of this research is confined to the Cape Town area, particular attention is paid to 
the taxi wars in the Western Cape. This is followed by a discussion on conflict and 











a look at the response by the state to the instability in the minibus-taxi industry in the 
form of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry. The main causes of taxi violence as 
identified in the inquiry are examined, along with the recommendations with regard to 
addressing and resolving the problems within the taxi industry. 
3.2 The Western Cape Taxi Wars: 
A closer look at LAGUNY A~ WEBT As CODET A and CATA 
In the Western Cape in the early to mid 1980s, black people could only obtain a legal 
permit to operate a taxi if they qualified for residence rights in terms of Section 10 of the 
Urban Areas Act of 1945. Such a permit allowed taxis to operate in and between 
townships (Zille, 1992). Despite attempts by government to control the influx of people 
into the Western Cape, many flocked to the area, and being unable to work legally, they 
increasingly entered the pirate taxi industry. Since the growth of pirate taxis meant 
growth in competition for lucrative routes, tensions and hostilities quickly emerged 
between the legal operators and the burgeoning illegal industry. This set the stage for 
subsequent conflicts and the eruption of violence. The conflict in the Western Cape taxi 
industry in the early 1990s occurred mainly between two taxi associations, LAGUNY A 
and WEBTA. 
LAGUNY A, who took its name from the areas where all its business was conducted 
namely, Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga, was the first black taxi association in the 
Western Cape. Formed in 1952, and in line with the permits issued in terms of the Urban 
Areas Act, its taxis operated mainly within and between townships (Servas and Miller, 
1992). The pirate taxis that were growing steadily often operated outside the townships, 











LAGUNYA was not too concerned with the pirate operations because it was safer, from 
their point of view, to stay within the bounds of the law rather than risk losing their share 
of the market, especially since pirate operators if caught, often had their vehicles 
impounded and were subject to heavy fines. 
During the 1980s there were numerous attempts by pirate operators to become part of 
LAGUNY A, but they were almost always unsuccessful. The pirate taxis, bound together 
by their common resentment towards the legal taxi operators and the Traffic Department, 
in 1987 formed the Western Cape Black Taxi Association (WEBTA) (Zille, 1992). With 
deregulation occurring that same year, legalising WEBTA's operations became a top 
priority. Tensions started simmering between WEBTA and LAGUNYA as WEBTA 
threatened to upset the monopoly that LAGUNY A had over routes in the area (Dugard, 
2001). 
The decision to legalise taken in 1987 by the Department of Transport in conjunction 
with SABTA, brought with it a new route permit system. The new system would enable 
drivers to operate legally on the routes the pirates had already been utilising. Zille (1992) 
explains that when the decision to legalise the pirate operations was made, it was decided 
by then Minister of Transport, Mr. Eli Louw, in consultation with SABTA, that the 
pirates that had already been frequenting the new routes that were now to be made legal, 
would receive preferential treatment in the legalisation process. Essentially then WEBTA 
members were to receive the preferential treatment. Applications for permits for these 
new routes flooded the LRTB's and it soon became apparent to members within the 
industry that non-WEBTA members were not receiving access to these routes at alL 
Their permit applications were rejected at an alarming rate, whereas WEBT A applicants 











gone too far out of bounds. Not only were WEBT A members given these routes that 
they had before been operating on illegally, but the many non-WEBT A members whose 
permit applications were rejected, were not even given a time period within which to 
reapply or an explanation for why their permits were being virtually ignored (Zille, 
1992). The LRTB's came under constant fire for their permit distribution system and 
rumours of corruption soon emerged. 
One of the causes for the Western Cape 'taxi war' was 
rumours of widespread corruption within the Local Road 
and Transportation Boards. They were seen as siding with 
dominant associations in their areas, stoking violence 
between taxi operators by granting preferential licences to 
selected individuals or allowing only one association to ply 
a particular route (Torres and Minnaar, 1994:26). 
The LRTB's however defended their system, saying that many of the applications were 
completed incorrectly and therefore they were rejected. (Rapp, 1993). Tensions once 
again mounted as bitterness and resentment grew amongst members of LAGUNYA who 
felt that they should have been treated in a better manner since they were the ones who 
had for years operated in accordance with the laws of the Western Cape. 
The tables were thus turned. The former pirates who had for years operated illegally on 
lucrative routes now had the required documentation legalising their operations, while 
those who had abided by the rules were now being denied access to those routes, with the 
only way in which they could gain access being through illegal operations. This meant 
that they- would essentially become pirate operators. Tensions flared and a war erupted 
between LAGUNYA and WEBTA. It started with a shoot-out between operators from 










October 1990, and it intensified in 1991 when it escalated to include township residents. 
The events of 1991, as described by Dugard (2001) unfolded as follows. 
In early March 1991 the stage was yet again set for conflict as the Lingulethu West 
Town Council granted LAGUNYA a rank at Site C, Khayelitsha. WEBTA members 
came primarily from that area. Two taxis were burnt and shots were fired at several 
others as WEBTA and LAGUNY A operators openly clashed, accusing one another of 
stealing passengers. A peace agreement reached later in March failed to materialise 
following conflict in Khayelitsha that resulted in the death of a passenger. The conflict 
then escalated as in one incident in an attack at Nyanga terminus, 8 taxis were gutted and 
3 drivers were injured, and in another incident a taxi was hijacked and burnt. By mid 
March more than 12 people had been killed in taxi-related violence. Following a decisiQn 
by residents in Khayelitsha and Gugulethu to boycott taxis until the conflicts ended, 
several meetings were held between the two rival factions towards the end of March. 
Their efforts eventually led to the signing of the 'Ten Point Plan' in April 1991, which 
would be put in operation under the guidance of the Taxi Crisis Co-ordinating Committee 
(TCCC). 
The Ten Point Plan was a wide-ranging peace plan that 
dealt with agreements in principle for negotiations on 
routes, ranks, permits, fares, taxi ownership, law 
enforcement, monitoring mechanisms, and rank and queue 
marshals (Dugard, 2001:29). 
As a symbol of good faith and their commitment to the Ten Point Plan, both WEBTA 
and LAGUNY A consented to display a 'T' emblem on their taxis. However, shortly after 











The conflict resumed and continued despite the ongoing peace talks as both LAGUNY A 
and WEBT A failed to adhere to the route and rank allocations that were outlined in the 
Ten Point Plan. The situation intensified in June and July 1991 as members from the 
community were being drawn into the conflict following numerous violent attacks in 
Nyanga and Khayelitsha. Lives were once again lost and included among the dead were 
African National Congress (ANC) activist Mziwonke 'Pro' Jack, ANC Youth League 
official, Zola Ntsoni and Western Cape Civic Committee chair and member of the 
TCCC, Michael Mapongwana. Politics had come to be an important feature of the taxi 
wars. In July 1991, 10 000 residents from Khayelitsha marched to the police station 
demanding adequate policing and complaining that 'WEBTA assassins' were being used 
by the state to orchestrate the killings of ANC leaders (Dugard, 200 1:31). Allegations of 
police involvement and a 'Third Force' manipulating events in the taxi industry with the 
purpose of destabilising black communities soon emerged. In the months that followed 
the violence continued unabated despite numerous initiatives to find a peaceful 
resolution. Numerous shacks were burnt, property damage was widespread, damage to 
taxis amounted to more than RIm and hundreds of lives were lost (Race Relations 
Survey, 1991192; Dugard, 2001). In November 1991 it was announced that the Goldstone 
Commission of Inquiry would investigate the conflict and violence in the minibus-taxi 
industry in the Western Cape. In January 1992 the committee to conduct the investigation 
was appointed.4 
In May 1992, in an attempt to stabilise the taxi industry, the two associations, 
LAGUNY A and WEBTA came together and united to form the Congress of Democratic 
Taxi Associations (CODETA). This new association became the umbrella body for 











thirteen taxi associations (Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995a, 1995b). This attempt however, 
would also soon end in failure. 
Former WEBTA members were unhappy about certain conditions within the newly 
appointed body. The newly formed CODETA soon saw signs of strife, as members from 
the former WEBT A inquired after moneys that had belonged to the original members of 
WEBT A but which had never actually been distributed amongst them when the two 
associations merged. A vicious struggle ensued between the former WEBT A members 
and the leadership of CODETA and even after this particular issue had been resolved, the 
tensions remained (UMAC Second Quarterly Report, 1993). The former WEBTA 
members believed strongly that CODETA favoured LAGUNY A members and that the 
association had never really served their needs or interests (Dugard, 2001). It seemed 
impossible for the members of the associations to forget the old rivalries that had cost 
not only many lives, but also millions of Rands in damages to vehicles. To trust fellow 
members because the associations had now merged, proved too much of a task for many 
former WEBT A members. In October 1994, six months after the first democratic 
election, the inevitable split came when former WEBT A members broke away from 
CODETA and formed their own association called the Cape Amalgamated Taxi 
Association (CAT A). The break saw an almost immediate resurgence of the conflict as 
the newly formed CATA ' .. .launched a violent bid for routes, ranks and local association 











3.2.1 Political Affiliations 
Minnaar and Pretorius (1995b: 11) argue that the 1994 taxi conflict flared up under the 
guise of new taxi associations and political groupings, as the conflict was not only an 
extension of old local political rivalries which originated from squatter areas such as 
Crossroads near Cape Town, but also a restart of the early 1990s taxi war in the Western 
Cape between LAGUNY A and WEBT A. As they explain, the 1994 taxi conflict that 
occurred between CODETA and CATA was linked to the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO) and the Western Cape United Squatters Association 
(WECUSA). 
Both SANCO and WECUSA were aligned to the ANC. Jeffrey Nongwe, the chairman of 
WECUSA was also the chair of the ANC branch of Section 4 of Crossroads, however 
both Nongwe and his cabinet were expelled from the ANC after being implicated in the 
'forced removals' ofpeople from Sections 1 and 2 of Crossroads during the period March 
to July 1993 which saw the deaths of 55 people. Itthen further emerged that Nongwe's 
cabinet had allegedly been involved in the Western Cape taxi wars in 1991 and 1992. 
With WECUSA and the SANCO branch in Old Crossroads involved in a territorial 
struggle, Nongwe made use of the members of the Balaclava gang, perhaps better known 
as the Big 8 gang, as his bodyguards. Members of this gang were historically linked to 
WEBTA and in October 1994 it was alleged that Nongwe and the Big 8 were responsible 
for the break of former WEBTA members from CODETA and the subsequent formation 
of CAT A. Since some of the members of the newly formed CAT A were aligned to the 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), CODETA's affiliation to the ANC was given as one of 
the main reasons for the splitS. Immediately following the break by CATA from 











COD ETA, there were a spate of attacks and revenge attacks resulting in many deaths and 
as Minnaar and Pretorius (1995a:22) argue, these taxi hostilities 'became inextricably 
linked to Mr. Nongwe's personal struggle for control of certain areas in Crossroads.' In 
addition, during the course of these attacks there yet again emerged suspicions that a 
'Third Force', independent of both associations was manipulating the situation. Some of 
the incidents that occurred subsequent to the suspicions being voiced, reinforced the 
notion that it was indeed possible that there was an elusive 'Third Force'. 
On 16 October 1994, following the killing of a CATA and Big 8 member, Sandile 
Nongwana, retaliation came when armed men opened gunfire at a SANCO rally held at 
Khayelitsha stadium. During the course of events 10 people were killed and 23 injured. 
(Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995b t A month long battle ensued and events, as described by 
Minnaar and Pretorius (1995a, 1995b), unfolded as follows. 
CODETA, refusing to acknowledge the legality of CATA, prevented them from gaining 
access to the newly opened Station Deck Taxi Rank in Cape Town. CAT A in turn 
obtained a temporary court interdict which then restrained CODET A from preventing 
them access to the new rank. The stand-off erupted into violence. On 29 October 1994, 
10 people were injured when a shoot-out broke out between members from the two rival 
associations. The Western Cape Provincial Government responded by having the police 
conduct random weapon checks at the rank and by establishing the Western Cape Task 
Team. The Task Team's call for the unification of the then more than 90 taxi associations 
in the Western Cape proved futile as the taxi wars continued. On 8 November 1994 after 
members of CATA managed to force CODETA members away from the Station Deck 











Taxi Rank, gunfire was exchanged at the Nyanga taxi rank resulting in the injury of 
several drivers. In the weeks following there was a rapid escalation of the violence: 
Roving hits quads ambushed and chased taxis, drivers were 
abducted and executed, commuters intimidated and shacks 
torched. Anyone even vaguely connected to the two 
warring taxi organisations became a potential target. 
(Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995a:22). 
A Peace Pact, agreed upon on 13 November 1994 and to be signed on 17 November 
1994, never materialised as attacks continued. This resulted in CATA's withdrawal from 
the process. Suspicions by the police soon surfaced that there was a third party 
manipulating CATA and CODETA and stoking the violence for their own ends. An 
incident later in the month would lend truth to this argument. On 21 November 1994, 
both CATA and CODETA received messages that tensions were brewing at the 
Claremont rank and that their members were under threat. Both associations rushed to 
the rank and yet again gunfire was exchanged resulting in 2 people being injured and 9 
taxis being damaged. The notion of a 'Third Force' was further reinforced when on 27 
November 1994 unknown gunmen opened fire on members of CATA and COD ETA 
simultaneously, killing 2 people and injuring 4. This incident led to tit-for-tat reprisals in 
which 7 people were killed within a 24-hour period (Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995a, 
1995b). Following this, a truce was finally agreed upon, but peace soon proved to be 
elusive. By the end of November 1994, after a month and a half long battle, 25 people 
had been killed and 165 injured in 99 incidents of taxi violence between CAT A and 
CODETA (Dugard, 2001). 
Incidences of taxi violence continued throughout 1995. An upsurge in violence in 1996 











National Taxi Task Team (NTTT).7 According to Dugard (2001:35) the proposals 
'exacerbated conflict between CATA and CODETA as CATA felt that it had to rapidly 
develop a power base in order to benefit from plans to re-organise the industry.' By the 
end of 1996, 80 people had been killed in taxi-related violence (Ahmed, 1999; Dugard, 
2001). The Western Cape Provincial Government and the newly elected Cape 
Metropolitan Council, in an attempt to respond to public demand, used their legislative 
powers to address the crisis in the taxi industry. As Dugard (2001:38) explains, 'the 
affected area was placed under a partial state of emergency and police and army 
reinforcements were called in to patrol the taxi ranks and routes.' Such law enforcement 
strategies however met with little success. The conflict between CATA and COD ETA 
continued throughout the year, resulting in still more deaths. 
3.2.2 Gang involvement 
Near the end of the 1990s the issue of gang involvement in the taxi conflicts surfaced. In 
January 1998 the Human Rights Committee suggested that the incidents of taxi conflict 
in the Western Cape could be related to the failure of some taxi operators to pay 
'protection money' to gangs. 
It is a known fact that many of the taxi operators on the 
Cape Flats are compelled to pay protection money to 
certain gangs, and it is possible that some of the violence is 
related to the non-payment of this money (Human Rights 
Committee, January, 1998:31). 











According to Dugard (2001: 15), it had became apparent that many of the CAT A drivers 
were gangsters who were using the taxi industry 'as a springboard for gang and drug-
related warfare.' The involvement of gangs in the taxi industry made the issue of taxi 
conflict and violence an even more complex and difficult one. As Dugard (2001:15) 
states: 
The combination of gangsterism and taxi violence, in an 
area renowned for violent gang warfare, is an explosive 
mix that has the potential to drive the taxi wars to new 
heights of violence. 
While the CAT A/CODETA feuds continued through the 1990s, violent conflict in the 
Western Cape minibus-taxi industry during this period was not restricted to conflicts 
between taxi associations. Conflicts also existed between taxi associations and the bus 
industry. 
3.2.3 The bus/taxi conflict 
The bus/taxi conflict, as examined by Minnaar and Pretorius (1995a, 1995b), dates back 
to 1993 when the Golden Arrow bus company extended its services in Khayelitsha while 
taxi operators were involved in blockades protesting the increase in the petrol price. Bus 
drivers soon found themselves the targets of harassment and attacks by taxi drivers who 
tried to prevent them from operating in Khayelitsha. Between September 1993 and 10 
February 1994, 3 Golden Arrow employees were killed while in a number of incidents 
bus drivers were shot at, passengers were intimidated and attempts were made to run 
buses off the road. The Western Cape Transport Forum held 'rogue elements' within 











negotiations between CODETA and bus compallles, an agreement was reached 
stipulating that buses could operate in Khayelitsha on condition that they ' ... stick to the 
designated bus routes and stopping points' (Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995b: 14). 
In early 2000 the bus/taxi conflict flared up again, resulting once more in violent attacks 
being carried out against the bus industry by members of the taxi industry. On 29 Maya 
Golden Arrow bus driver was 'shot and burnt to death in a firebombed bus, five 
commuters were injured in a shooting and an empty bus was gutted by fire' (Business 
Day, 30 May, 2000). In a statement issued on 19 April 2000, Transport Minister Dullah 
Omar called upon Golden Arrow and the two taxi associations CAT A and CODET A, to 
resolve their dispute. Said the Minister: 
We wish to call upon all parties involved to settle this 
dispute in the interest of peace and in the interest of all 
commuters who have been affected by this dispute. This 
situation cannot be allowed to continue because violence 
doesn't have any place in the future of our public passenger 
transport operations. 
This call for peace was not heard, and the conflict continued. 
In a meeting held on 15 June 2000 between the National and Provincial government and 
CATA and CODETA to discuss the conflict with the Golden Arrow bus company, 
National Government agreed to facilitate a meeting between the taxi industry and Golden 
Arrow (Statement by Minister of Transport, 23 June, 2000). However, despite talks of 
peace, more shootings occurred with more drivers and passengers being killed and 
injured. In a statement issued on 27 July 2000, the Minister of Transport condemned the 











to bring these faceless killers to justice'. He further called for the police elite unit, the 
'Scorpions', to intervene and conduct the investigation. The Deputy National Police 
Commissioner, Andre Pruis then announced that hundreds of police officers from other 
provinces around the country, including members from elite special task forces from 
Kwazulu-Natal and Pretoria were to be deployed in townships in Cape Town in an 
attempt to end taxi violence (Business Day, 2 August, 2000). Armoured vehicles, road 
closures and a 24-hour ban on road public transportation in Khayelitsha, were all to be 
put in place in a bid to· stabilise the situation. Meanwhile, Lennit Max, the Provincial 
Commissioner, announced a breakthrough in investigations, with the arrests of 9 people 
on 30 and 31 July. Amongst them were six people from Khayelitsha and a prominent 
gangster from Mitchell's Plain. They were arrested on charges of murder and attempted 
murder. Weapons and other ammunition were recovered in the process (Business Day, 2 
August, 2000). In a statement issued on 31 August 2000, the Transport Minister, 
'welcomed the steadily decreasing tensions surrounding the transport crisis in the 
Western Cape' . 
The Sunday Times Metro, on 28 January 2001, reported the story of how a 'former 
Urnkhonto weSizwe and South African National Defence Force member' was hired by 
members of the taxi industry to act as a hit-man during the height of the bus/taxi feud in 
the Cape Peninsula in mid-2000. The man, Bandile Botya was convicted and sentenced 
to 3 life terms for the murders of 3 people, 2 passengers and a bus driver. He received a 
further 75 years imprisonment for the attempted murder of 36 people and the illegal 
possession of an R4 rifle, 'ammunition and a hand grenade'. During his trial Botya 
revealed that he had expected to be paid R40 000 by 2 taxi operators, but instead he 











and Botya agreed to testify against them. It became apparent that members of the taxi 
industry had resorted to recruiting hired assassins to eliminate competitors who 
threatened the economic viability of the industry. The issue of 'hit-men' will be explored 
in more detail in the next section. 
3.3 Taxi conflicts around the country 
Taxi conflict and violence was not restricted to the Western Cape. Throughout the 1990s 
taxi violence showed signs of proliferation around the country. In the year leading up to 
the election in 1994 there was a dramatic increase in the number of deaths in taxi-related 
violence with the national figure increasing from 184 deaths in 1992, to 330 deaths in 
1993. This increase was attributed to the intensification of destabilisation of black 
communities in the run-up to the election (Dugard, 2001). In 1994 and 1995, while taxi 
violence continued around the country, the number of deaths related to it decreased from 
the 330 deaths in 1993, to 197 deaths in 1994 and 195 deaths in 1995. The decrease was 
regarded as being a result of the taxi industry undergoing' ... substantial re-organisation in 
response to the more permissive environment of the 'new' South Africa' (Dugard in 
Steinberg, 2001: 136). However, while political violence decreased following the 
election, taxi violence appeared to move in the opposite direction. Table 1 shows the 
number of deaths and injuries related to taxi violence that were recorded nationally from 
1991 to 1999. As is clear from the details contained in Table 1, taxi violence still 












NUMBER OF DEATHS AND INJURIES 
RELATED TO TAXI VIOLENCE: 1991-1999 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
DEATHS INJURIES 
1991 123 156 
1992 184 293 
1993 330 526 
1994 197 314 
1995 195 282 
1996 285 586 
1997 218 335 
11\1\0 291 343 
1~ 263 287 .1.,,/,,,,,, I 
(Statistics: South African Institute of Race Relations: South African Police Services) 
3.3.1 Mother bodies 
More recently the issue of mother bodies has been recognised in the debates regarding 
the taxi conflicts. Dugard (2001) contends that the 'real money' generated through the 
operations in the taxi industry is made by the executive members of mother bodies. As 
she explains: 
Mother bodies typically comprise loose alliances of local 
and long-distance taxi associations in a particular 
region ... Mother bodies are essentially historical constructs: 
supra-local taxi associations that, 'by virtue of throwing 











other players in the industry, as well as the government, as 
official (Dugard, 2001: 18). 
These mother bodies extract income and compliance from their members through the use 
of violence or the threat of violence. An estimate by the National Intelligence Agency 
(NIA) revealed that mother bodies earn over RlOO 000 monthly 'per local affiliated 
association' (Dugard in Steinberg, 2001:143). Dugard (2001) further argues that the 
moneys accumulated in this manner go directly into the pockets of the executive 
members of mother bodies since there exists no formal financial controls in the taxi 
industry. This means that there are usually no receipts, no audits and government 
taxation. Thus, in pursuit of this available fortune, hit-squads have come to playa key 
role in the violence in the taxi industry as they are often recruited by taxi associations 
with the purpose of eliminating competitors who 'threaten to adversely affect the flow of 
revenue to the mother bodies. Furthermore, as the means to accumulate these vast 
amounts of money lies in the control of a mother body, there has emerged vicious 
struggles often characterised by assassinations of leaders of mother bodies, and violent 
take-overs, to usurp leadership positions at the executive levels (Dugard in Steinberg, 
2001). 
3.3.2 The role of hit-men in taxi violence 
As events of taxi conflicts and violence began unfolding around the country, patterns 
started to emerge. According to Torres and Minnaar (1994), one of the first incidents 
where a hit-man was used in the violence in the taxi industry was reported in 1993 in 
Mamelodi near Pretoria where 5 people were killed at a taxi rank. The police also later 











attacks within the industry in the PretoriaiWitwatersrandiVereeniging (PWV) and 
Northern Transvaal area. Minnaar and Pretorius (1995b) argue that in Gauteng and the 
Northern Transvaal Regions the use of hired hit-men appeared to be more widespread 
than anywhere else in the country. In 1994 Gauteng police claimed that hit-men were 
being paid Rl 000 for the death of a passenger, R2 000 and R4 000 respectively for the 
deaths of a taxi driver and taxi owner, and up to R10 000 if the victim was a chairman of 
an opposing taxi association (cited in Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995b; Race Relations 
Survey, 1996/97). By the following year reports indicated that the prices had increased to 
R3 000 for a rival taxi driver, R9 000 for a rival taxi owner and up to R15 000 for the 
chairman of a rival taxi association (cited in Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995b). 
Any person who was willing to commit murder for money was considered a hit-man and 
as Minnaar and Pretorius (1995b:4) explain, operations of hit-men were well-planned 
and executed ambushes, where the targets would be killed 'in a hail of bullets', with the 
preferred weapon, an Ak-47. One of the features that emerged from the assassinations 
that were carried out by these hit-men was that while hit-men were often hired to kill 
specific individuals, innocent commuters and bystanders were often also killed in the 
crossfire. Areas like the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal soon followed the trend as 
more incidents of taxi violence involving hit-men began to emerge. 
Hit-men thus started featuring more prominently in taxi violence around the country. The 
Sowetan, in September 1995, said that it had in its possession confidential police 
documents showing that the anti-corruption unit of the SAPS had uncovered evidence 
that suggested that 'hit-squads' from neighbouring countries were brought in to assist 
taxi associations in the protection of lucrative routes (Race Relations Survey, 1995196). 











Mozambicans to carry out contract killings and that the foreigners were hired because 
they would be harder to trace than assassins hired locally (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 29 
May, (998). In January 2001, as was explained earlier, it was found that a hit-man had 
played a key role in the Western Cape bus/taxi conflict of 2000. 
3.3.3 Allegations of corruption within the SAPS 
As the conflict and violence in the minibus-taxi industry increased and the use of hired 
hit-men became more frequent, allegations of police involvement soon emerged (Dugard, 
2001). A common response by the SAPS to criticism about their failure to respond to 
taxi-related violence has been the lack of proper resources to police the industry. 
However, allegations of police corruption and complicity have been rife, since, as 
Dugard (2001) explains, it quickly became apparent that the authorities failed to act even 
after they had been furnished with details of hit-men and impending attacks. Speculation 
existed that members of the SAPS had stakes in the taxi industry and that it led them to 
either favour or victimise certain associations (Minnaar and Pretorius, 1995b). In 
addition, the Sowetan further reported (September 1995) that police documents 
revealed that nearly 200 members of the SAPS allegedly owned minibus-taxis (Race 
Relations Survey, 1995/96). In a report released in 2000 by a Commission established to 
investigate taxi violence in Gauteng, police officers in Pretoria were implicated in tales 
of corruption involving the taxi industry. Members of the SAPS were said to be releasing 
firearms, bullet proof vests and even police uniforms to be used by members of taxi 
associations in their attacks against rivals. The report further revealed that members of 
the SAPS actively participated in attacks against members of the taxi industry and that 











... there IS overwhelming evidence proving police 
complicity, collusion and/or corruption, and further, the 
commission of criminal offenses including those of 
defeating the ends of justice and the unlawful use of 
Government property In the cause of the taxi 
violence ... (The Final Report by the Commission of Enquiry 
into the causes of taxi violence and related unresolved 
deaths in Gauteng Province, 1999:14). 
Corruption within law enforcement agencies whose task it is to police the taxi industry, 
thus carne to playa very prominent role in the continuation of taxi conflict and violence. 
Taxi conflicts continued throughout the country despite numerous attempts to reach 
peace agreements. While there were areas in the country where events and patterns were 
peculiar to that area, there existed' ... enough of a congruence between causes to be able 
to say that the underlying dynamics are applicable in all the regions ... ' (Minnaar and 
Pretorius, 1995b:3). In the next section the causes of the taxi conflict and violence as 
identified by the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry will be examined. 
3.4 The Goldstone Commission of Inquiry: 
A review of the main causes of taxi violence 
Appointed on 24 October 1991 by the State President in terms of Section 3 of the 
Prevention of Violence and Intimidation Act 1991 (Act 139 of 1991), the Goldstone 
Commission of Inquiry was an independent body with the primary function of directing 
and co-ordinating the gathering of facts with regard to public violence and intimidation in 
South Africa (Goldstone Commission, 1992). A fourth committee of the commission was 











the public transport system in the country. The establishment of this committee was seen 
as a direct result of the ongoing taxi wars. The committee was to determine the nature, 
causes and aims of the violence in the industry, along with identifYing the persons 
directly involved in the instigation or the perpetration of the violence (Goldstone, 1992). 
Recommendations were then to be made with regard to addressing the problems within 
the industry which appear to be causing the instability in the taxi industry. Seven reports 
by the committee to the commission followed, each focusing on a different area in the 
country where taxi violence was widespread. The First Interim report presented in May 
1992, focused specifically on conflicts between WEBTA and LAGUNYA in the Western 
Cape. The Second report dated July 1992, focused on taxi violence in Ivory Park in the 
Midrand area. The Third (November 1992) and Fourth (February 1993) reports focused 
on taxi related violence in Alexandra, Johannesburg and Groblersdal, respectively. The 
Sixth report (July 1994) dealt with the taxi crisis in King William's Town, while the 
Seventh report (August 1994) focused on Queenstown. What these reports revealed was 
that the struggle for economic survival had come to play a key role in the instability in 
the minibus-taxi industry. 
The Fifth Interim Report presented to the commission was a comprehensive document 
detailing the main causes of the conflict and violence in the taxi industry. Following 
numerous sessions at various venues around the country where evidence that related to 
taxi violence was heard, the committee found that although there existed factors or 
circumstances which were peculiar to each specific area, the root causes of the violence 
in the minibus-taxi industry, in all the areas, showed discernible similarities (Fifth 











which were found to be applicable to all the feuds that were occurring within the taxi 
industry throughout the country. In sequence they were as follows: 
1. The effect of apartheid laws on urbanisation; 
2. Commercial factors; 
3. The role of the Department of Transport; 
4. Lack of law enforcement; 
5. The absence of facilities; 
6. Intolerance and Power struggles. 
3.4.1 The effect of the apartheid laws on urbanisation 
The findings of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry revealed that the instability in the 
taxi industry is a direct result of the impact the apartheid laws and policies had on the 
urbanisation patterns in the country. The development of the industry, both its legal and 
illegal sectors, and the subsequent tensions that emerged between the two were attributed 
to the divisions that emerged between people during the apartheid era. The legal taxi 
operators, those operating with the required permits, transported blacks who were legally 
housed in the townships because they had been granted Section 10 rights. However 
government could not stem the influx of immigrants from the tribal homelands who 
housed themselves in informal settlements illegally. Thus 'because they received no legal 
recognition by the authorities, no permits were issued to minibus-taxi operators to 
transport them'(Fifth Interim Report, 1993:19). Transport was still a necessity though 











The very existence of a band of taxi operators operating 
virtually upon their doorstep without any semblance of 
legality and providing stiff competition for passengers 
whose means and choices were limited by their own 
deprivation, proved to be the touchstone of conflict in 
virtually every metropolitan area. The 'haves' were thrust 
upon their resources to protect what they regarded as their 
hard-earned domain against the free-wheeling onslaught 
from the 'have-nots' (Fifth Interim Report, 1993: 19). 
3.4.2 CQmmercial Factors 
The struggle to control key resources which can accelerate 
the process of capital accumulation in the taxi business 
emerges as a cardinal feature in the origins and operation of 
taxi-related violence. The conflict appears to be largely 
economic in origin, although it operates in the structural 
and legislative context created by the state (Khosa, 
1991:250-251). 
Following the implementation of the deregulation policy in the transport sector, the taxi 
industry, once a profitable enterprise for the 'pioneering black entrepreneurs' (Fifth 
Interim Report, 1993:20), became overcrowded resulting in a decline in profitability. 
Other contributing factors influencing the economic viability of the industry included the 
increase in price for minibuses, fuel, spare parts and insurance (Fifth Interim Report, 
1993). In addition, it was argued that 'the overall cost, in terms of time and money, to 
obtain a permit to operate a taxi could in itself serve as a deterrent and may influence a 
prospective operator in his decision whether or not to operate legally' (Fifth Interim 











The Goldstone Commission Report further revealed that few members within the taxi 
industry possessed the business skills to understand and analyse factors that influence the 
industry and therefore they were unable to comprehend that competition was beneficial 
to everyone, instead dealing with competition by eliminating it, often through the use of 
violence. Browning (1989: 135) argued that discussions with drivers showed that' ... the 
very nature of business - the investment of capital in order to provide a profit and 
therefore a return on the capital - is not understood', and further stated that the aggressive 
and violent manner in which taxi industry members often react when they are confronted 
with a threatening situation, is an indication that they lack the skills to react in any other 
manner that is more peaceable. As he explains: 
When frustration builds up because of poor economIC 
returns and the inability to pay such things as the monthly 
instalment on the vehicle, the result is quite likely to be 
aggression against newcomers (Browning, 1989: 136). 
Another, somewhat more sensitive issue is that of subsidies, with the buses and trains 
being heavily subsidised by the government while the taxi industry has been struggling to 
survive on its own economically. This has greatly impacted on the fare structure of the 
taxi operators in that in order to compete with the buses, operators have to 'charge an 
unrealistic fare based on considerations bearing little relationship to his own expenses' 
(Fifth Interim Report, 1993:23). Inflation is virtually ignored as the black commuter's 
needs are taken into consideration resulting in taxi fares often remaining the same for 
years on end. Thus, with the saturation of the taxi industry which resulted from the 
' ... uncontrolled influx of new entrant operators ... ' (Argue, Pretorius, Green, Moss and 
Sonderling, 1993 :viii), competition for lucrative routes intensified and operators 











Soon taxi associations, who because of their size were able to wield power to protect 
their members, frequently employed violent methods to attack competitors (Fifth Interim 
Report, 1993), to ensure that their share of the market was not threatened. As Torres and 
Minnaar (1994:28) explain: 
Since lucrative routes are the core of a successful minibus 
taxi operation, rival owners have increasingly resorted to 
violence to 'eliminate' competitors. 
The competition is for passengers and Evans and Cook (1985) argued that it was at a 
specific time during the daily routine of taxi driving that competition for passengers was 
at its highest. 
For the kombi driver, especially those paid on a 
commission basis, operating during peak periods is to his 
advantage, given high frequency of full trips associated 
with this demand period ... During the off peak midday 
period, given the cost of petrol and the low commuting 
demand, it often pays the driver to wait at the rank for 
potential passengers rather than cruise in search of them 
(Evans and Cook, 1985:5). 
Therefore, in the competitive environment of the taxi industry 'protecting one's territory' 
has become crucial, as newcomers threaten to deplete the already scarce resources 
(Kgosimore, 1995). Established taxi operators would go to any lengths to ensure that 
their territory is not invaded and their already meagre profit margins threatened. Violence 
is thus strongly linked to economic survival as whoever is able to utilise violence in a 











3.4.3 The role of the Department of Transport 
In the Goldstone Commission findings it was concluded that the conduct of the 
Department of Transport and the LRTB's has contributed to the conflict and violence in 
the minibus-taxi industry. Furthennore, it was found that nothing positive was done on 
their part' ... to contain the violence Of to mediate between warring groups to bring about 
peace' (Fifth Interim Report, 1993:25). Accusations against the Department of Transport 
policies and officials included allegations of corruption and favouritism, the issuing of 
pennits without consistently applying the prescribed criteria, the failure to provide 
adequate reasons for refusing pennit applications and continued issuing of penn its even 
after it became clear that the market was overcrowded (Fifth Interim Report, 1993). The 
report further stated that the LRTB's had not adequately anticipated the problems that 
would arise as a result of their pennit policy. The lack of communication and 
transparency in the pennit allocation process was considered to be a contributing factor 
to not only the tension between rival taxi associations, but also between the LRTB's and 
the members of the taxi industry. Thus, the lack of forward planning and the lack of 
strategy to deal effectively and efficiently with an industry they had before not regarded 
as legitimate, were considered as the main reasons why the Department of Transport 
appeared unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with an industry they had in fact helped to 
create. 
3.4.4 Lack of Law Enforcement 
The lack of control Of defects of regulation that exists in the taxi industry is directly 
related to the lack of proper law enforcement strategies. Policies aimed at dealing with 











unto themselves, and with the purpose of bringing order to the industry, meet with 
failure if the necessary policing does not accompany it (Fifth Interim Report, 1993). In 
evidence revealed in the inquiry it was found that where 'a concerted effort with 
sufficient manpower and facilities was launched to address the violence an immediate 
positive result ensued' (Fifth Interim Report, 1993:42). Overall though the report showed 
that law enforcement agencies were either unable or unwilling to properly enforce the 
law, and that this resulted in not only pirates benefiting from the lack of law enforcement, 
but also all other criminals who break the law. Said the report: 
This brings law enforcers into disrepute leading ordinary 
citizens to doubt the efficacy of the whole system of 
control, including the legal system( 1993:44). 
3.4.5 The absence of facilities 
The absence or inadequacy of ranking space in an industry where competition for 
passengers who congregate in certain areas is fierce, easily causes tempers to flare (Fifth 
Interim Report, 1993). In the Goldstone Commission investigations the following 
problems at ranks were identified in various areas or towns around the country: 
• overcrowding at ranks during peak hours; 
• the absence or inadequacy of toilets and shelters; 
• lack of adequate control by marshals which often resulted in 
jostling for position, queue jumping and favouring of one taxi 
operator above another; 
• the intimidation and poaching of passengers; 











• members from one taxi association unlawfully attempting to 
stop members of rival associations from using the ranks (Fifth 
Interim Report, 1993). 
When deregulation of the taxi industry came into effect and brought with it an increase in 
the utilisation of various routes, including new routes that were before considered illegal 
if operated on, facilities were needed by the industry for the purposes of loading, off-
loading, parking and holding activities. That these facilities were not provided, was as a 
result of ' ... tardiness on the part of those municipal authorities to give adequate 
recognition to the place of the minibus industry in the firmament of trade and business' 
(Fifth Interim Report, 1993:45). The Goldstone investigation revealed that in the majority 
of towns no or grossly inadequate facilities existed. The lack of adequate facilities has led 
to fierce competition for existing facilities as conflicts exist concerning who controls the 
facilities and who is allowed to use them. 
3.4.6 Intolerance and Power Struggles 
In the Goldstone Commission report it became clear that blame for the eruption of 
violence in the taxi industry is also to be placed with the taxi operators themselves (Fifth 
Interim Report, 1993). Evidence brought to the committee suggested pervasive 
intolerance, selfishness, greed and provocation. Furthermore, operators seldom took 
responsibility for their role in conflicts, instead placing blame on members of rival 
associations or the LRTB's who they regarded as corrupt and showing favouritism to 
their competitors. Selfishness and greed were found to be the foundations of power 
struggles throughout the taxi industry and it was further discovered' ... that a collective 











that they could impose their will on others by the use of violent means'- (Fifth Interim 
Report, 1993:49). As many members within the industry refused to bend to the will of 
others, specifically the wills of their rivals, attacks, followed by counter attacks emerged 
as the pattern of taxi wars. 
The Goldstone Commission of Inquiry succeeded in identifying a number of contributory 
causes of conflict and violence in the minibus-taxi industry. The findings showed a 
complex interplay between the legacies of apartheid and the inadequacies of the state, 
evident in its weak regulatory capacity and its internal corruption. The Inquiry however, 
failed to acknowledge the role that politics played in the taxi conflict. It was argued that 
political affiliations and political rivalry did not feature prominently in the instability in 
the taxi industry. Dugard (2001) regards this finding as a 'miscarriage of justice' as there 
existed overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In the Western Cape in particular, as was 
shown by Minnaar and Pretorius (1995), [examined in section 3.2.1], political affiliations 
came to playa key role in the taxi conflicts. 
3.5 The recommendations from the Goldstone Commission 
The Goldstone Commission's committee investigating public violence and intimidation 
in the minibus-taxi industry, having identified what they believed to be the main causes 
of taxi violence, made the following recommendations regarding the taxi industry: 
• that deregulation in the taxi industry should not occur for the 
foreseeable future; 
• that there be restructuring of the regulatory system so that 











obligations of taxi operators who function within the system, 
and that the taxi industry itself should be directly involved in 
establishing the framework of the regulatory system; 
• that direct subsidisation be avoided for the future, but that 
indirect subsidies from the private sector, particularly with 
regard to the improvement of facilities, be considered; 
• that all representative organisations in the industry from local, 
regional and national levels be identified and participate fully in 
the consultation process with regard to the formulation of local, 
regional and national transport policies. In the report it was 
further stated that government should not attempt to identify 
anyone association as representative of the entire taxi industry 
as evidence revealed during the inquiry tended to show that 
national associations were strong in some areas, but weak in 
others; 
• that training facilities be made available for members in the taxi 
industry; 
• that local authorities and local taxi associations, as a matter of 
urgency, discuss and implement ways of improving the ranking 
facilities in the taxi industry; 
• that the functions previously performed by the inspectors from 
the Department of Transport be transferred to local authorities, 
in particular the traffic police; 
• that every local authority appoint at least one person to liaise 
with both local taxi associations and community leaders; and 
• that dispute resolution and mediation mechanisms with 
representatives from all interested parties at all levels be put in 











The Goldstone Commission's investigation ,provided the government with a detailed 
description and analysis of the conditions and systemic problems facing the taxi industry. 
The government further had a set of recommendations for what could be done to rid the 
industry of some of its main problems. 
Conflict and violence in the taxi industry existed during the latter years of the apartheid 
regime and continued right through the transition to a democratic government. The 
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry revealed the condition the minibus-taxi industry was 
in prior to the 1994 democratic elections. In the next chapter, the focus will be on the 
manner in which the government, post-1994, has attempted to resolve the crisis in the 
taxi industry through the formation of the National Taxi Task Team and the introduction 












THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO 
THE CRISIS IN THE MINIBUS-TAXI INDUSTRY POST-1994 
4.1 Introduction 
A key initiative to stabilise the minibus-taxi industry has been the formation of the 
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) in 1995. Based on its final recommendations presented 
in 1996, the government proceeded to develop a strategy to restructure, formalise and 
regulate the taxi industry. This strategy, known as the Recapitalisation Programme, and 
government's attempts to implement the programme has elicited fierce opposition from 
members within the taxi industry. In this chapter the NTTT's final recommendations and 
the Recapitalisation Programme will be examined in detail. By way of conclusion the 
reactions of the taxi industry to such governmental attempts at restructuring the industry 
will be discussed briefly. 
4.2 The National Taxi Task Team 
In late 1994, then Minister of Transport, Mac Maharaj, in an attempt to address issues 











November 1994, at a Minister's Council on Transport (MINCOM)8 meeting, this "taxi 
process" was' ... adopted as Government's proposal to begin a consultative programme to 
involve the role-players from the industry in finding lasting and sustainable solutions' to 
the problems within the taxi industry (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996: 1). In 1995 
taxi representatives from each of the nine provinces, as well as government officials from 
an tiers of government, came together at a National Taxi Workshop to decide the way 
forward to solving the crisis in the taxi industry. This workshop was convened on 
March 18, 1995 and marked the first time that representatives from all concerned parties 
came to address issues together (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996). The result of this 
workshop was the formation of the National Taxi Task Team in April 1995. The team 
consisted of nine taxi representatives, one from each of the provinces, nine government 
representatives across all tiers of government and a group of specialist advisors who were 
appointed jointly at the first meeting. Dipak Patel was chairman of this task team. The 
Mission statement of the NTTT was as follows: 
To investigate the problems and issues within the taxi 
industry and to formulate solutions and/or policy options 
for recommendation to the National Minister of Transport, 
for his consideration and/or submission to MINCOM, to 
ensure the short- and long-term sustainability of the 
industry so that it can play an equitable and competitive 
role in an effective and efficient public transport system 
(NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996:2). 
To achieve these objectives as revealed in the Mission Statement, the NTTT formulated a 
3 phase strategy namely: 
8 MINCOM is a ministerial committee chaired by the National Minister of Transport and is attended by all 











• Identifying issues and problems; 
• Analysing those issues and problems; and 
• Generating solutions. 
Thirty-six public hearings were conducted around the country with the purpose of 
enabling the participation of not only stake-holders, but also other interested parties.9 Not 
surprisingly, much of what was found by the NTTT regarding the main contributors to 
the conflict and violence in the taxi industry, had already been made known by the 
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry. Issues raised ranged from, problems with the LRTB's 
and its permits system; the decline of profitability in the taxi industry; government 
subsidy policies; corruption and lack of effective policing; to lack of business skills; poor 
infrastructure and problematic relationships within the taxi industry and between the taxi 
industry and outside parties. 1o The NTTT recognised the need for effective government 
intervention stating: 
Though it has tried for years to control itself and eliminate 
conflict, violence is rife, and the call is that Government 
should step in (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996: 18). 
4.3 The Final Recommendations of the NTTT 
The final recommendations of the NTTT, published in August 1996, dealt with four main 
issues namely: granting recognition and assistance to the taxi industry; effective and 
efficient regulation and control of the industry; training and capacity building for both 
9 These hearings were conducted between 23 August 1995 and 13 January 1996 (NTTT Final 
Recommendations, 1996). 
to For a more detailed look at the main issues as identified in the hearings conducted by the NTTT in the 











taxi industry members and transport officials; and ensuring the future economic viability 
of the industry. The recommendations were thus grouped into the following categories: 
1. Formalising the minibus-taxi industry; 
2. Regulating and controlling the industry; 
3. Training and capacity building; and 
4. Economic sustainability and empowerment. 
4.3.1 Formalisation 
In order to structure the industry democratically, openly 
and transparently, the rules by which it is governed should 
be accessible to members of the industry and the 
commuting public alike, just like the constitution of the 
country (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996:49). 
The National Taxi Task Team saw the adoption of a Standard Constitution by all taxi 
associations, dealing with issues such as; a code of conduct for all industry members, 
disciplinary procedures II, conflict resolution procedures as well as grievance procedures, 
as a key aspect of the legalisation and formalisation of the taxi industry. Registrations of 
all taxi associations with a Provincial Taxi Registrar, was then seen to be the next logical 
step,I2 with the NTTT further arguing for the establishment of councils for taxi 
associations at regional and provincial levels, to facilitate and ensure a representation 
structure for the industry at all levels. 
11 This included the setting up of self-disciplinary mechanisms to punish delinquents within the taxi 
industry (Mail and Guardian, 16 August, 1996). 
12 To qualify for this registration process the association would have to prove to the registrar that it had the 
required minimum number of members, that the association had been in existence for at least one year, and 











4.3.2 Regulation and Control 
The NTTT recommendations regarding the regulation and control of the taxi industry 
included a complete overhaul of the permit system, turning it into ' ... an effective and 
realistic permit system that can be properly policed' (NTTT Final Recommendations, 
1996:70)13. As with the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry, the NTTT found that LRTB's 
were contributing to the instability in the taxi industry. Therefore, along with the 
redrafting of the permit system, LRTB's were to be turned into more representative 
bodies (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 16 August, 1996). Furthermore, effective law 
enforcement was seen as crucial to stem the flow of violence and conflict in the taxi 
industry. The recommendation was that 'sufficient strength' be placed in police sectors to 
deal with taxi related violence and that police community forums be promoted. 
The NTTT, like the Goldstone Commission, also found that the existing infrastructure 
for the minibus-taxi industry was lacking. Adequate facilities were urgently needed and 
this was considered to be the responsibility of the 'metropolitan and local authorities' 
(NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996:94). Once again it became clear that while 
membership in the taxi industry had increased dramatically, facilities to accommodate 
the growth were non-existent. 
Another key issue investigated was the labour relations within the taxi industry. The 
nature of the relationship between the owners and drivers was of particular interest, since 
it became very clear yet again, that owners were failing to meet their obligations as 
employers. Owners were found to be lacking in many aspects, including failure on their 
parts to make contributions towards pension funds, medical aid schemes, unemployment 
13 For a detailed look at the permit system and its proposed restructuring, see: NTTT Final 











insurance funds and accident funds. Furthermore, employers did not pay their employees 
a minimum wage as set by legislation. 
Following the discussion on the issue of labour relations, the taxi industry component of 
the NTTT failed to give its unconditional support to all the proposals made. While there 
existed a commitment to developing sound labour relations within the industry, the taxi 
representatives argued that such development could only occur ' ... once the process of 
formalising the industry and restoring its profitability in a sustainable way enables it to 
meet the requirement of formal labour relations practices' (NTTT Final 
Recommendations, 1996: 164). Therefore, the recommendations made regarding labour 
relations were supported only by the government component of the NTTT. Included 
among the recommendations were the following: 
• the standard constitution for taxi associations should bind 
members to abide by the labour legislation and acceptable 
employment practices; 
• the constitution should contain a disciplinary code with a list of 
offences and appropriate penalties such as suspension and 
expUlsion; 
• databases of the Provincial Taxi Registrars should contain 
accurate and detailed information about both employers and 
employees, and the information should be accessible to the 
Department of Labour; and finally, 
• workshops should be made available to create awareness of 
both employer and employee rights and obligations in terms of 
the labour legislation. It was suggested that these workshops be 
a joint venture between the Department of Labour and the 
Department of Transport. This would then link discussions on 











fonnalising, restructuring and ensunng the economic 
sustainability of the industry (NTTT Final Recommendations, 
1996). 
4.3.3 Training and Capacity Building 
The NTTT further recognised the need for skills training and capacity building within 
the taxi industry. While initiatives to address these issues had been put in place prior to 
the release of the NTTT's final report, it was found that ' ... such initiatives were 
characterised by a lack of co-ordination and an almost complete absence of monitoring 
and evaluation' (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996: 106). The recommendation was 
therefore that a more holistic approach be adopted to ensure effective capacity building 
and skills training so that substantive results could be seen. 
The NTTT recommended that workshops for taxi owners focus on issues such as 
negotiating skills, the operation of co-operatives and constitutional changes, while 
workshops for drivers focused on advanced drivers skills, customer care, life skills, the 
code of conduct for the industry, vehicle maintenance and safety operations, traffic 
legislation, and communication skills. For rank officials who playa key role in the 
operations of taxi ranks, a more general training course was recommended covering such 
issues as vehicle checks, environmental care, passenger care and the protection of people 
(NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996). However, the NTTT recognised that it was not 
only members of the taxi industry who needed skills training, but that officials that 
interface with the taxi industry were in need of it too. Said the NTTT: 
This need arises from acknowledging the reality that the 











industry was guided by and dictated to by government 
policies that have since been replaced. Re-orientation 
becomes thus almost imperative (NTTT Final 
Recommendations, 1996: 110). 
It was therefore advised that workshops dealing with the re-orientation of public 
transport officials focus on the following issues: change management; conflict 
management; and cross-cultural awareness. Mechanisms were to be put in place to 
monitor programmes aimed at improving skills and training of the relevant role-players. 
4.3.4 Economic Survival. Sustainability and Empowerment 
MINCOM agreed to the formation of trading co-operatives within the taxi industry. The 
definition of a co-operative given by the NTTT was as follows: 
An association of persons who have voluntarily joined 
together to achieve a common end through the formation of 
a democratically controlled organisation making equitable 
contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair 
share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in which 
members actively participate (NTTT Final 
Recommendations, 1996: 116). 
These trading co-operatives were thus meant to provide services to its members which 
would not only lower their input costs, but would also in some instances provide 
opportunities for an increase in income. Members on their part would adhere to a code of 
conduct. The recommendation regardin~ the co-operatives was that membership would 
not be compulsory, but that being a member would be the only way in which to gain 











stated that the principle behind the establishment of trading co-operatives within the taxi 
industry, was 'based on the recognition of a common economic need that can be met 
more economically by a group rather than an individual' (NTTT Final 
Recommendations, 1996:126). It was therefore seen as an undertaking where a group of 
individuals on a voluntary basis, strive to meet their mutual economic and social needs in 
a manner that ensures that the economic advantages derived are greater than that which 
the individual could achieve on his own.14 The taxi industry, the government and the 
private sector were all considered to be important role-players in the formation of these 
co-operatives. 
4.4 The NTTT recommendations and the Western' Cape 
The minibus-taxi industry in the Western Cape, at the start of the formalisation process in 
September 1996, had a fleet of some 7 500 vehicles (5 500 of these vehicles having the 
required legal permits, while the rest were pirate operators), with approximately 80% of 
the fleet based in the Cape Town Metropolitan Council area. As Ahmed (1999:2) 
explains, the taxi industry in the Western Cape had a 'significant business presence' in 
the province with a 'fleet replacement value of R700 million and an industry turnover of 
some Rl billion per annum .. .' 
In terms of the recommendations made by the NTTT, the formalisation of the minibus 
taxi industry was dependent on the co-operation of members of the industry to 
voluntarily submit themselves to the process. In the Western Cape, the Provincial 
government, placed under considerable pressure to stop the violence in the province, 











attempted to do so by legislating key aspects of the NTTT recommendations. This in 
effect made the formalisation process a legal matter rather than a voluntary process. The 
legislation, entitled the Western Cape Road Transportation Act Amendment Law, No.8 of 
1996, was tied as an amendment to the Road transportation Act of 1977, and according to 
Ahmed (1999:3), 'the promulgation of the Amendment Law was immediately followed 
by a campaign designed to continue the momentum gained by the start of the 
implementation of the NTTT recommendations and the promulgation of the Law.' 
Hence, the formation of the Provincial Taxi Working Group (PTWG). 
A PTWG was established in December 1996 to take the recommendations of the NTTT 
further in the Western Cape. This group then further established eight focus groups 
constituted by various role-players in the industry, each with a focus on a specific 
element in the drive towards formalisation of the taxi industry in the Western Cape. The 
aims and objectives of these groups, as outlined in the Western Cape Taxi Industry 
Formalisation Information Booklet(1997) were as follows: 
1. Legalisation - aimed at facilitating the issuing of permits to illegal 
operators and making amendments to existing permits so that they 
would reflect the routes or networks of routes more clearly. The group 
actively encouraged illegal taxi operators to apply for permits through 
the NTTT Special Legalisation Process, and by the end of February 
1997, 1 614 applications for legalisation had been submitted. 
2. Registration - to facilitate the registration of all taxi associations. By 
31 October 1997, 81 associations, 2 494 taxi operators and 3 628 
minibus-taxi vehicles had been registered. 
3. Route Identification and Marking - aimed at identifying all routes 
and vehicles for the benefit of commuters and to facilitate the 











the permanent marking of taxis was completed in September 1997 and 
was promulgated as a regulation in terms of the 1996 Road 
Transportation Act Amendment Law. This regulation made it 
compulsory for all minibus-taxis to openly display their origin, route 
numbers and destination. 
4. Enforcement and Legislation - focusing on a review of the existing 
legislation, and bringing about amendments, new laws and regulations 
where none exist, with attention to actual enforcement of the 
legislation. The first achievement of this group was the promulgation 
of the 1996 Western Cape Road Transportation Act Amendment Law. 
Regulations dealing with issues such as the bearing of interim stickers 
by taxis, permanent vehicle markings and the adoption of the Standard 
Constitution and Code of Conduct were among the first to be drawn 
up. 
5. Taxi Liaison and Office - servmg as an official communications 
channel between the taxi industry and the Department of Transport. On 
28 February 1997, the Provincial Representative Taxi Council, a 14 
member representative structure, was formally introduced to the MEC. 
The council was to serve as the official communication channel 
between the Department of Transport and the taxi industry. 
6. Economic Restructuring - with the purpose of creating equal 
economic opportunities through the removal of economic imbalances, 
and in the process unlocking the inherent potential growth and 
development of the taxi industry. This group, comprised of various 
experts, had as one of its tasks the preparation of a strategy for 
implementing the NTTT vision for the creation of conditions to ensure 
economic survival, sustainability and empowerment of the industry in 
the Western Cape. 
7. Training - meant to identify required skills, knowledge and expertise 
that are needed for individual operators, taxi associations and taxi 











non-profit company set up to promote public transport in the Cape 
Metropolitan area led the training drive and appointed a Human 
Resource Development Officer to manage the training programs for 
public transport operators. 
8. Communication - with the purpose of facilitating the consultation 
process as well as to open up the channels of communication between 
stake-holders. One of the first tasks this group completed was the 
preparation and distribution of the Western Cape Taxi Industry 
Formalisation Information Booklet published in 1997. 
The formalisation process in the Western Cape has clearly been and continues to be a 
'highly complex' one, but as Ahmed (1999:6) explains: 
The Western Cape has committed itself to transforming the 
minibus taxi industry into an effective, regulated and 
transformed transport mode, for the benefit of the users of 
public transport and those involved in the business itself. 
The findings of the NTTT, much like the findings of the Goldstone Commission, 
revealed an unstable taxi industry in urgent need of restructuring. While the industry had 
managed to maintain its position as an important part of the transport sector in the 
country, the conflict and violence that plagues it has had a very negative impact on not 
only the industry itself, but also on the community and more especially the commuters 
who are often witnesses to the taxi wars. In recognition of the findings and 
recommendations of the NTTT, the democratic government's long term solution to the 
crisis in the taxi industry has been the introduction of the Taxi Recapitalisation Strategy. 
This comprehensive plan is intended to completely restructure the industry taking into 











4.5 The Recapitalisation Programme 
As was already mentioned, the Recapitalisation Programme, which was approved by 
Cabinet in September 1999, has its roots in the final recommendations of the NTTT. 
Among the issues identified as being responsible for the recapitalisation crisis in the 
industry were the following: the increase in vehicle prices which have made them 
unaffordable for many within the industry; the average life of the minibus-taxi has 
peaked at ten years; the inability of members in the industry to access funding to renew 
its fleet; and the inadequate revenue caused by competition against subsidised modes (5th 
Draft of Recapitalisation Strategy, 2000). The programme aims to regulate the industry, 
improve safety standards, diminish corruption, eliminate taxi wars and create new 
empowerment opportunities (Cape Argus, 8 February, 2000). On 12 June 1997, in a 
debate of the National Council of Provinces, then Minister of Transport, Mac Maharaj 
stated that the restructuring of the taxi industry should be viewed in the context of the 
democratic government engaging in a review of the land transport policy. The new 
transport policy, as outlined in the White Paper on National Transport Policy which was 
accepted by Cabinet in 1996, is aimed at fundamentally restructuring the manner in 
which the function of land transport is managed in the country. The 3 pillars of the new 
policy are planning, regulation and law enforcement. 
In the 200012001 Transport budget speech, the Minister of Transport, Dullah Omar, 
stated that: 
Because the industry arose in the margins of our society, 
the law was often ignored. In many instances, regulation 
became almost non-existent and lawlessness and violence 











government as part of the transformation process to 
introduce effective regulation, transform the informal into 
formal and to implement effective law enforcement. 
It was further argued that the Recapitalisation programme ' ... must be seen as part of a 
broader economic empowerment program which will give millions of blacks a stake in 
the economy in the country.' The Departments of Trade and Industry, Minerals and 
Energy, together with the Department of Finance and the Department of Transport have 
been responsible for the drafting of the Recapitaiisation strategy. 
One of the most important objectives of the Recapitalisation programme is the 
formalisation of the taxi industry, the 'recognition by government of the taxi industry as 
a formal part of the public transport system' (5th Draft of Recapitalisation Strategy, 
2000:2). This recognition is however contingent upon the industry 'complying with 
fundamental principles of democracy, peace and unity within the industry' (5th Draft of 
Recapitalisation Strategy, 2000:2). This compliance has taken two main organisational 
forms, one being the adoption of a Standard Constitution and Code of Conduct by taxi 
associations, and two, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of 
Transport and the South African Taxi Council (SATACO), which was signed in 1999. 
The adoption of the Standard Constitution is intrinsically linked to the registration 
process wherein all members of the taxi industry are required to register with a Provincial 
Registrar. Issues outlined in the Constitution include: 
• the aims and objectives of a taxi association; 
• the roles and responsibilities of the Executive committee which 
is responsible for the management of an association; 
• thecriteria for membership; 











• a code of conduct for members; 
• disciplinary procedures should the code of conduct be breached; 
and 
• grievance procedures. 
SATACO, a national organisation 'representing' the taxi industry, was formed on 24 
August 1998. The government welcomed the formation of SAT ACO as there now existed 
an organisation to work together with government on issues regarding the taxi industry. 
In May 1999 the Minister of Transport, in committee with the Provincial MEC's of 
transport, signed an Interim 'Memorandum of Understanding' with SATACO. This was 
said to mark a commitment by both the government and the industry, to work together to 
stabilise the taxi industry. SATACO, on behalf of the taxi industry, pledged to support 
government's restructuring plans. 
In forging unity across the divide, the taxi industry pledges 
its support to the government's comprehensive partnership 
strategy in general, as contained in the NTTT Final 
Recommendations, and m particular to formalise the 
industry as enshrined m the NITT Final 
Recommendations. Which in tum, has the capacity to 
create a conducive environment for black economIC 
empowerment within the broader context of social 
transformation of our country. The taxi industry hereby 
pledges an unwavering commitment to the fundamental 
principles of unity, peace, safety and democratic practice 
(Interim Memorandum of Understanding with the SA Taxi 
Council, 1999:3). 
The key element of the Recapitalisation programme is the introduction of new 18 and 35 











proposals for the manufacturing of the new vehicles. International as well as local 
manufacturers were allowed to bid by means of the international competitive tendering 
process. Karin Pearce, the project manager of the Recapitalisation programme stated that 
the manufacturing of these new vehicles would be beneficial to the South African people 
since it would create thousands of employment opportunities (Cape Times, 24 January, 
2000). As was revealed in a statement by the Ministry of Transport on 31 August 2000, 
'one of the key criteria for bidders to qualify to produce the new vehicles, requires that 
the successful bidder will have to assemble the vehicles in South Africa, with all related 
services being done in joint ventures with local companies'. The new vehicles would then 
replace the existing fleet of minibus-taxis, being introduced into the market through a 
phasing out process. 
The introduction of the new vehicles into the market has been identified as one of the 
major challenges the government's implementation programme would have to contend 
with. A number of scenarios have thus far been examined. As outlined in the 5th draft of 
tbe Recapitalisation Strategy (2000), these scenarios included: 
a) The first come, first serve strategy, where applications for new 
vehicles are dealt with as they are received. 
b) The implementation of the new vehicles is done according to 
province. Here it is only once the one province is covered that 
another province can begin the phasing in of the new vehicles. 
c) The age and condition of the old vehicles are the determining 











d) A pilot area is identified and the various components of the 
programme, including the administrative processes, are put 
into operation. 
e) Pilot areas are identified in each province and a limited number 
of vehicles are then piloted in line with the anticipated 
volumes. 
To qualify for these new vehicles, operators would have to surrender their old minibuses, 
produce a valid drivers licence along with the required registration certificates and show 
proof of membership of a recognised taxi association that is registered with the 
Provincial Registrar. They would then be in line to receive a 'scrapping allowance' which 
is a discount of up to 35% for the new vehicle. Should an operator require financial 
assistance from a qualified financial institution, any bad credit records would not be 
taken into account. 
The Recapitalisation programme seeks to address not only the issue of regulation and 
control as was identified by the NTTT, but also the subsidy issue. The government has 
agreed to assist the taxi industry through not only the establishment of co-operatives, as 
was recommended by the NTTT, but also through facilitating the Recapitalisation 
programme: 
... the economic assistance strategy is aimed at providing 
significant incentives and disincentives towards the 
objectives of unifying the industry, stabilising its 
operations and significantly contributing to the objective of 
black economIC empowerment..(5th Draft of 











Effective enforcement of the permit system and the deployment of resources to enable 
such enforcement, has been identified as a crucial component of the Recapitalisation 
programme. The objective of the enforcement focus in the strategy has been with a view 
to achieve the following: 
• to create additional enforcement capacity by engaging traffic 
officers who would also act as transport inspectors; 
• to enforce adherence to speed limits for taxis; 
• to ensure that all taxis operate in terms of proper authorisations; 
• to ensure that all taxis are registered with the Provincial 
Registrars; 
• to enforce roadworthiness of taxis operating on the road; 
• to effectively police driver's licences for taxi drivers; 
• to effectively police overloading of vehicles; 
• to effectively police driving while under the influence of 
alcohol (5th Draft of Recapitalisation Strategy, 2000). 
A number of law enforcement agencies have been identified as key role-players in the 
campaign to achieve effective and efficient law enforcement with regard to the taxi 
industry. These agencies are: 
• The South African National Roads Agency 
• The Provincial Transport and Traffic authorities 
• Local Authorities 
• The South African Police Services 
• The Department of Justice 
• The Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
• Non-governmental Organisations and the Private sector (5th 











A number of critical building blocks have been regarded as essential to support the 
Recapitalisation programme and to ensure its success. These are: 
• the establishment of the National Transport Register; 
• the development of enforcement capacity; 
• the completion of the legalisation process; 
• the establishment of the taxi co-operatives; and 
• the completion of the industry democratisation process by 
electing Provincial Taxi Councils, culminating in the election of 
a permanent SATACO structure (5th Draft of Recapitalisation 
Strategy, 2000). 
The Recapitalisation programme is the democratic government's attempt to formalise 
and stabilise the minibus-taxi industry through completely altering every area of 
operation within the industry. The programme has not however, been welcomed by 
everybody and almost immediately following its introduction there has been fierce 
opposition to the programme. 
4.6 Opposition to the Recapitalisation Programme 
Since the very beginning of the Recapitalisation programme, there have been conflicting 
reports about the programme and the taxi industry's reaction to it. Optimism about the 
programme and its impact and positive effects, along with the programme being 
supported by all stake-holders, are countered by reports of blockades, marches, 
intimidation and violence by members of the industry in opposition to the programme. 
The democratic government, choosing not to heed the advice of the Goldstone 











entire taxi industry, conducted negotiations regarding the Recapitalisation programme 
and its implementation solely with SA TACO who was viewed as speaking on behalf of 
the entire taxi industry. In June 1999, a month after SATACO received official 
recognition, a 'splinter group of disgruntled taxi associations' banded together and 
formed an association known as the National Taxi Alliance (NTA) (Dugard in Steinberg, 
2001). In August the NTA claimed that proper consultation with all stake-holders had 
not occurred and called on the Minister of Transport to halt the Recapitalisation 
programme. The Alliance argued that SATACO, had not been 'consulted by any taxi 
association or individual operator about its initiatives' and contended that the taxi 
industry had been 'hijacked by individuals, who purported to be speaking on behalf of 
the industry, for their own enrichment' (Business Day, 16 August, 1999). The Alliance at 
this point claimed to have the support of the majority of taxi operators in the country. 
During this period the bus industry also came out strongly against the Recapitalisation 
programme, arguing that it 'discriminated against bus operators'. Chairman of the 
Western Cape Southern African Bus Operators' Association, George Maluka in August 
1999 claimed that the negotiations had occurred without consultation with bus operators 
whom he believed would be 'significantly affected parties' (Sapa, 5 August, 1999). 
In early January 2000, while a semor official from the Department of Transport 
announced that the new fleet of vehicles would be on the roads by October 2000 (Sapa, 6 
January, 2000), newspaper reports revealed that many members within the taxi industry 
were not familiar with the changes. This was despite many government claims that all 
concerned parties had been properly informed about the impending changes and its 
impact on the industry. The National Taxi Drivers Organisation (NATDO), on 11 











Recapitalisation programme, accusing government of 'unilateral decision-making' and of 
overlooking the fact that the programme would mean fewer drivers in one of the 
country's employment-creating sectors' (The Star, 2000). On 19 January, 2000, 
following a motorcade protest from Johannesburg to Kyalami, NATDO handed over a 
memorandum of grievances to a Department of Trade and Industry official condemning 
government's decision to continue an exhibition where examples of the proposed 
vehicles were to be staged at the Kyalami Exhibition Centre on 27 and 28 January 2000 
(Cape Argus, 20 January, 2000). The Organisation claimed that the government and 
SA TACO had gone ahead with plans without involving major stake-holders. NATDO 
threatened a nation-wide go-slow along with strikes if their concerns were not addressed. 
The very next day, on 20 January 2000, the Government Communication and 
Information System (GCIS) issued a statement announcing that all stake-holders in the 
taxi industry would have an opportunity to 'voice' their opinions on the final products set 
to replace the existing fleet. Suppliers, government departments and SAT ACO would be 
on hand at the exhibition to 'enlighten industry participants on all aspects of the 
transformation process to the use of the new vehicles' which would be compulsory for all 
operators after four years. The statement further said that government believed that the 
programme adequately addressed 'all identified problems and provides solutions' that 
would be beneficial to all participants in the taxi industry, from owners and operators to 
commuters. Disputing claims that government was attempting to usurp the authority in 
the taxi industry, a statement released on 24 January 2000 said that government's role 
was merely to 'facilitate the change-over to a more efficient, cost effective and safe 
system'. Furthermore, despite more claims that many in the industry had not been 











introduction of the new vehicles followed ' ... exhaustive consultation between the 
government and the taxi industry' (Cape Times, 25 January, 2000). 
On 27 January 2000, the Cape Argus reported that government's plan was 'facing fierce 
resistance' from NATDO. Themba Mgabhi, chairman of NATDO claimed that the 
Recapitalisation programme was just a 'political strategy' aimed at destroying the taxi 
industry, 'instead of subsidising and formalising it'. Mgabhi threatened to disrupt the 
Exhibition at Kyalami if their concerns were not met. These concerns included claims 
that the programme would split the industry since many operators would not be able to 
afford the new vehicles; job losses not only within the taxi industry, but also at Toyota, 
one of the chief manufacturers of the conventional minibuses; and longer waiting periods 
for commuters due to longer fill-up times. On 28 January 2000, the Minister of Transport 
stated that government would ignore the ultimatum by NA TDO, but would consider the 
'genuine concerns of workers' (Sapa, 28 January, 2000). On that same day, police and 
soldiers were deployed in Johannesburg as 'slow-moving taxis held up traffic for most of 
the day along the Ml North and besieged the exhibition of the new vehicles' at Kyalami 
(Cape Times, 28 January, 2000). On February 2, two days after government had declared 
the Kyalami exhibition a success, approximately 700 owners and drivers marched to the 
Department of Transport offices in Johannesburg to once again voice their opposition to 
the Recapitalisation programme. This occurred after owners had decided to join the 
protests along with the drivers (Sapa, 2 February, 2000). 
In mid February opposition parties openly criticised the government's plan to restructure 
the taxi industry through the Recapitalisation programme (Daily News, 17 February, 
2000). The leader of the African Christian Democratic party, Reverend Kenneth Meshoe 











Giving them bigger buses will make them more dangerous, 
not only to their passengers but to all road users. If the 
Government says drivers of the 18- and 35- seater buses 
will be properly trained, why do they not give the same 
training to the drivers of the present 15- seater taxis? 
(Daily News, 17 February, 2000). 
Furthermore, it was reported that Mr. Stuart Farrow from the Democratic Party, argued 
that not only did SAT ACO not represent the entire taxi industry, but that it would be a 
complete waste to provide billions to an industry when enforcing existing road rules was 
still a problem. Mr. Thomas Abrahams from the United Democratic Movement, was 
reported to agree in principle with the programme, but said also that it lacked legitimacy 
because of its failure to consult with all stake-holders (Daily News, 17 February, 2000). 
On 17 February 2000, five taxi drivers were arrested for assault and attempted hijacking, 
following a protest in Johannesburg against the Recapitalisation programme (The Star, 
17 February, 2000). Protesters halted traffic, smashed in windscreens and pulled 
passengers from taxis that were not part of the protest action. Mgabhi threatened to 
disrupt meetings which were to take place when a FIFA delegation 'assessing South 
Africa's bid to host the 2006 soccer World Cup' arrived in the country. Stranded 
commuters, unable to reach their places of employment blamed government for the 
situation. Mass action was further threatened if the president did not meet with the group 
within 7 days (The Star, 17 February, 2000). On 8 March 2000, Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma met with NT A representatives who assured him that they supported the 
government initiatives to regulate the industry and that they would not disrupt the FIF A 
delegation visit (Statement by the Office of the Deputy President, 8 March, 2000). They 











negative activities of some of the drivers, 'which they formally distanced themselves 
from'. 
In April 2000 the Recapitalisation programme suffered a setback when SAT ACO 
withdrew from talks with the government (Dugard, 2001). The council claimed that 
government had excluded them from decisions on choosing the manufacturers of the new 
vehicles. SA TACO further threatened mass action if government went ahead with the 
plans to implement the programme. A spokesman for the Department of Transport said 
that government was confident that SAT ACO would return to the negotiation table since 
it was 'in their interest that they come back because the taxi industry needs the 
programme' (Business day, 5 April, 2000). On April 14, 2000, it was reported that 
SAT ACO had agreed to suspend the mass action they had threatened (Sapa, 14 April, 
2000). 
On 17 August 2000, the NT A and SA TACO agreed to merge to form one new national 
body to engage government on the Recapitalisation programme (Business Day, 17 
August, 2000) and in October the two organisations marched to the Union Buildings in 
Pretoria asking government to consult the taxi i~dustry before implementing the 
programme. They threatened to 'stop operating' and 'block roads' if government did not 
respond to their demands. By January 2001 the merging of the two bodies had still not 
been put in place since, as they claimed, they were still 'finalising their constitution and 
looking for a sponsor to hold a unity conference' (Business Day, 3 January, 2001). 
The Department of Transport, despite all the protests and opposition to the 
Recapitalisation programme, maintained its position at the start of 2001, saying that it 











industry claimed to be 'misinformed and misled on implementation of the project without 
clear understanding of the financial risks and obligations', government argued that it was 
'acting fully within the framework of the national taxi task team and the memorandum of 
understanding between the minister, transport MEC's and SATACQ' (Business Day, 
January 3, 2001). 
A key argument used by many opposed to the Recapitalisation programme has been that 
the industry has not been properly consulted with regard to the details of the programme, 
its implementation, and its impact on the industry and its members. This argument is no 
doubt a valid one as it has become clear that SAT ACQ does not represent all the 
members of the industry and therefore, since government consulted only with SA TACO, 
there may be members within the industry who were not consulted and thus not included 
in the process. However, there also appears to be an ulterior motive behind the fierce 
opposition to the Recapitalisation programme and its implementation. 
There are people who benefit significantly financially from the industry being in its 
present unstable state. As was seen in the previous chapter, 'mother bodies' are able to 
extract vast amounts of money from the industry and it would therefore be in their best 
interest for the industry to remain unchanged. Restructuring the taxi industry would result 
in these mother bodies losing their positions of power and dominance, as the industry 
would then be subject to regulation and control by the state. As Dugard (200 I :22) argues, 
mother bodies ' ... regard restructuring as a threat to their violence-oriented business 
interests.' In addition, it has been reported that parties outside the taxi industry who have 
vested interests are manipulating events within the industry with the purposes of 
ultimately prohibiting the government from successfully implementing the 











internal government document linked Toyota to dissidents within the taxi industry who 
were threatening to disrupt government's restructuring plans. Toyota, commanding a 
massive 92% of the taxi market, stands to be one of the biggest losers if government 
restructuring continues. is Allegations in the report were to the effect that Toyota had been 
operating behind the scenes, sponsoring members of the National Taxi Alliance (NT A) to 
campaign against SATACO. The Department of Trade and Industry Task Team was said 
to have collected evidence suggesting that Toyota had provided cars and taxis for 
opponents of SATACO and that they had funded 'flights and expenses to drum up 
support at anti-SATACO rallies' (Mail and Guardian, February 4-10,2000). 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
The taxi industry, despite the lack of government assistance, and the general instability, 
has contributed greatly to the economy of the country. In 1999 it was reported that the 
industry contribute~ an estimated R12-billion towards the economy each year (Weekly 
Mail and Guardian, 30 April, 1999). It is the second largest fuel consumer after 
government, transporting 65% of the South African work-force. The instability in the taxi 
industry has resulted in government having to spend millions on attempts to stabilise the 
industry. From 1996 to 1998 Cabinet approved nearly R40-million for each year, for the 
purposes of implementing the 1995 recommendations of the NTTT (Race Relations 
Survey, 1997/1998). The latest initiative, government's Recapitalisation programme, is 
estimated to be costing close to R3-billion (Race Relations Survey, 200012001). While 
the programme seeks to bring the industry more fully into the economy and to open up 
is In 1995 it was estimated that the taxi industry provided manufacturers of taxis (Toyota, Volkswagen, 











more opportunities for active participation, the opposition to the programme by many 
within the industry is likely to bedevil governmental implementation strategies. This 
could result in valuable resources being wasted on an industry plagued with instability. 
The findings and recommendations of the NTTT and the subsequent introduction of the 
Recapitalisation programme is evidence of how the democratic government has 
succeeded in not only clearly identifying the core issues within the industry which causes 
instability, but also identifying the solutions and what is needed to bring about 
transformation. However, from what has been revealed thus far, the implementation of 
the Recapitalisation programme without a doubt promises to be a difficult task as co-
operation within the industry and between the industry and government, which is 
essential for successful implementation, appears to be severely limited. Opposition to the 
programme and government's response to that opposition which often tends to be 
dismissive, has already hampered the process considerably, causing major setbacks to the 
implementation process and giving the impression that the vision of the Recapitalisation 
programme will never come to fruition. The obstacles to successful implementation and a 
stable minibus taxi industry are clearly tremendous. The next chapter deals with the 
methodology utilised in this research. This is followed by Chapter 6, which is a 
presentation of the findings of an empirical investigation into the views and perceptions 
of 72 respondents with regard to issues surrounding conflict, violence and regulation in 














The research undertaken for this dissertation involved both an intensive review of 
relevant literature and in-depth interviews with members in the minibus-taxi industry, the 
SAPS, the Traffic Department and UMAC. To gain a clear picture and understanding of 
the issues investigated, the need for a flexible and semi-structured interview schedule 
was recognised early on in the research process. The early phases of the research 
revealed the wisdom of avoiding the rigid stances of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodological approaches, in favour of an approach best suited to achieve the goals and 
objectives of this research study. Therefore, both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
were utilised in this research, with the former however featuring more prominently than 
the latter, which was used to a lesser extent in the interview schedule and the data 
analysis. Here now follows a discussion on the methodology utilised in this research. 
5.2 The literature review 
A review of the relevant literature, ' .. .involves producing a thematic picture of the state 
of knowledge on the research topic and on the method proposed, exploring the major 
questions which have been investigated and considering how the literature can inform the 











the literature review before and during the research was not only helpful in detennining 
the research design, which ' .. .involves making decisions about the research strategy and 
data collection methods, sampling, the time dimension and data processing and analysis' 
(Francis in Jupp, Davies and Francis, 2000:39), but also in shedding light on how the data 
that emerged from the interviews compared to or differed from what has already been 
detennined in previous studies. 
The literature review involved a perusal of all accessible documented material, both 
published and unpublished, including journal articles and books, government press 
statements, policy documents, and reports, particularly investigative reports 
commissioned by the Department of Transport as well as reports by Commissions of 
Inquiry who had the task of investigating various aspects of the transport industry in 
South Africa. The sources ranged from material focusing on sociological and political 
analyses, to those focusing primarily on criminological and economic analyses. 
5.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Quantitative research is typically taken to be exemplified 
by the social survey and by experimental investigations. 
Qualitative research tends to be associated with participant 
observation and unstructured, in-depth interviewing 
(Bryman,1988: 1). 
The debate about the differences between quantitative and qualitative research has been a 
long-standing one. Bryman (1988:5) expounds on how the two approaches to research 
are regarded by some writers as being ' ... competing views about the ways in which 











ways of conducting social investigations· and which may be conceived of as being 
appropriate to different kinds of research question and even as capable of being 
integrated.' In the fonner argument quantitative and qualitative research are seen as 
representing different epistemological positions, that is, what is able to pass as 
' ... warrantable, and hence acceptable, knowledge' about the social world, whereas in the 
latter argument, the two approaches are essentially just based on technical issues, in that 
it is concerned simply with the 'different approaches to data collection'. (Bryman, 
1988:5). 
The alternative standpoint to the belief that quantitative and qualitative research 
represents different epistemological positions, is to argue that both quantitative and 
qualitative research are each, in their own ways appropriate for different research 
problems, the implication here being that the research issue itself should determine which 
approach is used (Bryman, 1988). This decision is therefore based on 'technical issues' 
with regard to ' ... the suitability of a particular method in relation to a particular research 
problem' (Bryman, 1988:106). The difference between quantitative and qualitative 
research then is essentially just differences in research strategy and data collection 
procedures. 
The methods employed in this study are consistent with the arguments made in the 
second standpoint. The nature of the research issue itself determined which of the two 
approaches would be utilised or whether it would be more beneficial to the research study 
for the two approaches to be combined. Regarding the two approaches as hailing from 
two divergent epistemological standpoints, makes combining them somewhat 











If quantitative and qualitative research are taken to 
represent divergent epistemological packages (or 
paradigms), they are likely to exhibit incompatible views 
about the way in which social reality ought to be studied, 
and hence what should be regarded as proper knowledge 
thereof. 
However, Bryman (in Brannen, 1992), further makes a distinction between the 
integration of quantitative and qualitative research and quantitative and qualitative data. 
He argues that the integration of quantitative and qualitative research involves the use of 
separate methods of data collection that are characteristic of each of the two approaches. 
For example, using unstructured interviews which is characteristic of qualitative 
research, and then also a structured questionnaire, which is characteristic of quantitative 
research. For Bryman though, the notion of using one primary method of data 
collection that conforms with quantitative research, and yet incorporating elements that 
are characteristic of qualitative research, for example, using a structured interview with 
pre-coded categories and including some open-ended questions, would be regarded as 
integration of quantitative and qualitative data, but would not have the same meaning as 
when one refers to the integration of quantitative and qualitative research. The argument 
here is that the quantitative or qualitative data collected in such instances ' ... have not 
been derived from different methods of data collection but from the same research 
instrument' (Bryman in Brannen, 1992:70). The instrument however is characteristic of 
only one of the methods as is the case in the example with the structured interview which 
included some open-ended questions. For Bryman the addition of the open-ended 
questions ' ... does not make for the collection of qualitative data of the kind that the 











but can be beneficial in the interpretation and understanding of the 'broad survey 
findings' (cited in Bryman in Brannen, 1992:73). 
This same argument is applied in cases where, as Bryman states, 'quantitative and 
qualitative data co-exist, but where the former derive from the quantification of the 
latter', and where terms like "many", "most", "often" and "hardly ever" are used to 
describe the findings (Bryman in Brannen, 1992:70). This argument according to Bryman 
goes as follows: 
... the use of quantification of such data is not meant to 
provide the means for examining the kinds of issues that 
are normally of concern among quantitative researchers, 
such as precise calculations of relationships between 
variables, teasing out causal paths, providing estimates of 
central tendency and dispersion, inferring from sample to 
population and so on. Instead quantification acts as a means 
of summarizing qualitative material as an alternative to a 
more indeterminate presentation of the data (1992:73). 
In the sections that follow the methods employed in this research study will be examined 
with a discussion on: the use of a semi-structured interview schedule, a qualitative 
method of inquiry; the process of data collection in the field; and the analysis of that data 
through the use of quantification. 
5.4 Semi-structured interviews: A qualitative method of inquiry 
The fieldwork section of this research focused on investigating the perceptions, views 











drivers and owners; taxi association officials; law enforcement agencies; and members of 
NGO's who are often involved in conflict resolution and mediation processes in an effort 
to facilitate the peaceful resolution to the conflict and violence. 
In this dissertation, in an effort to achieve the objectives of the research, a semi-
structured interview schedule was utilised. This method is consistent with qualitative 
research because as Fielding and Fielding (1986:50) argue, the semi-structured interview 
allows the respondents to, ' ... develop their answers in their full complexity outside any 
pre-structuring format.' Therefore while questions were specified, ' ... the interviewer is 
more free to probe beyond the answers in a manner which would appear prejudiced to the 
aims of standardization and comparability' (May, 1997: 111). Thus, as May argues, 
'Qualitative information about the topic can then be recorded by the interviewer who can 
seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given' (1997: Ill). 
In this study, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from the interviews 
conducted with members from the taxi industry. Many of the questions were open-ended. 
Patton (1980:28) argues that the 'purpose of gathering responses to open-ended questions 
is to enable the researcher to understand and capture the points of view of other people 
without predetermining those points of view through prior selection of questionnaire 
categories.' In addition to the open-ended questions there were also however some 
questions that had pre-coded categories for the answer. The pre-coded categories that 
were used in the interview schedule for members from the taxi industry, were as a result 
of the knowledge from the literature review, previous research studies and the initial 











represent the likely range of answers the respondents would givel6• With the rest of the 
respondents it was difficult to determine the range of likely answers beforehand, thus all 
questions administered to the members from the SAPS, the Traffic Department and 
UMAC were open-ended. 
The questions were designed to provide information on the following issues: 
• Working conditions within the taxi industry, 
., Conflict in the industry; 
., The State's response to the instability in the industry; 
• Regulation of the taxi industry and the Government's 
Recapitalisation Programme; 
• The nature of the relationships that exists within the taxi 
industry and between the taxi industry and outside parties, like 
the bus industry and law enforcement agencies; 
• The difficulties and challenges with regard to resolving the 
problems within the taxi industry. 
The aim was to determine an in-depth view of the nature and characteristics of the 
instability and the complexities of the social relationships between the concerned parties. 
One of the advantages of the semi-structured interview method is that there can be 
immediate clarification when misunderstandings occur regarding interpretation of 
questions andlor answers. Furthermore, as Hagan (1982:82), points out, note can also be 
taken of the researcher's 'impressions regarding the respondents and their environment', 
since in addition to recording verbal responses, the interviewer is also able to 'act as an 
observer.' The flexibility of the approach further allows the researcher to use 'their 
discretion' as to the appropriate time at which to ask the more sensitive questions', 
16 See Qureshi, H. Integrating methods in applied research in social policy: A case study in carers, (in 











perhaps at a point during the interview when' ... the subject appears most co-operative' 
(Hagan, 1982:83). Considering the nature of the research, some issues were indeed 
sensitive and required the flexible and non-directive approach. In many instances during 
the course of the research the order in which the questions were asked was altered, since 
through probing and the amplifying of questions and answers, the respondents revealed 
information in different ways. The interviews were designed to ' ... yield rich insights into 
people's experiences, opinions, aspirations, attitudes and feelings' (May, 1997: 109). 
Interviews, while yielding rich results, and being beneficial to gammg a better 
understanding of the perceptions and views of respondents, are not free of disadvantages. 
The nature of the semi-structured interview makes it a very time-consuming exercise. 
Not only are the interviews themselves time-consuming, but so too is the transcribing of 
the tapes. In addition to this, the semi-structured interview also results in large amounts 
of data that make analysis a very challenging process. Another difficulty is that the 
detailed explanations that comes through the probing, often result in respondents 
deviating from the issues under investigation, to ones far outside the scope of the 
research. The challenge then lay in not only directing the respondent back to the original 
topic, but also in sorting the data in a manner that ensures that relevant information is not 
lost. 
Another issue that presents itself is that of 'reactivity'. Bryman (1988: 112) defines it as 
being 'the reaction on the part of those being investigated to the investigator and his or 
her instruments.' The presence of the researcher then possibly influences the behaviour 
and responses of the respondents and thereby eliciting responses that the respondents 











The interviewer cannot hope, in this method of asking 
questions, to merge with the scenery and to be as 
unobtrusive as the naturalistic form of asking questions 
demands. Some explanation of the interviewer's purposes 
and needs is required and a degree of procedural reactivity 
is necessarily introduced because people, in everyday life, 
do not submit to an interview at length, except on well-
defined occasions such as job interviews. 
Furthermore, in this study the manner in which the respondents answered certain 
questions could also have been influenced by the presence of other parties during the 
interview. [See section 5.5.3 where at the request of the respondents other drivers or taxi 
'guards' were present during the interviews]. 
Since the very intention of this research was to understand the views and perceptions of 
the respondents themselves, no explicit theory was adopted prior to the research since it 
was believed that a stringent theoretical framework would be harmful to the study. As 
Bryman (1988:86-87) argues: 'the elaboration and application of theory prior to, or even 
at a relatively early stage of, a qualitative study may prejudice the researcher's ability to 
see through the eyes of his or her subjects.' In this research therefore an approach similar 
to the one used by Corrigan (1979 in Jupp, 1989:8), was adopted, as conclusions drawn 
in this research emerged from the data itself, ' ... founded upon the perceptions of the 













A total of 72 interviews were conducted between February 2000 and July 2001. The 
respondents were: 
• 35 taxi drivers and 15 owner-drivers from various taxi associations in 
Cape Town. The drivers were operators who were stationed at various 
ranks in five areas namely: Mitchell's Plain; Athlone; Gatesville; 
Mowbray; and Cape Town. The ranks in these areas were however only 
one end of the routes travelled by the respondents. The other ends 
included areas like Khayelitsha, Bonteheuwel, Manenberg, Bridgetown, 
Gugulethu, Hanover Park and Wynberg. 
• 10 taxi association executive committee members representing 
different taxi associations. These included chairmen and vice-chairmen, 
all of whom owned taxis and employed drivers. These associations 
were branches of different mother-bodies. [It should be noted here that 
owners who were not members of the executive committees but just 
members in the associations were not involved in the research since 
access to these owners proved difficult. Thus due to time constraints 
interviews with owners were not conducted]. 
• 5 members of the SAPS, 2 of whom had been specifically assigned to 
deal with taxi-related issues, while the other 3 had been involved in 
investigating taxi violence. 
• 5 traffic officers, all of whom had been involved in cases such as traffic 
offences committed by members of the taxi industry, like illegal 
parking, illegal stopping and the illegal conveyance of passengers. 
They were also involved with the policing of pirate taxis and those 
operating without the relevant permits. 
• 2 members of UMAC, a NGO which has been involved with the taxi 
industry since 1985. UMAC (U Managing Conflict, previously known 












involved in many conflict resolution and mediation processes with 
regard to taxi industry conflict and violence. Their investigating of 
incidents and identifying of causes of taxi conflict has been with the 
purpose of finding alternative and effective ways to resolve conflicts 
without the use of violence (UMAC Annual Report, 1997/8). 
The sampling method utilised was that of 'purposeful sampling'. For Patton (1987) this 
type of sampling is appropriate in that it allows one to ' .. .learn a great deal more by 
focusing in depth on understanding the needs, interests, and incentives of a small number 
of carefully selected [people] ... than gathering a little information from a large, 
statistically significant sample' (quoted in Hauck, 1997:40). Thus for the purposes of this 
study respondents were selected based on the fact that they were members of a group or 
category of people that are involved in the minibus-taxi industry: taxi owners; taxi 
drivers; taxi association officials; law enforcement agencies who have the task of 
policing the industry; and a NGO that has been involved in a conflict resolution capacity. 
It was believed that these people would have the information and knowledge that was 
relevant to this research. 
Having decided from which groups the respondents would be selected, gaining access to 
those groups was the next step. Once this was achieved individuals within these groups 
who agreed to be interviewed would often identify other individuals either within their 
own groups or within one of the other groups, who they thought would be helpful in the 
research and would agree to be interviewed. For example, after the completion of an 
interview with a police officer, he suggested that 'friends of his' be contacted in the 











perspective. This process of selecting respondents, through the following up of names 
mentioned during or after interviews is known as snowballing (May, 1997). 
Respondents were selected on the basis of their desire to participate in the research and 
their willingness to voice their views and opinions. Many other potential respondents 
were approached, but while many declined outright, others claimed to have relevant 
information but refused to go on record. 
5.5.2 Neliotiatinli Access 
Prior to the interviews being conducted, all respondents were approached either 
telephonically or through a visit, and following an introductory explanation about the 
research, asked whether they would agree to be interviewed. The difficulty with 
negotiating access varied with each of the groups. Drivers, the most visible group were 
the easiest to access. In some instances access was gained by engaging drivers in 
conversation whilst being a passenger in the front seat of the minibus-taxi. On many 
occasions the drivers approached in this manner agreed to be part of the research. Others, 
who were reluctant to participate, often facilitated introductions to other drivers at the 
ranks. There was a general willingness to talk about the research issues, even in cases 
where drivers refused to go on record. Gaining access to owners who were not drivers or 
the executive members of the taxi associations, was difficult for two reasons: 
1. Drivers were reluctant to give out any information about the owners of 
the vehicles they were driving. It is suspected here that drivers were 
fearful that their employers would discover that they had participated in 
the research and that they had expressed negative views, particularly 











linked to drivers wanting continual reassurances that their identities 
would be kept confidential. 
2. Other parties were also reluctant to give out information about the taxi 
industry and its members. The Department of Transport was contacted, 
but despite numerous inquiries about the Department releasing 
information, nothing was forthcoming. In another case a NGO member, 
who eventually provided telephone numbers, was reluctant to release 
the information since previous negative experiences had caused 
'problems', though of what nature these 'problems' were, was never 
clarified. 
The executive committee members were approached at the offices of the taxi 
associations. In some instances it took three visits to address the committee regarding the 
research and the motives behind it. Once permission was granted by the executive 
committee, members of the committee either volunteered to be interviewed, or were 
selected by the chairman. Access to members of the SAPS and the Traffic Department 
who have had dealings with the minibus-taxi industry in a law enforcement capacity, 
proved more difficult despite referrals. Potential respondents initially contacted appeared 
wary of being interviewed and often cancelled, in some instances at the very last minute 
before the interview was scheduled to take place. It was eventually possible only after 
members of the SAPS who were or had been involved with the taxi industry, were 
approached at various police stations. Gaining access to one respondent in the SAPS in 
this manner opened the door to not only one other officer who was willing to be 
interviewed, but also to two traffic officers who eventually became two of the 
respondents. The 10 respondents who were finally interviewed all had experience in 
dealing with members of the taxi industry. They were chosen because of their Willingness 











One of the main reasons respondents gave for their reluctance to voice their opinions was 
the manner in which they or their organisations had been portrayed in the past. The SAPS 
and the Traffic Officers were particularly vocal about having been misquoted, wrongly 
interpreted and portrayed in a negative light. While drivers were more likely to express 
their views once their confidentiality was guaranteed, the SAPS and Traffic Police, 
unlike all other respondents, carefully scrutinised the university letter confirming 
credentials. Mention was often made of the harm misunderstandings could do to the 
already fragile relationships between the parties. The concern about accuracy and 
misquoting contributed greatly to why many respondents, otherwise wary of the tape-
recorder, agreed to be recorded. [The use of the tape-recorder will be discussed in more 
detail below]. With respondents from the NOO, access was relatively easy. 
Confidentiality was hardly mentioned and there existed a willingness to comment on the 
research issues. Overall the process of gaining access to the respondents was bedevilled 
by various obstacles. This was no doubt due to the nature of the research where the aim 
was to investigate sensitive matters regarding the volatility of the minibus-taxi industry. 
5.5.3 Process 
Interviews with all the respondents were conducted face-to-face. With drivers the 
interviews were conducted at the various ranks and often in the minibus-taxis or on the 
street. In some instances, and only at the request of the respondents, interviews were 
conducted in the presence of others, usually other drivers who refused to go on record, or 
the taxi 'guards' 17. Although this was not ideal, since the flow of the interview was often 
17 The guard referred to here is taken from the slang term usually used 'guardjie'. The guard essentially has 
the job of a conductor in that he sits in the back of the taxi and collects the fares from the passengers and 











disrupted, it appeared to visibly put the respondents at ease. The interviews conducted 
with the executive committee members, the SAPS, the traffic officers and the 
respondents from UMAC, usually took place at the respondents' place of business, 
usually their offices. In two instances interviews were conducted at the University of 
Cape Town. Interviews ranged from 30 and 45 minutes to 2 hours. 
In most of the cases, respondents agreed to the use of the tape recorder for the collection 
of the data. This however only occurred following an explanation about the advantages of 
the tape recorder and the guarantee that personal details and whatever else the respondent 
requested would be omitted. In some instances the respondents requested that the tape 
recorder be switched off when they were answering questions they considered to be 
sensitive. When this occurred the information was either given off the record, notes were 
taken when information was on the record, or taken immediately after the interview if the 
respondent requested that notes not be taken during the interview but that the information 
was 'just to listen' to. 
The use of the tape-recorder was a great advantage since it allowed for greater accuracy 
in the data collection. As May (1997:125) points out, ' ... tape recording guards against 
interviewers substituting their own words for those of the person being interviewed ... ' In 
addition to this, the tape recorder also allowed for the focus to remain on the interview 
and the respondents. Frantically taking down notes during the interview, and this 
occurred in cases where respondents refused to be recorded, seriously affected the 
interactive nature of the in-depth interviewing. The focus was thus more on getting down 
the information accurately and not missing anything in the wording, than it was on the 
respondent. As Patton (1980:247) argues, 'the interviewer who tries to write down every 











However, even in cases where the tape recorder was used, notes were still taken during 
the interview. These notes though served a different purpose in that it was meant to 
' ... help the interviewer formulate new questions as the interview moves along, 
particularly where it may be appropriate to check out something that was said earlier' and 
to ' ... facilitate analysis, including locating important quotations from the tape itself 
(Patton, 1980:247). 
5.6 Context 
... whatever the sphere in which data are being collected, we 
can understand events only when they are situated in the 
wider social and historical context (Bryman, 1988:65). 
In early 2000, conflict between the taxi industry and the Golden Arrow Bus Company in 
the Western Cape flared up once again. This was a renewal of old hostilities and conflicts 
that had been ongoing since the apartheid era, during which the bus industry was 
considered the legitimate mode of transportation, whereas the taxi industry was 
marginalised. Following the impounding of numerous unroadworthy and illegal taxis, 
CATA and CODETA, old rivals that have for years hired hit-squads to attack each other, 
on 27 March 2000, joined forces and demanded that Golden Arrow cut down on its 
services during the week and to stop services at the weekends so that taxi operators could 
increase their passenger loads (Business Day, 30 May 2000; Weekly Mail and Guardian, 
7 July 2000). Failing to meet this demand, buses travelling through the townships 
quickly became the targets of violent attacks. As was described earlier in Chapter 3, bus 












Since a number of informal interviews's were conducted prior to the eruption of conflict 
and violence, it became clear during the interviews conducted at the height of the 
conflict, that the context had a tremendous impact on the findings, especially with regard 
to perceptions about the bus industry and the relationship between the two industries. 
References to the conflict were regularly made as will be seen in the presentation of the 
research findings in the next chapter. 
5.7 Ethical considerations 
An important ethical consideration was the confidentiality of the respondents. Prior to the 
commencement of the interviews, issues regarding confidentiality and anonymity were 
discussed in detail with each of the respondents. It was evident from the very beginning, 
but even more so during the bus/taxi conflict of 2000, that respondents were extremely 
concerned about their identities, the names of their associations and the locations of their 
ranks becoming public knowledge. Considering the history of that conflict and the 
widespread existence of intimidation, there was little doubt that very real threats existed. 
The fears and concerns of the respondents, as well as the sensitivity of the issues under 
investigation which concerns illegal activities in the taxi industry, had to be recognised. 
The need for accurate quotations and interpretations was extremely important. Given the 
climate within which the research was done, there existed a particular responsibility on 
the part of the researcher to respect the confidentiality of the respondents' views. 
18 Informal interviews refer to discussions held with drivers and owner-drivers during the process of 











5.8 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is the process whereby the researcher brings order to the data. It is the 
stage in the research where sense is made of what has emerged from the research. While 
analysis of the data occurred virtually throughout the research, in that after each 
interview the data was briefly evaluated and checked against the themes of the study, the 
final analysis occurred after the completion of the fieldwork, when sense could be made 
of all the information that had been gathered during the research, including the 
information that emerged from the literature review. 
Following the collection of data, transcription of interviews took place. All recorded 
interviews were fully transcribed. Transcripts of each of the interviews were then placed 
into one of three groups: the taxi industry; law enforcement; or NGO's, depending on 
which group the respondents belonged to. Within each of these groups there were also 
categories and thus transcripts were then placed into one of the categories within each of 
the groups. In the taxi industry group, the categories were: taxi drivers; owner-drivers; 
and taxi association executive committee members. In the law enforcement group the 
categories were: the SAPS and the Traffic Department. In the NGO group, because the 
respondents interviewed were both from the same NGO, there was only category in this 
group namely UMAC. Taking into consideration the confidentiality of all the 
respondents, each category was assigned a letter and each respondent in the category was 
assigned a number, which, for convenience was assigned in the order in which the 
interviews were conducted. Thus, for the category taxi drivers, the letter A was assigned 
and each of the 35 taxi drivers interviewed were assigned a number from 1 to 35. 
Similarly, the categories owner-drivers, taxi association executive committee members, 











respectively and the respondents in each of these categories were assigned the numbers 
1 to 15, 1 to 10, 1 to 5, 1 to 5, and 1 to 2 respectively. Therefore Respondent A5 would 
immediately be identified as a taxi driver, whereas Respondent E4 would be identified 
as a traffic officer. Table 2 shows the codes the respondents were assigned. 
Table 2: CODES ASSIGNED TO THE RESPONDENTS 
NUMBERS 
GROUP CAIEGQRY LEITERS ASSIGNED IQ IHE 
ASSIGNED RES,eQNDENTS 
taxi drivers A 1 to 35 
taxi industry owner-drivers B 1 to 15 
association C 1 to 10 
executive committee 
members 
SAPS D 1 to 5 
law enforcement 
Traffic Department E 1 to 5 
NGO's UMAC F 1 to 2 
Once this process was complete, the individual interviews were carefully scrutinised and 
themes that emerged within each one were highlighted and compared to the rest of the 
interviews in that group. Similarities, patterns, relationship trends that became visible 
were further highlighted. Upon completion of this, the process of quantification was 
adopted. As was discussed earlier and as will be seen in the presentation of the findings 











any way related to the manner in which it would apply in purely quantitative research. 
'Quasi-quantification' terms like 'many', 'most', 'often' and so forth were used in this 
research as a means of summarising what the data yielded and presenting an overall 
picture. Furthermore, direct quotations from the transcripts will be presented in the 
findings with the intention of showing what was typical of a particular response or what 
best explains and represents what the general view was concerning a particular issue. 
The entire analysis process was geared towards shedding light on the issues explored in 
this research, and through this process, to develop a better understanding of the 
complexities of issues that concern the minibus-taxi industry. Thus the key areas focused 
on during the analysis were: conflict and violence in the taxi industry; regulation of the 













PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a presentation of the main research findings which emerged from 
three distinct groups: members of the minibus-taxi industry; law enforcement officials 
and members of UMAC, a NGO actively involved in dispute resolution and peacemaking 
activities. On the whole, the findings capture the extent to which the taxi industry in 2000 
remained bedevilled by systemic ailments which have been long in the making. This 
continuity in volatility suggests that post-1994 governmental strategies are still to bear 
fruit. 
6.2 Respondents from the minibus-taxi industry: 
drivers, owners and taxi association executive committee members 
The respondents from the taxi industry were all men in their mid to late thirties and early 
forties who come from the historically disadvantaged communities of South Africa, 
namely the African and Coloured communities. Many of the drivers and owner-drivers 
have been in the industry for longer than 10 years, while the majority of the committee 
members have been in the industry for longer than 15 years. Drivers, owner-drivers and 
committee members all stated that the main reason for entering the taxi industry was 











and training, the taxi industry afforded them an opportunity to 'make a living'. Part of 
the initial appeal was the seeming ability of drivers to control their income. However, 
many of the respondents stated that what had appeared to be a lucrative business 
opportunity, in fact turned out to be a continuous struggle to 'make ends meet'. For these 
drivers and owner-drivers making money in the taxi industry was not an easy task. 
Committee members on the other hand felt that while the industry was not as lucrative as 
it should be, it was an industry where money could be made. Many of the executive 
committee members had started out as drivers and after some years in the industry had, 
through obtaining financial assistance or saving their own money, purchased their own 
vehicles and employed drivers. 
A notable observation about respondents within the taxi industry was that although they 
came from different taxi associations, associations often in conflict with one another, 
members often had the same experiences and confronted very similar difficulties. 
Furthermore they were not only in the same positions, but they very often had similar 
views and opinions about the same topics. A further observation was that there existed a 
hierarchy in the taxi industry, with a critical distinction between drivers, owner-drivers 
and taxi association executive committee members. With regard to power, influence and 
economic standing. drivers were at the bottom of this hierarchy while the executive 
committee members appeared to be near the top. Mother bodies and in particular the 
executive committees of the mother bodies as has been shown by Dugard (2001), are 











6.2.1 W orkin~ conditions in- the taxi industry 
One of the key issues that emerged from the literature was the working conditions which 
have existed within the industry since its inception. In this research, enquiries into the 
working conditions within the industry were aimed at gaining a better understanding of 
the operations of the taxi industry and what conditions the drivers face on a daily basis. 
This was to better grasp the stresses that are faced within the workplace and how 
respondents viewed their daily working environment. It was also to determine whether 
anything has changed significantly within the work environment in democratic South 
Africa, since restructuring the taxi industry has been in effect in one form or another 
since the days of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry. 
Perceptions of working conditions within the taxi industry were greatly influenced by the 
position each of the groups found themselves in. Drivers and owner-drivers involved in 
the daily operation of the taxi industry, often found conditions to be 'unbearable' and 
'difficult. 'They emphasised the long hours they have to work, often from as early as five 
in the morning, to as late as nine in the evening. The weekly wage paid to drivers is 
often determined by means of a quota system. Quotas are usually amounts set by the 
owners, and according to the drivers, these quotas are in most instances unreasonably 
high. This was seen by many as an attempt by the owners to ensure that little or no time 
is left for the drivers to make money for themselves after the target amount has been 
reached. Thus, one of the difficulties drivers face in their working environment is the 
struggle to reach their quotas in an overtraded market. While there was great reluctance 
to discuss finances and incomes, respondents, by way of explaining their situations, 
estimated that in cases where an average amount of between R1600 and R2000 per week 











instances RJOO. A few respondents claimed to have received as little as R150, with this 
often occurring if drivers failed to reach the quota. There were also a few cases where the 
drivers were required to bring in a set amount at the end of each day and in such 
instances the drivers would then receive a set wage on either a weekly or monthly basis. 
All the drivers agreed that the amounts that they were being paid were not sufficient to 
meet their living expenses and many saw this failure by the owners to pay them 'decent 
wages' as a deliberate tactic by their employers to keep them in their present positions 
where they are barely able to 'make ends meet '. They saw what they regarded as their 
'exploitation', as a means for the taxi owners to become 'rich', while they are the 'cheap 
labour' who make it possible. 
Owner-drivers appeared to have a slight advantage in that they owned their own taxis and 
were therefore essentially working for themselves. Pressures to reach a certain amount 
by the end of the day were thus significantly less than in the case of drivers. In cases 
where the owner-drivers owned more than one vehicle and employed drivers, the 
advantage was even greater. 
To help shed light on the operations in the taxi industry the case study in figure 1 gives 











Fi ure 1: A case stud 
A day in the life of a taxi driver: 
The story of Mr. Adams12 
It is 5am and the alarm signals the start of the new working day. Mr. Adams is familiar 
with the routine, he has followed it everyday for the past nine years. 'I am so used to 
getting up early. It has become just like my life. I must get up and go to work because it 
means a pay check at the end of the week. I don't mind getting up so early', he says. By 
5:30am he is well on his way to his employer's home to fetch the taxi that overnight was 
parked in his employers garage. There have been occasions when Mr. Adams has had the 
taxi overnight at his own home, and though this is convenient for him, since he is able to 
go directly to the rank from his horne without stopping at his employers horne, his 
employer seldom allows this to happen. Mr. Adams feels that his employer does not trust 
him to take care of the vehicle while it is on his property. 
By 5:45 Mr. Adams and his 'guard" whom he picked up along the way, reaches the 
rank. Many other taxis from his association and from other associations are already there. 
There are also long queues of passengers already waiting to be transported to their 
workplaces. Many of the other drivers are loading, and Mr. Adams falls in the back of the 
long line of taxis to wait his tum. 'It is always like this so early in the morning ... The 
people line up around the block and it is easy to make the taxi full'. By 6:00am Mr. 
Adams has loaded his taxi and is on his way making the first trip for the day. He is 
familiar with many of his passengers since they are regulars. 'I know most of my 
passengers that travel with me in the morning. Some of them travel with me again in the 
night. They trust me ... I am like their friend. We laugh and make jokes '. His guard collects 
the fares and lets Mr. Adams know where the first passengers will be getting off. Putting 
a cassette into the tape, Mr. Adams goes about the business of negotiating heavy peak 
hour traffic. 
The bumper to bumper traffic is a regular sight during peak hours. It is during this time 
that Mr. Adams and the rest of the taxi drivers have to be careful since, being known for 
their hazardous driving, there are a number of traffic officers on the road waiting to pull 
over a taxi that appears to be disobeying the rules of the road. Mr. Adams is of the 
opinion that the traffic officers enjoy wielding their power and that they pull over any 
taxi even if that driver did not do anything that warranted him being pulled over. 'They 
just love it, I think. Some of these guys they do it just for kicks. I mean they can sometimes 
see that the drivers don't do anything and still they pull them over. They see the van is 
ull and then they want to pull the taxi over and talk for half an hour ... Now if there is a 
real problem, if the driver was going to make a accident, if the brakes are bad or 
something like that or if the driver is drunk, and is making things dangerous for other 
drivers then okay, I say then you can pull him over, but if it's nothing then leave the guys 
alone ... but then again you must also understand that some drivers drive bad but it is not 
19 Keeping in mind that the confidentiality of all the respondents is to be protected in this research, the Mr. 
Adams referred to here is a fictional character created to illustrate a day in the life of a taxi driver. 
However, the events described are accounts of how many drivers spend an average day in the taxi 











really bad because they know how to drive the tfLti. They have been doing it for years 
They are just good at the job '. 
As Mr. Adams drops passengers along the way, his guard shouts through the open 
window signalling to potential passengers. The taxi stops often as people get off and 
others get on. Mr. Adams is well aware that some of the stops he makes are in violation 
of traffic rules, but he justifies it by saying that what he does is convenient not only for 
him, as he is able to get a lot more passengers that way, but also for the passengers as 
they appreciate that he drops them as close to their destinations as possible, especially if 
there are no taxi ranks or bus stops in the area. 'Look, I can't just stop at the rank. Some 
people they stand along the road and they stick out their hands. The buses are not going 
to stop there. I must stop there. The people know we will stop. And they want us to stop 
because otherwise they have to walk long ways. I am doing them a favour and they 
appreciate it. It makes things better for them and better for me because it is easier for 
both of us. If we don '[ get caught by the traffic cops, ... and there is so little of them on the 
road that we can get away with it a lot, ... and ifnobody gets hurt then I don't see what the 
problem is. I can't just sit back and let all the other tfLT.is do it and I don '( do it because I 
want to be good and get in the good books with the cops. Are the cops there to see me be 
good? No! How are they going to reward me for my good behaviour? If they can catch 
me when I am doing something bad, then they can catch me and I must face it, but if I can 
get away with it and make money and make the passengers happy, then I must do what I 
have to do. There are not enough places for us to stop and for the people to get on, and 
sometimes people can't get to the ranks. ' 
When the peak hours are over and the passengers are scarce Mr. Adams prefers to wait at 
the rank instead of 'cruising'. 'It is okay to cruise sometimes, when things are real~y 
going slow, but that also takes up your petrol you see and then sometimes you can ride 
or a long time and not get any passengers. ' 
The last trip is completed at 8:45pm. Mr. Adams delivers the taxi at his employer's house 
where he has to hand over R250 from the day's income. Whatever additional amount he 
was able to make goes directly into his pocket and in the pocket of his 'guard'. However, 
it is not always easy to reach the target amount. For Mr. Adams the overcrowded market 
is one of the main reasons for this difficulty he experiences. 'There are just too many 
taxis and too many associations and everybody want the same thing. We are all in the 
same boat and it is not easy to make money to take in at the end of the day. But you try 
you know. That is why there is so much fighting, because we are struggling to just get the 
targets, and on some routes it is easier ... but if another guy from another association 
comes and tries to get the passengers here on the route that I operate on, then something 
must be done because the people can choose what taxi they want to get, but if they choose 
him it is wrong because he is not even supposed to be there in the first place ... and if he 
isn't there then they will choose me or maybe another driver that is supposed to be there. 
I don't actually mind competing with another guy that must be on the route because he is 
supposed to be there ... that is a fair game ... but if the guy that is not supposed to be there 
steals our passengers, then me and that other guy ... we get together and we stand with 
each other to see to it that the other guy goes away ... If that means that we must fight, 
then it must be so ... but on most days it is just difficult to make money even with the guys 











The executive committee members, although acknowledging that difficulties existed in 
the working environment, claimed that the driver determined his own working 
conditions. These committee members, many having been drivers themselves argued 
that because drivers were accustomed to the daily operations of the taxi industry and 
were aware of what it took to survive in the industry, they were equipped to deal with the 
daily pressures that existed. As one respondent explained: 
"Look. we know it is difficult out there. but the drivers are 
used to it by now. They know what circumstances exist and 
they know how to handle it. They must decide when they 
start in the morning, how is my day going to be? Am I 
going to fight with my enemy or am I going to be smart and 
do my job better than my enemy. ,,20 
The committee members all owned more than two taxis and employed drivers. Money 
collected by the drivers came directly to these owners, and it was then up to the owner to 
decide how much the driver would be paid. While drivers felt strongly that their 
employers' refusal to pay them adequate wages was based on greed, committee members 
claimed to pay their drivers 'according to the work he does' and 'the money he brings 
in '. Many also argued that maintenance of vehicles drained their profits. One respondent 
captured the views held by many of the committee members: 
"For drivers it is like a temporary job. We provide that job. 
They must appreciate it and the money that we give them. 
Where are they going to find another job out there? There 
are too many people without jobs. One driver gives up his 
job and another one steps in. My taxi, lawn it, he works Jar 
20 Respondent C4, June 2001. The 'enemy' referred to here was the drivers from other associations who 











me and I pay the wages, make repairs and buy parts for the 
taxi. And I must also still make a profit. That's how it is. ,,21 
When asked about leaving the taxi industry for better working conditions, financial 
packages and benefits, the majority of the drivers and owner-drivers said that they would 
without a backward glance leave the industry. Many had dreams of financial freedom, yet 
while expressing the desire to improve overall living conditions, they soon seemed 
resigned to the fact that they would remain fixed in their current positions. In sharp 
contrast, the committee members all felt that they had too much invested in the taxi 
industry to just pack up and leave. The financial loss it would cost them was often 
mentioned as their reason for wanting to remain in the industry, along with 'being your 
own boss' and 'calling your own shots " instead of having to work for and answer to 
someone else. One respondent described it as his 'life's blood " while another felt that 
the industry had given him the best opportunity to make a living with the little education 
he had. 
Khosa in 1994 described conditions within the taxi industry saying: 
Employed taxi drivers are often forced to work extremely 
long hours for a pittance. Research indicates that taxi 
drivers often work between 16 and 18 hours a day. Daily 
takings vary from RIOO to R200 for short distances and 
between R500 and RI 000 for long distances. Out of an 
average of R800 generated per week, a short-distance taxi 
driver would be paid about a RIOO per week (Khosa, 
1994:63). 











From what has been revealed in this research, very little has changed in the plight of the 
taxi drivers. While democracy brought with it new legislation with regard to labour 
relations in the workplace, such as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, it appears here that these laws have not as yet 
been put into effect in the taxi industry, Working conditions for taxi drivers remain as 
difficult as ever and there appears to be no government mechanisms in place to monitor 
whether or not the taxi owners or the taxi associations have adopted the standards set by 
the labour laws. 
6.2.2 Relationships between drivers. owners and taxi associations 
One of the objectives of the research was to better understand the relationships that exist 
within the taxi industry. Having confirmed the existence of a hierarchy, the nature of the 
relationships becomes even more crucial as the balance of power emerges as a key 
element in the relationships. What quickly became apparent is that the relationships 
within the industry were severely strained and that although many of the respondents 
would often characterise the relationships as 'okay', their explanations would reveal a 
story that emphasised that the relationships were in fact far from being 'okay', The 
problems experienced in the relationships between members within the industry 
highlighted the unequal balance of power as well as the lack of communication, lack of 
trust, the exploitation, fear, and intimidation that often characterises these relationships. 
As was already seen, drivers viewed owners in a rather negative light. In addition to 
feeling excluded from the decision-making processes, drivers also felt that owners were 
not treating them fairly with regard to work hours, working conditions and wages. This is 











power. Contracts between owners and drivers are usually secured through an oral 
agreement and could be terminated at the owner's discretion as neither the owner or the 
association abides by protective labour legislation. In 1996 Mthembu argued that no 
improvement had occurred in the relationship between drivers and owners and that 
working conditions remained unchanged. 
Owners, although characterising their relationships with their drivers in a much more 
positive light, felt that since they were the ones paying the wages, they were entitled to 
make all the decisions, without any input from the drivers. Although the owner-drivers 
generally described relationships with their drivers as 'okay', and the committee 
members all saying that their relationships with their drivers were 'very good', the 
overwhelming feeling was that taxi owners were doing their drivers a 1avour' and that 
drivers should be more appreciative. The high unemployment rate in the country was 
often mentioned, with many of the respondents feeling that drivers should be grateful for 
the opportunity owners gave them to 'earn money'. Committee members further agreed 
with the drivers in that they too believed that the owners had the power in the owner-
driver relationship. 
Deep divisions appeared to exist not only between the drivers and the owners, but also 
between both owners and drivers and the taxi associations they were affiliated to. Many 
stressed that being a member of a taxi association was essentially just a means of 
ensuring legitimacy within the taxi industry, since not being a member of an association 
makes it extremely difficult to operate on certain routes and have access to ranks, as taxi 
association members ensured that 'their turf' was not violated. Drivers and owner-drivers 
generally had very negative perceptions of taxi associations, the consensus being that 











association leaders failed to properly include all members in the decision-making 
process. Contrary to the opinions of drivers who felt that taxi associations did not do 
much for its members, the committee members all felt that the relationship between the 
association and its members was very good and that the association committees were 
'always there to assist the drivers with whatever grievances they may have '. They saw 
associations as not only being a means for the drivers to be part of a legitimate group 
within the taxi industry, but also as providing a space where problems could be sorted 
out. 
Considering the history of conflicts between rival taxi associations, it was not surprising 
that drivers and owner-drivers had negative views of other taxi associations. 
Respondents' relationships with members of other taxi associations who often compete 
for the same routes and same passengers, appeared to be plagued with problems. These 
'other' associations were often blamed for many of the problems within the taxi industry, 
with respondents in almost all instances arguing that rival taxi associations refused to 
take responsibility for their actions. It was interesting to note that although the majority 
of the respondents appeared dissatisfied with their own taxi associations, they did not 
once entertain the notion that their association could perhaps share in the blame for the 
state that the industry is in with regard to conflict and violence. Their competitors were 
always the ones responsible for the conflicts that existed over the control of routes, ranks 
and passengers. 'They' were the ones overstepping the boundaries and it was in 'their' 
association that the corrupt elements were to be found. Furthermore, many respondents 
felt that their rivals were responsible for creating the negative image of the taxi industry. 
'Their' drivers were reckless, dangerous, breaking traffic laws and disobeying the rank 











'victims' of 'difficult' and 'corrupt' members from rival associations. There was an 
overall tendency towards scapegoating and the demonising of members from 'other' 
associations, as this shift of blame appeared in some form or another in statements made 
by all drivers and owner-drivers. Personal responsibility was seldom taken for similar 
behaviour, as respondents often rationalised such behaviour by describing it as being a 
defence against, or a reaction to others exhibiting the behaviour first. As the following 
respondents stated: 
"They bait us. We just do what they do, otherwise we lose 
out. They are getting away with it, so we can '[just sit back 
and do nothing while they steal our share. But they started 
it first . .,22 
"You have to think of yourself first. If they play dirty, I 
must play dirty too, or I will lose the game. I will look like 
a complete idiot if I let them steal my passengers and I do 
nothing about it. So I must do what they do, or else I don 'f 
survive. ,,23 
"If you let them get away with stealing your passengers or 
doing some other thing wrong then they will keep on doing 
it. You must show them that you are willing to stand up for 
yourself, so that they will stop. Otherwise they will walk all 
over you. ,,24 
Surprisingly the committee members felt that relationships between rival taxi 
associations were very good. Many respondents claimed that 'for the moment' everything 
was 'quite good', but that the possibility for conflict always existed since associations 
had little control over the reactions drivers had towards each other on the roads. An 
22 Respondent AS, March 2000. 
2J Respondent A28, July 2000. 











argument between two drivers who 'just don't like each other' could, it was noted, act as 
a catalyst for a conflict. Through the intervention of other drivers from both associations, 
the conflict could rapidly escalate, with attacks quickly being followed by retaliatory 
attacks. When asked how associations reprimanded drivers who were involved in 
conflict, respondents stated that the executive committee would be contacted, a meeting 
would be called and the punishment the driver will receive would be decided. These 
punishments ranged from being asked to stay at home for a period of time (usually a 
week at the least), being fined (which drivers would then have to work off) or being fired. 
One respondent admitted though that relationships between rival taxi associations would 
never be okay and that 10r the time being', they were only 'okay on the sUlface '. As he 
explained: 
"Look, we will never agree on the same things. So now 
things look like they are okay, but it is only on the surface 
you understand. If you just say or do one thing wrong then 
the fighting starts again. For now everything is quiet but 
underneath you remember what happened last week, last 
month, last year. It is always in the back of your mind and 
it will come out one day ... 25 
Another respondent further argued that differences in beliefs and ideologies were among 
the main reasons why relationships between rivals were so difficult. This was given as an 
explanation for why certain groups did not want to 10rm one big group '. Here the issue 
of race was brought in, however, it was not seen as the primary reason for why some 
associations had a predominantly Coloured membership or why others were 
predominantly African. The reason for this was seen to be the differences of opinion 











regarding how an organisation should be run and who should be in charge of that 
organisation. As was stated: 
"We will never agree on things. So it is best that we must 
stay apart. That is the only way there can be some peace. 
Otherwise when we are together, we fight, people die and 
that is not good. "16 
6.2.3 Taxi industry versus Bus industry 
In chapter three the context within which this research occurred was explained, showing 
how the bus/taxi conflict of 2000, the period during which the majority of the interviews 
were conducted, had a significant effect on the research findings. The objective behind 
examining the relationship between the two industries is that the bus industry has on 
many occasions featured prominently in the conflicts that emanates from within the 
industry. The relationship between the taxi industry and the bus industry has always been 
a strained one, and of particular interest was whether or not the reasons for the strained 
relationships have changed in recent years. At the core of the conflicts that occurred 
between the two industries during the apartheid years was the fact that the bus industry 
received large subsidies and was considered the legitimate mode of public transportation, 
recognised by the government. What emerged from the research is that virtually nothing 
has changed regarding the relationship between the two industries even though the taxi 
industry, in post-apartheid South Africa, has now too been recognised as a legitimate part 
of the transport sector. All of the same issues that featured in the conflicts between the 
two industries in the past, still, as is evident from the research, features prominently in 
the conflicts between the two industries today. 











Considering the context then, it was not too surprising that many respondents had strong 
opinions concerning the relationship between the bus and taxi industries. There was an 
overwhelming feeling amongst all those interviewed, that the taxi industry was still being 
marginalised, although the methods employed were considered to be more subtle today 
than they were during the apartheid years, Many felt that they had a 'bad' relationship 
with the bus industry, with a large majority of the views indicating that the drivers from 
both sides were barely able to tolerate one another. Respondents tended to defend the taxi 
industry and its actions by highlighting the injustices the industry has suffered at the 
hands of the bus industry. With regard to the bus/taxi feuds of the past and especially the 
one of 2000, many respondents felt strongly that the bus industry had brought the 
problems on itself. They felt that the taxi industry was entitled to a larger share of the 
market since the bus industry was still being subsidised by government. 
Furthermore, it was felt by many respondents that the situation would not have escalated 
to the extent that it did if the bus industry had been more open to 'ideas' during 
negotiations. Members of the bus industry were thus considered to be 'unreasonable', 
Many claimed that there existed 'unfair competition' from the bus industry, an industry 
which refused to give the taxi industry their deserved share of the market. Drivers saw 
this as one of the main reasons why they were struggling to reach their targets. The 
committee members also often referred to the bus/taxi conflicts, with many arguing that 
the taxi industry was not as lucrative as it should be as it faced 'unfair' competition from 
the government subsidised buses. Overall, it was very clear that the taxi industry was still 











6.2.4 Relationship with the community 
The relationship that the taxi industry has with the wider community is of importance 
since the manner in which the community views the industry directly impacts how 
successful the taxi industry becomes as passengers are the lifeblood of the industry. The 
many conflicts within the industry coupled with the overloading, speeding and general 
disregard for the traffic laws, has tarnished the image of the taxi industry and of interest 
here was determining in what light the industry viewed their relationship with the 
community, being aware that it is only through a positive relationship with the 
community that the industry can be sustained. 
While a large percentage of respondents stated that the taxi industry had a good 
relationship with the community, there were those who argued that the relationship had 
been strained. They felt that the image of the industry had been severely tarnished 
because of the violence that often resulted in the deaths of innocent bystanders. However, 
a number of respondents argued that although they were often portrayed as the villains in 
the media, members of the community, many of whom were regular passengers and who 
knew the drivers well, were aware that not all drivers and owners were responsible for, 
involved in or had knowledge of criminal activity or violence. The committee members 
took explanations further, many arguing that the taxi industry's relationship with the 
community was 'very good' because the industry provided a 'valuable service' and the 
community, especially the previously disadvantaged communities, 'depend' on the 
industry. 
"Our relationship with the people is good because we pick 
them up and take them to work. If sometimes they got a lot 











not like the bus. We are always around and we go fast ... we 
help them out for cheap . .,27 
6.2.5 Relationship with !ian!is 
When it came to the relationship between the industry and gangs, a very complex picture 
emerged. As was mentioned in chapter 3, gangs have been known to be involved with 
members of the taxi industry and there have been allegations that the failure on the part 
of taxi drivers to pay 'protection money', has been a contributory factor to some of the 
taxi conflicts. Respondents were very reluctant to openly discuss the issue of 
relationships that exists between members of the taxi industry and the gangs that exist in 
Cape Town and that are known for their terrorising of the communities. It became very 
clear though that there existed an atmosphere of secrecy and fear surrounding this issue 
as many respondents preferred to voice their opinions off the record, while those willing 
to go on record tended to be very careful in how they responded. It was therefore 
difficult to determine the nature of the interrelationships between gangs and taxi 
operators. It was however apparent that there was no fixed manner in which the gangs 
operated. 
Among the drivers and owner-drivers, there were a number of respondents who argued 
that members within the industry, drivers in particular at times 'desired' a relationship 
with a gang because a 'gang connection' would prove to be extremely 'useful' when it 
came to conflicts with rival taxi associations. The feeling here was that gang members 
who are well known for their criminal activities, not only have the resources to assist in 
eliminating competitors, but that they are also able to make it extremely difficult for law 











enforcement agencies to apprehend offenders, as bringing in a 'gang connection' 
complicates what has proved to be an already difficult situation for the investigators. 
While respondents were visibly reluctant to provide information on this issue, there were 
stories that emerged of members within the industry who arranged for members of gangs 
to 'assist' them in preventing members from rival associations from gaining access to 
lucrative routes, at times even when they have the required permits. Others stated that 
entering into a financial agreement with a gang was not always a choice but that, since 
the arrangement could be mutually beneficial, there was no reason to risk injury or death 
by refusing to co-operate or challenging the issue of protection money. The argument 
here was that gangs could provide assistance in the conflicts between associations where 
one association wanted to limit its competitor's access to lucrative routes. Respondents 
therefore suggested that there are members within the taxi industry who would pay 
protection money to ensure that only their association's members are able to travel on 
the routes. In some instances extra money would be paid so that gangs would not make 
agreements with other associations also. Gangs would then deny some operators access 
to routes by using strong arm tactics, while allowing others, those who have paid 
protection money, to operate freely. Generally, despite the limited information given by 
the respondents, a picture of fear and intimidation emerged, where members of the taxi 
industry were forced into a relationship with a gang. The gang either demanded that a 
financial arrangement be made with an association with the assurance of safe passage 
through gang territory in exchange for a fee, or randomly stopped taxis who travelled 
through the gang territories, demanding money. In the latter scenario the assumption is 
that the money will be used for drugs: a quick fix. Respondents refused to speculate as to 












The committee members confirmed that relationships between members of the taxi 
industry and gangs 'does in fact exist'. Here again, there was a reluctance to discuss the 
nature of such arrangements or the benefits that are afforded to the parties. Like the 
drivers and owner-drivers, the committee members tended to portray the connections that 
existed between the taxi industry and the gangs as being the fault of 'other associations'. 
They consequently denied knowledge of any relationship existing between gangs and 
members of their own associations. As one respondent pointed out: 
"It does happen, this relationship with the skollies, the 
gangsters. It does happen as I hear it in other associations. 
I suspect it is the associations that use gangsters when 
they've got a problem with another association. They have 
gangsters to protect them. "28 
Exploring the relationship between the taxi industry and gangs, while extremely difficult, 
was important in shedding light on the complexities that surround the issue of conflict 
and violence in the taxi industry. There appears to be not only members within the 
industry that are responsible for the criminal activities, but also members from criminal 
gangs, showing an interconnection between different criminal networks. With alliances 
being forged between these different networks it is not hard to understand the difficulties 
the law enforcement agencies have in determining who the perpetrators are. Once again 
the complexity of the issue of conflict and violence in the minibus-taxi industry comes to 
the fore. 











6.2.6 Relationship with law enforcement a~encies: the SAPS and Traffic Officers 
The laws and policies of the apartheid government contributed greatly to the manner in 
which policing occurred in the black townships. With their main agenda being the 
enforcement of apartheid laws and the elimination of any threat to the status quo, police 
involvement in crime and violence that did not directly threaten the state (but in fact had 
township residents fighting amongst each other) was minimal. In cases where the police 
did intervene, the use of excessive force was the norm rather than the exception. The 
belief was that this was the only way in which to control the black majority of the 
population. As Ellis (1999) explains, the police have always had a semi-military nature 
and preceding the political violence of the apartheid era even, ' ... the South African Police 
had developed a specific view of how to police African Populations' (1999:55).29 Law 
enforcement agents served the government and not the people. Developing relationships 
with the community was not a priority as brutalising through excessive force became the 
means of policing the oppressed people of South Africa. As Weitzer (1990) explains, 
their chief objective was defending white supremacy, with any opposition to their cause 
immediately being crushed. Botes (1993) argues that the tensions and hostility existing in 
the relationship between taxi drivers and traffic officials comes from bitter encounters 
experienced during the apartheid years. Furthermore, Van der Reis, Miller and Servas 
(1993) found that the negative views that taxi drivers and traffic officials had about each 
other included views that traffic officers were dishonest and often take bribes, and that 
taxi drivers are lawless. As they state: 
29 For more on the origins of the South African Police (founded in 1913), that lie in British Colonial 
tradition of indirect rule', see: Ellis (1999). 'The New frontiers of crime in South Africa' in J-F. Bayart, S. 












... the relationship between traffic law enforcement officials 
and combi-taxi operators/drivers, has been a cause for 
concern for some time ... this uneasy relationship has often 
been stretched to breaking point, and has even given rise to 
a number of violent confrontations (Van der Reis, Miller 
and Servas, 1993: 1-1). 
The relationship between taxi drivers and traffic law enforcement officials especially, are 
also often characterised, as Miller (1991) put it, ' ... by suspicion and mistrust' (quoted in 
Van der Reis et ai, 1993 :2-14). With democracy came attempts by the police to alter the 
relationship between the industry and the law enforcement agencies responsible for 
dealing with taxi related issues. Of concern then in this research was whether there has 
been any dramatic change in the perceptions members of the industry had of the SAPS 
\ 
and Traffic Officers. 
The South African Police Service was viewed negatively by over 90% of the drivers and 
owner-drivers. They were considered to be 'corrupt " 'ineffective I and 'incompetent '. 
Perceptions of conspiracy and collusion were dominant as many respondents accused the 
SAPS of conspiring against certain' associations while favouring others. Among the 
respondents there existed little doubt that reports about corruption within the SAPS were 
true. Many further believed that members of the SAPS were providing weapons to 
members of the taxi industry for the purposes of eliminating competitors. The arguments 
here were that many within the SAPS had personal fmancial interests in the industry and 
that they would go to any lengths to protect those interests. While respondents claimed to 
have knowledge of actual instances where police where involved in arranging to provide 
information and weapons to members within the industry, none would go on record as to 











and in fact being very involved with taxi associations. Bribery was considered to be a 
common practice and while many acknowledged that there were 'clean' members of the 
SAPS who want to have a positive impact and who do attempt to do proper police work, 
the consensus was that it was extremely difficult to trust the SAPS since it could be a 
potentially 'deadly mistake '. As was stated: 
"Look, you get the good guys, you know these new guys 
who are coming in and want to do the right thing. The 
problem is that these good guys are working with the bad 
guys. They are colleagues and so you see when colleagues 
share information then there can be a bad guy that hears 
about that information and he will do bad things with that 
information. So who do you trust? Can you take a chance 
like that? ,,30 
"If for instance I go lay a charge and I speak to one man 
and I see that he is being difficult, that he is not willing to 
hear me, then what is the use of me going to someone else 
in that same station if that one man, if he wanted to, could 
make my information that I give disappear. ,,31 
The committee members also had negative perceptions of the SAPS, believing strongly 
that the level of police involvement in the taxi industry was based on their personal 
investment in the industry. Here stories emerged about police manipulating situations 
through interfering in the industry to serve their own interests. It was believed that these 
policemen were being paid by some associations to 'stay off their backs' or to 'get on the 
case of another association '. One respondent alluded to the 'dirty cops' who make a 
)0 Respondent A8, March 2000. 











'decent living' only because they are involved in 'scams' which involve the taxi industry. 
As he stated: 
"They don 'f earn so much money. They earn little and they 
put their lives on the line for little money? No, they must 
make extra income. There are ways to make that extra 
income. You must just know the right people who have the 
power and then you do what they say, do some favours, 
give out a name and number or you make something 
disappear. There are ways to get some extra money. For 
the police it is easy. So they are safe. They get their money 
and that is it ... 32 
Similarly, relationships with traffic officers were considered to be bad. Drivers often 
described traffic officers as 'being out to get them' or to be 'harassing' them. 
Respondents often referred to the number of times per week they were pulled over for 
what they considered to be 'minor' traffic violations. 
"They are out to get us. Even when we are doing nothing 
they just see us and pull us over. Then if we ask why, they 
threaten to fine us. They are just as corrupt as the police. 
They just want to show us who's in charge ... 33 
The committee members, while admitting to not having much contact with traffic 
officers, argued that they have in the past and the present heard and seen how some 
traffic officers treat the taxi drivers. Drivers, owner-drivers and association executive 
committee members were all convinced that racism played an important part in how the 
SAPS and traffic officers treated members of the taxi industry. 
32 Respondent C9, June 2001. 











"After 1994, nothing changed. They say we have rights but 
unfortunately a number of our people, especially in our 
industry, unfortunately they don't know their rights. ,,)4 
"They say to us - Thabo Mbeki he says that 1 must do this 
to you. They are still racist. They say to us, your president 
makes new rules now. It is difficult to lay a charge because 
we don't trust them and we don't know the rights of the 
people. Racism still exists. Sometimes the traffic officers do 
something that is totally incorrect, but what can you do 
about it? ,,35 
Effective law enforcement has always been lacking when it comes to policing the 
minibus-taxi industry. Whatever the reasons for the lack, be it the agenda of 
destabilisation during the apartheid era or lack of resources, the issue the democratic 
government is faced with now is that the relationship between the industry and law 
enforcement agencies is severely strained. The nature of the relationship hampers any 
genuine attempts to police the industry and address the issue of conflict and violence. 
6.2.7 Perceptions of the Recapitalisation Programme 
When asked to identify the most serious problem facing the minibus-taxi industry, the 
majority of the interviewees focused on the restructuring of the industry with specific 
reference to the Recapitalisation programme. This issue seemed to take precedence over 
a range of other problems (such as corrupt traffic officials, crime and violence, and pirate 
operators), presented in a closed question during the interview. However, given the 
prominent nature of the Recapitalisation programme at the time the research was 
34 Respondent C4, June 2001. 











conducted, this was not too surpnsmg. Both the drivers and owner-drivers were 
extremely concerned about the future of the taxi industry, fearing that the restructuring of 
the industry would mean the loss of their jobs. From the interviews it became apparent 
however that all of the respondents had very little substantive knowledge about the 
programme itself. 
Drivers knew only that new buses would replace their existing taxis. Many did not even 
know the name of the programme, referring to it only as the 'government's programme'. 
A majority of the respondents (drivers and owner-drivers) argued that their associations 
probably had all the information and details about the programme, and all the 
respondents felt that they had not been adequately informed about the programme's 
details. Many saw this failure on the part of the associations to filter the information 
down to the drivers, as another indication of their positions in the industry hierarchy. 
Some respondents claimed that 'people who call the shots in the taxi associations' were 
not too concerned about the drivers and their fears because 'they were not the ones that 
would lose their jobs. ' As was argued: 
"Those people have nothing to worry about. I am the one 
that will lose my job and then be out on the streets. They 
are the taxi people, the important people. Like the owners, 
they have got the money to do other things. They will be 
able to afford the big buses and then they will only need 
maybe one driver and then what happens to the other 
people. I am out of a job. Now they don't tell us anything. 
Maybe they are not concerned because they are safe you 
understand. ,,36 











Only a small number (less then 15%) of the respondents were in favour of the 
programme, hoping for better incomes, working conditions and stability in the taxi 
industry. The majority opposed to the programme feared that their jobs would be lost and 
that government attempts to implement the programme would lead to more violence in 
the industry. 
"What are they [government] going to do? Take our taxis 
away? What if we don't want those new things, the big 
buses? What ifwe don't want it? Are they going to force us 
to take them? No they can't do that. People are going to 
fight!! ,,37 
"Must we just stand still and see how they take away our 
jobs. ,,38 
Having carefully scrutinised newspaper articles and government statements in which it 
was continuously stated that all stake-holders had the necessary information about the 
programme, and with drivers voicing their suspicions that the taxi associations had the 
necessary information about the programme and had just failed in their duty to inform 
them, it was surprising to discover that the taxi association executive committee members 
did not know much about the programme either. Only four out of the ten respondents 
from the executive committees had a basic working knowledge of the programme. When 
they were asked exactly what they knew about the programme, all that was mentioned 
was that 'new buses would replace old taxis " 'there will be certain benefits' and 'there 
would be many job losses'. Another interesting discovery was that none of the executive 
committee members knew of their association being consulted by either government or 
37 Respondent Al 0, April 2000. 











SATACO. Respondents often referred to other associations, their main rivals, and stated 
that 'they must know the details about government's plans. ' Two of the respondents 
further felt that the mother bodies might have the information since they were the ones 
who sent representatives to 'negotiate with the government'. A chairman from one 
association who had attended a meeting with a mother body stated that the industry 
members had 'some knowledge' about the Recapitalisation programme, however since no 
final decision has been made yet, and since the 'threat is not immediate', there was 'no 
real need' to inform the drivers. Similar responses were given by the other committee 
members regarding why information about the programme had not reached the drivers. 
As one respondent stated: 
"No decision has been made yet. Unless a decision is 
made, we don't have to tell the drivers. ,>39 
The lack of communication and information was considered by many respondents as a 
failure on the part of the government. As the following respondents explained: 
"It is a problem. Nobody came from government to address 
the associations - what's going on - we find out through the 
news. Nobody comes to tell us what's going on, so it is a 
problem. We don't have the details. We don't have full 
information. ,,40 
"We don't have all the information so we don't know what 
is going on and that is dangerous because we hear from 
outside that the government wants to come and take over 
the industry and we read in the paper and see on the news 
what is going on in Jo 'burg. They are fighting and 
government ignores their concerns. ,>41 
39 Respondent e6, June 2001. 
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"There might be a lack from the government in delivering 
the information. There might be a lack from our 
representatives. Maybe they don't break the information 
clearly. But we are in darkness. That is why we don't want 
to accept something like that ... 42 
"As we see in the newspaper, the government says at the 
end of the year [2001 j, the process will be continued, the 
new taxis will be delivered ... and then at the same time we 
hear government say they give us chance until 2006. We 
don't really have proper information ... 43 
Respondents all stated that they would be willing to 'sit and talk' with the government 
about the Recapitalisation programme and 'negotiate.' Yet at the same time many felt 
that it was not likely to happen. As was stated: 
"The government, they only want to come here to us when 
they need votes, otherwise we are not important. But I am 
saying that we would accept them coming here and talking 
to us. ,,44 
"You see this office here, nobody from government comes 
here to talk, to sit down and tell us what is going on. They 
are welcome. We would be glad if we can see government 
coming here to talk. '145 
Furthermore, with regard to SATACO and its claims to represent the taxi industry, one 
respondent summed up the general consensus: 
"I don 'I know anyone who is a member of SA TACO bUI I 
hear even the mother bodies they are complaining of 
42 Respondent C5, June 2001. 
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SATACO: SATACO is going to represent us without our 
consent. So I don't know. That was the talking last year 
[2000). So many complaints about SATACo. We know 
nothing oJSATACo. ,,46 
Respondents, although acknowledging that they did not have all the information about 
the Recapitalisation programme, and considering the possibility that there could 
potentially be some good aspects about the programme that would benefit the industry, 
tended to focus more on the negative impact they feared the programme would have on 
the industry. Like the drivers, there was concern about job losses, but while the drivers 
and owner-drivers showed genuine concern for not only themselves but also for their 
fellow drivers, these owners at the executive levels appeared more secure in their 
positions. The following responses captured the overwhelming feeling: 
"Some will be able to afford these new vehicles that the 
government wants to bring in, but many others, the 
majority even, will not have the finances. Now I don't know 
exactly how things will work, but I think some will be more 
secure and others with no money won't be. ,,47 
"There will definitely be a loss oJjobs. For instance, I have 
three people I employ. So if the government, they give me 
one van, what happens to the other two? They lose their 
jobs. Some others have ten vans. The government give two 
or one - loss oJjobs ... 48 
The lack of clear information about the Recapitalisation programme has clearly created 
problems of a serious nature within the taxi industry. The lack of clarity about not only 
46 Respondent C7, June 2001. 
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the programme, but also government's intentions and government's role has resulted in 
many drawing their own conclusions. These conclusions have the capacity to start a 
panic in the industry. 49 
While the government is firmly set on its plans for formalising and regulating the taxi 
industry, there is disagreement within the industry regarding who represents it in the 
negotiations with the State. Thus far SA TACO has been the chief 'representative' body 
of the taxi industry, however many have come out strongly against SATACO, saying that 
it does not represent everyone within the industry. Yet, despite these outcries, and a host 
of media reports saying that SATACO does not represent the entire industry and 
therefore cannot make decisions on behalf of it, the government has continued its 
dealings with SATACO, pretending not to, but virtually ignoring the other voices in the 
industry. As was clearly revealed in this research, there are associations that do not feel 
represented by SA TACO and that have not even come into contact with any government 
official, local authority or SATACO member with regard to the Recapitalisation 
programme. With the uncertainty surrounding the programme still so evident, there is the 
very real threat that the industry will reject the programme and show this opposition 
through staging more blockades, marches and threatening violence. Furthermore, many 
within the industry believe that the programme will be a divisive force in the industry 
since some will qualify for it while others will not. One area where the potential for 
violence already exists is in the scrapping allowance which will be made 'available to 
legal owners of existing vehicles to offset the price of the new vehicles' (Minister of 
Transport, Budget Speech, 2000/2001). Thus only members of the industry who have 
legally registered vehicles will qualify for this allowance and be part of the new industry. 












However, the fact remains that despite ca11s that all illegal taxis be registered, there are 
still many illegal drivers operating today. There is the belief by government that illegal 
taxis will be eliminated from the industry as it is expected that when the programme is 
implemented, identifying these elements would become easier. Knowing the history of 
conflict and violence in the taxi industry the important question then becomes: will these 
operators stand aside and relinquish their stake in the industry just because government 
has demanded it? 
6.2.8 Re~ulation of the taxi industry 
The attempts by members within the taxi industry to regulate operations on routes and at 
ranks, and the absence of effective state regulation has contributed greatly to the unstable 
condition that the industry finds itself in today. With fears regarding the implementation 
of the Recapitalisation programme so visible among members in the industry, exploring 
the perceptions on regulation becomes important as government intends to regulate the 
industry through the programme. 
Many respondents felt strongly that joint committees should regulate the taxi industry. 
Joint committees meant elected representatives from all concerned parties being involved 
in the decision making process regarding how the industry should be regulated and who 
should be the regulatory body. While many acknowledged the need for the government 
and its various departments to playa role, they felt that not all the responsibility and 
power should be left to the government. A small percentage of respondents felt strongly 
that the government had no right to want to step into a regulatory position now, when the 











Others were of the opinion that because there was a lack of trust in the relationship, 
government had no right to expect that the industry would welcome its input. Still others, 
who were in the minority argued that they believed that the government had good 
intentions regarding the Recapitalisation programme and its attempts to regulate the 
industry. The general view though was that regulation should be the responsibility of all 
concerned parties, thus ensuring that no single structure held all the power. Furthennore, 
the negative views of the SAPS and traffic officers, and the beliefs that these agencies 
were corrupt, appeared to serve as a justification for why the taxi industry should not 
subject itself to the authority of the government. The committee members all agreed that 
the government's efforts to restructure the industry was an attempt to get control of the 
industry. The following statement captured the views of many respondents: 
"All these plans of government is to get control of the 
industry. We don '[ trust them, as a result we are hesitant to 
just agree ... 50 
The negative nature of the relationships between members of the industry and 
government, coupled with the lack of effective communication between the parties, 
threatens to severely hamper any government attempts to restructure the industry. Clearly 
the legacy of distrust left by the apartheid regime is a major contributing factor to the 
industry's unwillingness to be subjected to the regulation of the state. 
6.2.9 Conflict and violence in the minibus-taxi industry 
One of the key themes in this research has been the nature and characteristics of conflict 
in the minibus-taxi industry. Of particular interest has been the continuation of the 











conflicts after the democratic election. Prior to 1994, the Goldstone Commission of 
Inquiry identified the main causes of violence in the taxi industry. A concern in this 
research is thus whether progress has been made with regards to addressing the 
underlying contributory factors. 
Money was considered to be the main cause of conflict and violence by over 80% of all 
respondents. The need to improve one's economic standing in an industry where 
competition for lucrative routes was extremely intense was seen to be the motivating 
factor behind the violence in the industry. Power struggles within the industry were 
regarded as struggles to ultimately gain the economic advantage. Furthermore, many 
respondents acknowledged that there was a strong economic element attached to the 
violence since whoever was able to use violence or the threat of violence effectively, 
would in all likelihood benefit economically. 
The committee members tended to couple money and power as the reasons for the 
conflict. Respondents further stated that conflict arises when associations have 
disagreements within its leadership structures. These disagreements would then often 
result in members breaking away to form their own associations. This splitting of 
associations would not only result in bitterness, anger and resentment on both sides, but 
also fierce competition for the routes that had the most passengers. The respondents 
further noted that when there is a struggle and the prize' is money then 'sharing is 
impossible'. Another argument made was that 'fighting' and 'violence' was a means to 
assert authority and to show who had the resources and the power to 'crush the enemy'. 











"You see when they fight then there is always a winner. 
They don't want to stop if the other guy got the upper hand. 
If you and I fight and I win the fight, you are going to 
remember that and you are going to want to win the fight 
also so that your people don '[ think that you are a coward 
and that people can walk over you. You don't want others 
to see that you have lost your power and that you are weak. 
so that is what happens when they fight. ,,51 
Once agam though respondents tended to refer to 'other' associations as the ones 
operating in this manner. 
The general feeling was that in order to continue to make a living, a taxi driver had to 
make use of routes where the most passengers are found. With an already overtraded 
market, the quotas demanded by owners and the competition from buses, this task is 
becoming increasingly more difficult as many taxis now frequent the same routes. If 
access to lucrative routes is denied, either through legitimate or illegitimate means, and 
survival is threatened, then, as was stated by the respondents you have only two options. 52 
You could go along, accepting that you have been denied access to routes, which would 
eventually result in you going 'out of business " or you could 'fight' and 'take it by 
force '. With the perceived positive results violence has had for some in the industry in 
the past, it is very likely that they will continue to use it in the future. 
One committee member very clearly stated that peace agreements could not last long 
since disagreements always emerged and conflict always arises from those 
disagreements. When asked about other, more peaceful methods that could be used to 
SI Respondent C6, June 200 I. 
52 This can occur through having permits which designate routes, or through being denied access by 











convey the same messages, the responses were all similar. One respondent captured the 
views: 
"You can't talk. You can't sit down and tell your 
grievances because you are ignored. You are told to wait, 
wait till tomorrow. Nothing happens. You must show that 
you are serious, that you mean business and that is what 
the people do. "53 
Identifying the perpetrators and instigators of taxi violence proved difficult since the shift 
of blame to 'other' associations was once again evident here. Committee members also 
tended to blame only drivers belonging to other associations and never their own drivers. 
Many argued that their drivers were reprimanded for any 'bad behaviour' and that they 
were less likely to be the instigators of the violence. Any involvement on their part was 
always viewed as a response to what was done to them first. 
A large majority of the respondents believed strongly that corrupt police officers ranked 
high on the list of major players involved in the violence. Many respondents claimed to 
-
have knowledge of incidences where police officials were working with members of the 
taxi industry to carry out violent acts against certain associations. There was also the 
belief as mentioned earlier, that members of the SAPS provided automatic rifles to 
members of the taxi industry. One argument made was that conflict and violence would 
not occur on such a regular basis if there were not corrupt people within the SAPS to 
'cover up the evidence '. There were further arguments that lack of arrests and 
convictions in cases involving taxi-related violence was indicative of the corruption 
within the ranks of the SAPS, and how that corruption was a key factor in the seeming 
ineffectiveness of a police response to the instability of the taxi industry. Here 











respondents stated that police have the resources available to effectively police the taxi 
industry, but that until corruption was rooted out, it would be an 'impossible' task for 
police intervention to be successful. As was stated by respondents: 
"Sometimes the police favour. they are connected to one 
association and so when you go to make a complaint or say 
who did what. they take no notice of your complaint. ,,54 
"The police have what it takes to stop a conflict but they 
just stand there and do nothing. They have the guns, they 
are the SAPS and they have the knowledge about how to go 
and solve a case but why don't they use it? They are scared 
because they know if they arrest someone the finger will 
also be pointed to them. Their dark secrets will come 
out ... They cannot betray people if they already made deals 
with them. Then it is too late because if you want to do the 
right thing it is too late. ,,55 
Guns and man-made petrol bombs were considered to be the weapons most commonly 
used in the violence, with the targets often being the drivers or the vehicle itself.56 While 
many of the respondents argued that innocent passengers and bystanders were not the 
intentional targets, and were just 'unfortunately caught in the crossfire', there were 
respondents who argued that the attacks on passengers were in fact planned. Though few 
would give explanations for why innocent people were targeted, one respondent stated 
that it showed to what lengths people were prepared to go to, to get their message across. 
Mention was also made of an elusive 'third force '. There was the overall belief that there 
existed elements outside the taxi industry whose main objective it is to see the industry 
54 Respondent A8, March 2000. 
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destabilised. Many drivers commented on the strains of working in an unstable and 
dangerous environment, making the point that it would be ludicrous for anyone to believe 
that they would create that working environment for themselves. Views differed though 
on who this 'third force' could be. Some argued that it consisted of members high up in 
government ranks who had 'lackeys' lower down the ranks, while others argued that it 
consisted of gang members, who in an attempt to divert attention away from themselves 
and their corrupt and 'illegal' practices, either start or fuel the conflicts in the taxi 
industry. Many drivers and owner-drivers further argued that they had concerns for their 
own physical safety and therefore, on occasion carried weapons as a precautionary 
measure. In some instances drivers also travelled in groups. Committee members 
admitted that they knew of drivers who carried weapons, but they very clearly stated that 
they did not request that their drivers do this. 
There appeared to be no doubt amongst those interviewed that there were people who 
were benefiting from the ongoing violence in the taxi industry. Many respondents were 
of the opinion that there were certain corrupt state officials whose jobs remained secure 
as long as the violence in the industry persisted. Gangs were also said to benefit with the 
focus being removed from them and their activities while the taxi industry was in chaos. 
Furthermore, a large majority of respondents stated that 'hit-men' and 'hit-squads' are 
used by taxi associations for the purposes of eliminating competitors. These hit-men, 
who respondents claim are paid large sums of money, were thus also considered to be 
beneficiaries of taxi violence. 
When it came to views on the impact of violence on the taxi industry, commuters and the 
community at large, respondents recognised that the violence in the taxi industry, 











impact overall. The image of the industry and its members is tarnished and fear is 
instilled in the community and especially the commuters. Committee members however 
also felt that 'people sympathised with the taxi industry' and that the commuters 
'understand the problems the industry is facing '. 
A large majority of respondents felt strongly that corrupt elements needed to be expelled 
from all sectors of government and the taxi industry. The overall feeling was that until 
such corruption was rooted out, the violence and instability would continue. While 
acknowledging that the task would be a lengthy and difficult one, many respondents were 
convinced that allowing these corrupt persons to maintain their positions of authority 
and to operate with impunity, was detrimental not only to the taxi industry, but also to the 
government, since it showed the people how 'ineffective its structures are in combating 
crime and violence in the country '. 
Furthermore it was argued by many that communication was the key to solving many of 
the problems that exist within the industry and between the industry and law enforcement 
agencies. Proper communication between all parties was felt to be the 'only way' to 
include all stake-holders in the decision-making processes. The committee members 
argued that government needed to hear what all members of the taxi industry 'had to say' 
before embarking on their plans to restructure an industry that is known for its capacity 
for violence. The lack of effective communication between government and the industry 
was regarded to be one of the main reasons why many within the industry were against 











6.3 Respondents from the SAPS and the Traffic Department 
The ten respondents from the SAPS and the traffic department have all been involved in 
the taxi industry in a policing capacity, either with regard to traffic violations or conflict 
and violence. Here again many of the respondents had similar views making it apparent 
that the problems that exist in the taxi industry have already been identified and are 
known by the different parties. 
6.3.1 Policing the taxi industry 
Overall, the police and the traffic officers considered working conditions, particularly 
with regard to policing the taxi industry, to be extremely difficult. What stood out most 
in the interviews with these law enforcement officers were the difficulties the SAPS and 
the Traffic Department had regarding their negative image. There appeared to be an 
awareness that they were often perceived negatively not only by members of the taxi 
industry, but also by the community at large. As the following respondents indicated: 
"We know how we are seen. People don't trust us and look 
we understand that that is what we got from the apartheid 
years. It is going to take time. ,,57 
"The people in the taxi industry and most especially the 
media, they say terrible things about us as law enforcement 
officers. It is not easy wearing the uniform these days. You 
cannot make a small mistake because the community will 
want your head. ,,58 
57 Respondent D3, June 2001. 











The relationship between the taxi industry and law enforcement is thus severely strained. 
There exists little trust or proper communication and this was seen as an enormous 
obstacle to effective policing of the taxi industry, along with lack of resources and 
assistance from the public. Also high up on the list was the fear for their lives. Many 
respondents stressed the point that the dangers involved in policing the taxi industry were 
very real and life-threatening. 
"Look, if you get to the scene where violence is occurring 
and there are many taxi industry people there, the chances 
are that if you, as a police officer arrives on the scene first, 
then the taxi industry people outnumber you 50 to 1. And 
most of them are armed. Now what is a police officer 
suppose to do? There isn't the fear of killing a policeman. 
It has actually become a hobby with some of these groups 
to target the police. You are constantly in danger and you 
fear for your life. Now how can you handle a situation 
effectively when you are put in that position and there is 
no one to back you up and there are no people that will 
come forward to assist us in cases to identify 
perpetrators . .. 59 
"Well, the main obstacles that you face is that your life is 
threatened at all times because you are getting to deal with 
people from different walks of life. A taxi driver is not 
somebody who has gone through a screening process .. .!t is 
somebody that's just come off the street irrespective of his 
background or where he comes from and he's driving a 
t . ,,60 axl. 
59 Respondent D4, July 2001. 











Another difficulty law enforcement appears to have is the continuous introduction of new 
laws and by-laws with regard to regulation of the taxi industry. As one respondent stated: 
"The laws and the by-laws are changing day by day which 
makes your task as a law enforcement officer very 
difficult. ,,(if 
Furthermore, it became apparent that respondents had difficulty in dealing with the 
changes in strategy adopted by the state. One respondent captured the feeling many 
respondents had: 
"There are so many changes going on all the time. Okay so 
apartheid is gone, but the way things were back then is still 
remembered today and some of those practices still exist 
today even though it is not supposed to be that way. So they 
said everybody must change now, but that change has been 
difficult. But okay, we try to change and it is the soft 
approach, we must talk more, communicate and there must 
be understanding and working together. The police must 
now· work with the community and the people must work 
with the police. But then that doesn't work and we get 
blamed for not putting in enough effort, and so it is 
changed again and now we must get tough on crime and 
criminals. No more talking or negotiating. So it is different 
all the time and you have to keep up with all the changes 
and change too. Sometimes it is hard to do that . .,62 
Traffic officers also felt that members from the taxi industry failed to realise that the law 
enforcers had a 'job to do' and 'duties to perform' and that citing a taxi driver for an 
offence was not a personal attack on the driver or the taxi industry, but rather an attempt 
61 Respondent D5, J ul y 200 1. 











'to reprimand an offender who committed a violation', There was the further argument 
that law enforcement in general was viewed in a negative light, but that traffic officers in 
particular were considered to be 'bad guys' by the passengers, especially in cases where 
taxis were stopped while they were transporting people. 
"Those passengers want to get to work. Now if the taxi 
driver does something wrong on the road and it is my job 
to pull him over, I will be seen as the bad guy because I 
will be held responsible for letting those people come late 
for work. ,,63 
"I don '/ know, it is such a difficult situation because if the 
taxi is packed beyond its limit for instance and the driver is 
speeding, ignoring the laws, then I must pull him over 
right? Now when I do that the people in the taxi are 
already moaning and groaning because they are going to 
be late for work. And on top of everything else I find that 
the guy has no permits. Now what must I do? If for example 
he now has to make other arrangements for those 
passengers just there because I must get him off the road. 
those people are going to hate me. They are going to say 
that traffic cops are picking on the drivers and then you 
hear all sorts of stories about harassment and so forth. But 
now on the other side again, if a taxi like that is allowed to 
operate and there is a huge accident and people get killed, 
then everyone wants to know why didn't the traffic officers 
pull these taxis off the road. We get blamed either way. ,,64 
Many respondents also claimed to be aware of the difficult working conditions within the 
taxi industry and the 'stresses' drivers were under to 'reach their targets '. 
63 Respondent E 1, . June 2001. 











"At the end of the day it comes down to frustration from the 
drivers. This guy has got to drive for a set target, and now 
he drives for his target and there's no money on his route 
because there's a lot of taxis doing one route. So now he 
makes illegal stops just to get that one passenger and along 
comes the police officer or a traffic officer or I will say law 
enforcement officer. He gets charged R150 up to R600 for 
committing a violation. So now he loses out on his whole 
days target. ,,65 
The overall feeling was that since they were able to acknowledge the difficulties the 
drivers experience on a daily basis, the very least the drivers can do is recognise that the 
law enforcement agencies also had a job to do. 
6.3.2 Conflict and violence in the taxi industry 
There exists a lot of allegations about the involvement of law enforcement agencies in 
the conflict and violence in the taxi industry. While respondents often argued that 
conditions which exist within the industry are the main cause for the instability, there 
were those who acknowledged the contribution made by the corrupt forces within law 
enforcement agencies. 
The SAPS and traffic officers had similar views on the causes of conflict and violence in 
the taxi industry. High on the list was the 'money factor " followed by the 'fighting for 
routes to make more money'. Respondents argued that the target amounts set by the 
owners were unreasonable and that that was where the 'problems' started. Conflicts then 
65 Respondent D5, July 2001. According to the respondents, fines are made out to the owner because he 












arose because of the tactics some drivers used in order to reach their target amounts on 
routes that were overtraded. 
"There's not a proper screening process for the routes that 
they're doing. So you've got about 150 taxis running one 
route. Now 1 mean 150 taxis running one route in one 
day. ·>66 
Respondents further claimed that it was difficult to identify criminal elements in the taxi 
industry and that it was even more difficult to bring a 'perpetrator to justice '. There were 
those who argued that they have no assistance from the public and that when law 
enforcement officers attempt to investigate, witnesses do not want to come forward. 
Often mentioned were the intense pressures to perform enforcement duties properly so 
that cases were not dismissed on technicalities. 
"You've got to know your job, and now with the 
constitution you better know what you're going to be doing 
now. Are you going to arrest this person lawfully or are 
you violating his rights. There's a lot of things you've got 
to think about and this you've got to think while you are 
actually conversing with the driver. ,,67 
The respondents from the SAPS who had been involved in investigating conflict and 
violence in the taxi industry agreed that there were outside parties instigating the 
conflicts and manipulating events. Criminal gangs who wish to protect their own illegal 
operations through maintaining instability in the taxi industry so that the focus remains 
there, ranked high on the list. 
66 Respondent 05, July 200 I. 











Though visibly uncomfortable when discussing the issue, there were respondents from 
both the SAPS and the Traffic Department who admitted that corrupt elements did in fact 
exist within law enforcement agencies. Respondents tended to refer to media accounts 
about corruption within law enforcement agencies and the admissions appeared to come 
only because evidence about corrupt officials have been made public. This was said to 
contribute greatly to the negative image the taxi industry and the community had of the 
SAPS and traffic officers. 
"There is no trust in the SAPS. We are seen as corrupt. 
when in fact - and I am not saying that corruption doesn't 
exist because it probably does, but there are good police 
officers who want to make a difference. ,,68 
'The stigma from the apartheid days still exists today and 
it is going to take a long time before we gain the trust of the 
people. 1169 
Overall though there was optimism that over time, and through hard work and dedication 
on all sides, improving the relationship between the taxi industry and law enforcement 
was definitely possible. 
6.3.3 Regulation and the Recapitalisation programme 
The regulatory capacity of law enforcement agenCIes plays a vital role in the 
effectiveness of policing the taxi industry. With the Recapitalisation programme stressing 
the importance of effective law enforcement in the restructuring process, the perceptions 
of regulation and control and the capabilities of law enforcement agencies becomes 
68 Respondent D3, June 2001. 











important. In addition, identifying the obstacles that prevent effective regulation and 
attempts to eradicate them, is key in predicting the success of future regulatory capacity. 
Many of the traffic officers and the SAPS respondents felt that there has been a 'huge 
improvement' in the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies with regard to policing 
the taxi industry. There were those who felt that the Criminal Justice System is 'faulty' 
and that law enforcement has not been very successful. Still others argued that there were 
too many restrictions placed on law enforcement officers and that obstacles that they face 
are insurmountable. The following statements captured the views of the respondents: 
"You can't just go in there and drag a guy out and rough 
him up even if you know that he is responsible Jor 
something and you know that he will get away with it. If 
you do that then you as a police officer, you get into 
trouble and the public will want to see you go to jail or lose 
your job and then in a situation like that the system will 
probably work because they want to make an example and 
show how they are willing to get rid oJ bad cops. But when 
it comes to putting the real bad guys away, it hardly ever 
works ... 70 
"The Justice System hasn't really hit hard on it. The guy 
gets charged, he gets released the next day. I am sitting 
again with the same problem on the same route, in the 
same area. 71 " 
"We are getting better. It is a long process and what you 
have to understand is that things are not going to change 
overnight. But we are learning as we go along and it is 
getting better... something is being done. This new 
70 Respondent D4, July 2001. 











government programme is a long-term thing and that will 
make our jobs easier ... 71 
HI would really like to say we have been effective and in 
some ways we have been but when you look at the situation 
you see that things haven't changed that much. But you 
also have to look at it from our side. It is difficult out 
there. There are so many taxis and everyday they get more 
and more and many of them are pirate taxis. Now how do 
you identify these taxis? We can't be all over the place, all 
the time looking to catch them and pull them over. Even if 
we stop them today and take away their vans, tomorrow 
there will be more ... the fighting is still there and they are 
not scared to kill, so what have we really done? What can 
we do? ,,73 
A majority of the respondents further argued that the capacity of law enforcement 
officers to perform effectively is severely hampered by the lack of resources: 
"There are not enough resources made available. There's 
not enough logistical resources made available, so you're 
stuck with what you've got and you've just got to make it 
work for your area. ,,74 
All the respondents agreed that education, proper information and effective 
communication was crucial if there was any hope of ever resolving the problems in the 
taxi industry. The Recapitalisation was seen as a 'good programme', that could 'change 
the industry for the better', However, many argued that the programme would not be a 
success if government did not do more to 'fu their relationship' with the industry and to 
educate the industry members about the changes. 
72 Respondent E3, July 2001. 
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"At the end of the day it comes down to education. You've 
got to educate these people as to what you are doing, 
what's your purpose... and that is the only way how you 
can combat the problem .. .!t is a slow process. ,,75 
"You have got to let everybody know what is going on. And 
lets face it many of the drivers on the road do not read 
properly and they don't write properly and they don't 
understand much about new laws and regulations and 
things like that. So if no one goes to tell them, then how will 
they know. ,,76 
"The media should actually play a more positive role to 
inform the people instead of just tearing the police down. 
Why don't they help us to educate and inform the public. ,,77 
Respondents appeared convinced that the commitment for change does exist, but felt 
that if lessons learned in the past are not taken into consideration when dealing with taxi-
related issues in the present and future, very little change is likely to occur. As was 
stated: 
"We are familiar now with how these people operate and 
how they react to certain things. So we must remember 
what has happened in the past and we must learn from it. 
We must not make the same mistakes again otherwise we 
are going to get the same results over and over again. ,,78 
75 Respondent D5, July 2001. 
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6.4 Respondents from U Managing Conflict (UMAC) 
With the volatile relationships that exist within the industry between rival taxi 
associations and between law enforcement agencies and the industry, addressing and 
resolving issues, especially ones related to conflict and violence, have proved to be 
extremely difficult. UMAC has played a key role in attempts to alter the instability in the 
industry, first through monitoring and investigating conflicts, and later through 
facilitating mediation efforts with the purpose of bringing about resolutions. The two 
UMAC respondents interviewed during the research have been involved in crisis 
interventions, taxi mediations and conflict resolutions with members of the taxi industry, 
with the purposes of identifying causes of conflict and violence, and finding alternative 
ways to resolving conflict without the use of violence. 
6.4.1 The conflict resolution and mediation process 
The respondents explained that once an area of conflict or potential conflict is identified, 
the first response is a crisis intervention to bring the conflict to a halt. This is then 
followed by a more detailed mediation process with the purpose being to facilitate the 
parties identifying solutions '. The obstacles the respondents have faced in such processes 
ranged from difficulties with maintaining a neutral attitude and personal safety to 
problems with getting various stake-holders to the table and difficulties in reaching a 
compromise that is acceptable to everybody. Yet despite these obstacles, it was argued 












"Well, it is successful in a way that without any 
intervention you don't know what might have happened. 
That at least there was a place where that space for 
dialogue could be opened up ... How many lives that saved 
we don 'f know. Politically you could say it is very 
successful because it shows there's something being done 
not only on the law enforcement side but also addressing 
some of the underlying causes. But you know you think of 
how far we still have to go in terms of some of the 
structure problems, then honestly it hasn't been very 
successful. .. 79 
6.4.2 Conflict and violence in the taxi industry 
Conflict in the taxi industry was seen to occur for a number of reasons: competition for 
routes, the establishment of illegal ranks, or the violation of certain agreements. Fierce 
competition for lucrative routes in an overtraded industry was considered to be one of the 
main causes of the conflict, as an association who is able to dominate lucrative routes is 
the one that benefits economically. Pressures to have the biggest associations and access 
to the most routes were seen to fuel the conflict along with links between the taxi 
industry and outside criminal forces. 
"There's a lot of money in the industry on the 
peripheries .... associations that have the bigger membership 
. are also attractive to dealers of minibus parts, contracts, 
advertising, ... so there's pressure on people to have the 
most prestigious, biggest associations and to be leaders of 
the taxi associations. To do that they obviously have to 











attract members. They attract members by offering security 
belonging to the association. That can be done 
scrupulously and unscrupulously and honestly that sort of 
pressure to come out as the biggest and the best ... definitely 
fuels it. A lot of the taxi industry leaders are on the fringes 
of criminality, there's links proven and unproven between 
taxis and drug running, taxis and gun-running and taxis 
and gangsters, money laundering, ... and that fuels the 
conflict. ,,80 
Like the law enforcement agencies, the respondents from UMAC also claimed that it was 
difficult to identify perpetrators of violence and conflict in the taxi industry. However, 
they were convinced that there were people behind the scenes who actually hire outsiders 
to kill and injure. 
"In our work we've come close to identifying sort of key 
people within the conflicts. But again its difficult to pin it 
down. I mean the associations becomes an umbrella body 
looking after the needs of various smaller groupings, route 
committees, rank committees. There might be a squabble 
within one of these groups that actually causes the 
fights .... one of the owners might decide he's had enough 
and hire a hit-man to take out his competition. So it is 
difficult to pinpoint. ,,(11 
HI mean if you look at this taxi thing, taxi and buses. The 
guy was arrested. He was paid R50, a well trained soldier 
who can be employed anywhere, he was paid R50 by taxi 
people who said to him ... when you finish the people in 
Khayelitsha, killing those people ... when its finished we are 
80 Respondent F 1, April 2001 











going to give you R40 000. That is what they said to him. 
Now he is in jail. There are people behind these things. ,,82 
The UMAC respondents further argued that there were people outside the taxi industry 
who were at times manipulating events within the industry for their own benefit. Gangs 
and criminal elements featured near the top of the list of who this 'third force' might be. 
One respondent stated that certain political parties could benefit if they are able to take 
advantage of the situation and organise people to support their party with promises of 
interventions. 
"There were covert operations during the apartheid years 
and those covert operations were aimed at breaking down 
township resistance to the government. And whether it was 
supporting one civic faction against another civic faction 
or one taxi faction against another taxi faction ... so from 
that you can get a third force. Or it could be dntg 
merchants wanting to disrupt dntg trafJicking of one of his 
competitors, ... or it could be a smoke-screen for a gang 
problem. ,,83 
6.4.3 Reimlation and the Recapitalisation pro~amme 
The respondents agreed that dealing with problems within the taxi industry was a very 
difficult task since it often involved complicated and interrelated issues. However they 
felt that the root causes of the problem have not really been dealt with and that that has 
been one of the main reasons why many of the conditions in the industry have remained 
virtually unchanged. As one respondent stated: 
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"It is an incredibly difficult problem to deal with. They [the 
State] haven't really taken it on and run with it as they 
should. There are obvious political and socia-economic 
dangers of associating with it .. .!t·s an issue where the State 
has to come in and take a direct leading role in sorting it 
out. Legalisation is the objective and regulation. Then 
there needs to be a long-term solution. And then also in 
terms of recognising some of the additional issues that 
need to be attached to the regulation and legalisation, 
seriously supporting capacity development, conflict 
resolution, adding weight to maintaining an ongoing 
mediation around the process. That's all been lacking. One 
. of the difficulties being, going in and mediating and as 
soon as the mediation is over. the parties say 'that's it. 
We've done our jobs' and move away. The root causes 
remain and the fact is that we haven't been able to take it 
on when that window of opportunity arises... there's no 
point. ,,84 
Respondents further argued that law enforcement has improved tremendously, moving 
from having information provided by UMAC made available to them about impending 
attacks and doing nothing, to 'developing capacity and dedicated units to deal with the 
taxi violence. ' 
The respondents saw the Recapitalisation programme as a 'good programme', arguing 
that it was the 'solution' to the instability in the taxi industry since it takes into account 
all the problems that exists in the taxi industry today. There was the recognition that the 
implementation would be a slow process and that it would be a difficult one. Overall 
there was concern about the opposition to the programme by many within the industry 











and the implementation being hampered by parties who claim that they have not been 
properly informed about the details of the programme. It was further acknowledged that 
many within the industry 'probably' do not have the necessary information about the 
programme and its impact and felt that the government would have to address this issue 
first if any implementation was to be successful. The threat of violence was considered to 
be very real, and it was argued that government needed to be 'extremely careful' in their 
approach as 'one wrong move' could lead to an eruption of violence that could cost many 
people their lives. 
Once again, as with the respondents from the SAPS and the Traffic Department, there 
was the firm belief that proper communication of relevant information needed to become 
a priority on the part of government to alleviate the many fears concerning the 
restructuring of the industry and to ensure that the Recapitalisation programme had the 
greatest chance of being a success. 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
The intention of the field research was to examine the views and opinions of members 
from the minibus-taxi industry, law enforcement agencies and UMAC. During the course 
of the examination there emerged common themes relating to the issues under 
investigation. There was overall agreement among all the respondents concerning the 
causes of the instability in the taxi industry. In addition, the issue of communication 
between all relevant parties featured prominently in all the interviews. The lack of 











not only conflict resolution processes and law enforcement efforts, but also government 












ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The instability in the minibus-taxi industry dates back to the apartheid era when the 
government's policies directly impacted on the growth and development of the industry. 
This occurred first through the strict regulation of the transport system shaped by the 
government's discriminatory policies and legislation, which effectively prohibited the 
growth of the black taxi industry, and then later through the implementation of the 
deregulation policy. The process of deregulation was meant to remove the racial 
restrictions in the law and encourage free market enterprise. However, with the failure of 
the Department of Transport to properly monitor the growth of the industry, coupled with 
the failure of law enforcement agencies to effectively curb the conflicts and incidences of 
violence that soon erupted in an overcrowded environment, the policy of deregulation 
instead produced an industry where fierce competition reigned. This concluding chapter 
takes a comparative look at competition and regulation in the urban public transport 
sector in South Africa against the background of other developing countries. The 
countries examined are ones where vehicles exactly like, or very similar to the South 
African minibus-taxi, form part of the informal sector and where there exists similarities 
to operation patterns in the South African context. In addition, there will be an evaluation 
of the South African government's attempts to restructure the taxi industry. The level of 











viewed in tenns of the success of the overall transfonnation process in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Concluding the chapter is a brief discussion on the challenges for future 
regulation of the South African minibus-taxi industry. 
7.2 Competition in the South African public transport sector 
On South African roads, competition in the public transport sector occurs not only within 
the taxi industry, between members from different associations, but also between the taxi 
industry and the bus industry. Within the minibus-taxi industry, as is evident from this 
research, the intense competition occurs in an overcrowded market, and it often results in 
clashes between taxi associations contesting the same lucrative routes and limited 
facilities. The conflict between associations have been characterised by fierce gun battles 
and as was revealed in the literature, and particularly in newspaper accounts, a recurring 
theme in the conflict has been the hiring of hit-men. Members within the taxi industry 
have resorted to recruiting people to carry out attacks against their opposition with the 
purposes of eliminating competitors. These hit-men have become quite adept at eluding 
the law, as detecting them has proved to be a difficult task for law enforcement agencies. 
The competition between the taxi industry and the bus industry has also seen an eruption 
of conflict as members of the taxi industry have often targeted attacks at members of the 
bus industry, regarding them as rivals for lucrative routes who further threatens the 
economic viability of the industry. One of the key elements in this antagonistic 
relationship between the bus and taxi industry is that the bus industry has for many years 
been identified as a symbol of the apartheid government which heavily subsidised the 
buses while the taxi industry was left to survive on its own. The democratic government 











subsidisation of the industry would in fact perpetuate the problems instead of solving 
them. It was felt that potential drivers would find the industry an attractive prospect 
should the government provide the industry with subsidies85• This would then just serve 
to exacerbate the already volatile situation. The disagreements concerning the subsidy 
issue has contributed to the battles that have occurred between the bus and taxi industry. 
Still today the animosity of earlier years remains and features prominently in the conflicts 
that continue to flare up. The competition in the South African transport sector has thus 
resulted in members from the taxi industry using violence or the threat of violence as a 
means of exerting control to ensure their economic survival. Of interest then is the 
question of whether instability characterised by incidences of conflict and violence is the 
inevitable outcome of intense competition in transport sectors where there is 
overcrowding and little or no government regulation. 
7.3 International experiences: insights into urban public transport in 
developing countries 
It is relatively rare among cities in developing countries for there to be total reliance on 
publicly owned bus companies (Gomez~Ibanez and Meyer, 1993). In some instances 
even where the cities do have extensive publicly owned bus services, there is often 
competition from other forms of privately owned transportation modes which offer 
services similar to that of the buses. As Gomez-Iba.fiez and Meyer (1993:22), argue: 
By far the most common scheme for providing urban 
services in developing countries is a mixed system of 
publicly and privately owned buses. Often the conventional 
full~sized buses are operated by a publicly owned 











corporation while private operators provide significant 
minibus services. 
Minibuses are thus not unique to South Africa. In other parts of the developing world 
minibuses often form part of the 'jitney services' which offer the same type of service 
that minibuses offer in South Africa. Like the minibuses in South Africa, jitneys 
operate without subsidies and are well known for their speed and flexibility. In addition 
to this, jitneys also' ... provide a source of income to many people who would otherwise 
be unemployed or severely underemployed .. .' (Takyi, 1990:163). As Takyi (1990) 
explains, a jitney is usually defined as a 5 to 12 passenger station wagon, car van andior 
minibus that operates along fixed or semi-fixed routes. They usually pick up passengers 
anywhere along a route until the vehicle has reached its capacity, and passengers are then 
dropped off wherever they specify. The name 'jitney', which is a slang word for 'nickel', 
came from the fare that was charged at the time of initiation. 
In Buenos Aires, Argentina, one of the most important modes of public transportation is 
the microbus or 'collectivo'. Roth (1987), examining the private provision of public 
transport services in developing countries, explains that this mode of transport developed 
in the 1920s when a general economic crisis in the country forced people to travel in 
groups while still continuing to pay their fares individually. These collectivos, which run 
more frequently than the other modes of public transport, account for approximately 83% 
of public transport trips and operators compete vigorously for passengers who favour the 
collectivos for both their speed and flexibility (Roth, 1987; Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
The organisational unit of these collectivos is the route association, otherwise known as 
an 'empresa'. According to Armstrong-Wright (1993) there exists 300 empresas, each 











are able to choose and replace their drivers at will, assume the responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of their vehicles, and each empresa has the task of scheduling 
bus services and providing their members with administrative and legal services. While 
fares are fixed by government, Roth (1987) explains that income goes directly to the 
owners who then decide to either tum the money over for distribution among the 
members of the empresa, divide it proportionally according to the mileage run by each of 
the vehicles, or divide it in whatever way the empresa chooses. Armstrong-Wright 
(1993:14) argues that in most cases though the empresas ensure 'equitable earnings by 
interchanging routes and schedules on a weekly basis.' 
In Colombo, Sri Lanka, private bus services are subject to little government regulation 
and are able to select their own routes, set their own fares and determine their own daily 
schedule (Roth, 1987). As Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) explain, this was as a result 
of the inadequate services that were being provided by the publicly owned bus company 
which resulted in government turning to the private operators. However, while the private 
operators are able to set their own fares, the policy by the Central Transport Board 
(CTB), the public operator of the buses, of maintaining extremely low fares, has served 
to limit the ability of the private operators to raise their fares (fares were estimated to be 
only about 5% higher than the fares of the CTB's) (cited in Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 
1993) 86. As a result of this some of the operators have found it difficult to survive in the 
competitive environment and as Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) argue, there have been 
operators who have resorted to overloading their vehicles and serving only profitable 
routes, while avoiding unprofitable ones. 
86 As of 1985, the CTB operated around 3 000 buses with a carrying capacity of 55 passengers each, while 
the private operators operated around 4 000 buses, most of which had a carrying capacity of 10 to 30 











In Caracas, Venezuela the 'carros por puesto' system captures approximately 47% of the 
transit market with 90% of the registered vehicles having a carrying capacity of between 
12 and 16 passengers (cited in Takyi, 1990). Takyi (1990) explains that the por puestos 
compete with a cheaper but poor bus service and with ordinary 'taxi cabs', Associations 
which range from 5 to 300 vehicles per association are responsible for organising the 
carros por puestos and members are required to pay dues to the association. The carros 
por puestos, which provide an alternative to the autobuses, are popular because of their 
speed and flexibility (Takyi, 1990). 
In Nairobi, Kenya, the public sector bus system competes with a private sector 
comprising large buses operated by a franchised company, as well as smaller buses called 
'matatus'. (Armstrong-Wright, 1993). The matatus contribute approximately 6 800 direct 
and indirect jobs in the informal sector (Takyi, 1990). Matatus include minibuses, light 
pick-up trucks, larger pick-up trucks, as well as midibuses (cited in Roth, 1987). They are 
attractive because of their flexibility, speed, their ability to relieve peak-hour loads and 
because of the service they provide to low density routes as well as narrow roads where 
buses are not able to travel (Roth, 1987; Takyi, 1990), While the matatu operators are 
able to set their own schedules, fares, and are able to decide their own vehicle design, the 
government in its 1984 Traffic Amendment Act officially recognised the role matatus 
played in the public sector and therefore attempted to implement regulatory procedures 
with safety being one of the key areas of concern (Takyi, 1990). Annual vehicle 
inspections, insurance and four years driving experience were then required before the 
issuing of a matatu license. However, as Takyi (1990) points out, despite these 
regulations, the matatus showed both high accident rates and a high percentage of 











frequent overloading and speeding. In an attempt to improve the matatu service the 
authorities in Nairobi have thus been focusing on ways of improving the enforcement of 
the safety and the insurance regulations through providing convenient maintenance 
facilities (Roth, 1987). 
Takyi's (1990) evalu~tion of jitney systems in developing countries further included a 
look at Metro Manila in the Philippines where one of the most popular forms of public 
transport is the 12 to 15 seater jeepney. Out of the three fourths of Metro Manila 
residents who use public transport, 77% take the jeepney. While the jeepneys are 
favoured because of their flexibility, they are also associated with hazardous driving, 
chaotic loading and unloading practices, speeding and congestion. Government officials 
have thus been faced with proposals to alter the operations of the jeepney. 
In the examples cited above where competitive practices occur within the urban transport 
sector, the disadvantages of competition have come to the fore. A common feature that 
emerges in areas where there is competition for routes in the transport system is that 
profit margins become extremely important to the private operators from the informal 
sector. As is the case in the South African context with the minibus-taxis, jitney operators 
in many developing cities have resorted to behaviours such as overloading their vehicles, 
speeding, and they have become notorious for their reckless and aggressive driving and 
also their picking up of passengers at ' ... dangerous and disruptive spots' (Takyi, 
1990:174). Furthermore, according to Takyi (1990), municipal officials and the public 
also often criticise jitneys for unruly behaviour and being difficult to discipline. The need 
to make a profit has led to not only undisciplined attitudes and behaviour toward traffic 
laws, but has also resulted in accident rates being high' ... due typically to the erratic and 











vehicles are given' (Takyi, 1990: 170). Roth (1987) argues that vehicles are often 
maintained only to the extent necessary for them to keep running and that vehicle 
maintenance and safety issues becomes secondary to ensuring survival in a competitive 
environment. Other observers have further suggested that the provision of better 
facilities for the informal sectors and the enforcement of the traffic regulations could 
serve to ease the safety problem (G6mez-Ibafiez and Meyer, 1993). Armstrong-Wright 
(1993) emphasises that the greatest stumbling block to effective management of public 
transport in developing countries is the absence of effective enforcement of traffic 
regulations. 
In addition, route associations, like the taxi associations in the South African minibus-
taxi industry, have come to play key regulatory roles in sectors where there exists 
minimal government regulation. However, there appears to be a sharp contrast in the 
roles assumed by taxi associations in South Africa and route associations in other 
developing countries. Taxi associations in the South African minibus-taxi industry are 
often associated with conflict, as they tend to ' ... use their organisational strength to 
extract income, commonly through the use of violence' (Dugard, 2001:11). Route 
associations on the other hand are said to ' ... exercise informal supervision to mitigate the 
dangerous and disruptive practices often attributed to free market conditions ... ' (The 
World Bank, 1986:27). There have however been reports of 'infighting' between route 
associations who compete for the same routes. Roth (1987:224-225) contends that 
opportunities for illegal operations do exist as attempts by some route associations to 
protect their turf • ... can become criminal, unlawful, perhaps even homicidal.' In general 
though, it would appear that there exists a large amount of co-operation among the route 











pUblic. This brief review of comparative experiences of other developing contexts, seems 
to suggest that the predisposition toward violence in the South African minibus~taxi 
industry is not that common a feature of other developing societies. There appears little 
evidence that competition between the route associations results in the kind of frequent 
and violent conflicts that are so characteristic of the South African minibus~taxi industry. 
According to Bayliss (2000) there are preconditions for effective competition to occur in 
the urban public transport sector. Firstly, he argues that the use of competition must be 
favoured by public policy that is supported by a legal framework which allows and 
protects property rights and fair trade. Secondly, there must exist a culture of 
competition, along with the industrial capacity to ensure that effective competition 
becomes a reality. Thirdly, there have to be rules to regulate the manner in which 
competition occurs. Therefore, as Bayliss (2000) explains, there must essentially exist 
not only clear transport objectives in which competition has a place, but there should also 
be evidence of the existence of the administrative and institutional capacity to promote, 
direct and regulate such competition. The investigation into the South African minibus-
taxi industry and the brief examination of transport sectors in comparable developing 
countries, suggests that in developing contexts competitive forces in the transport sectors 
are strong whereas the regulatory capacity is extremely weak. The challenge for 
government's in developing countries thus lies in their ability to foster competition while 
at the same time ensuring that there exists the capacity to enforce regulations in terms of 
the set policy agreements. As Bayliss (2000:6) instructively reminds us: 
Competition can be a powerful force in urban public 
transport and can be used for the good. However it will only 
bring the large benefits it offers if suitably - and this does 











This observation regarding the need to balance vibrant competition with robust regulation 
seems particularly pertinent to the South African case where the administrative capacity 
to regulate competition in the transport industry more widely and in the taxi industry 
more specifically has been sadly lacking. 
7.4 Restructuring the South African minibus-taxi industry 
This dissertation has presented a detailed examination of events that occurred in the 
minibus-taxi industry over the last ten years. It has shown a decade of attempts by both 
national and local government to address the volatile nature of the industry through 
formalisation and regulation. The aim has been to create regulatory frameworks which 
would not only set out the terms of reference for regulation of the taxi industry, but 
would also define and assign regulatory responsibilities to the wide range of concerned 
parties, from national government, local authorities and law enforcement agencies, to taxi 
association members. Ultimately government attempts. to restructure the industry through 
the implementation of the recommendations of the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) and 
the introduction of the Recapitalisation programme, has been with the intention of 
establishing a web-like regulatory framework which effectively binds all the key role 
players into a consensual network. 
On the basis of the historical record, it would appear then that the democratic government 
cannot be faulted for its attempts to restructure the minibus-taxi industry. With regard to 
identifying the solutions to the problems within the industry, the government has been 
very successful, as is evident from the NTTT recommendations and the Recapitalisation 











needed in order to restructure the industry and make it an integral part of the transport 
sector. However, the weaknesses of the government become visible when one examines 
the success rate with regard to implementation of the clearly identified solutions. While 
success has been achieved on paper, it would appear that very little success has been 
achieved in actual practice thus far. But this discrepancy between theory (policy) and 
practice (implementation) is a matter of much wider state significance. 
One crucial area where government has succeeded in theory but has failed dismally in 
bringing about change in practice, is with regard to labour relations in the minibus-taxi 
industry. While labour legislation such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 
75 of 1997 and the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 has been put in place, which 
identifies the basic conditions of employment in South Africa and which strives to ensure 
social justice, labour peace, economic development and general democratisation of the 
workplace, it has had little impact on the practices in the taxi industry. As was clearly 
seen in this research, taxi owners and taxi associations do not abide by these labour laws 
and continue to exploit their drivers. This occurs despite the fact that taxi associations 
who are legally registered with the Provincial Taxi Registrars agree formally to 'ensure 
fair labour practices by all its members' (Office of the Provincial Taxi Registrar, 1996:2). 
What is clearly lacking then is the capacity of government to move effectively on 
implementation and to put into practice the transformation it has been able to achieve on 
paper. While the government appears to have mastered the rhetoric with regard to the 
resolution of complex issues within the taxi industry, tangible results on the grassroots 
level are still lacking. However, this failure on the part of government to implement 
successfully on the ground levels is not restricted to the transformation of the taxi 











weakness in governmental circles to implement and sustain policy plans on a much 
wider front. 
7.5 The transformation process in democratic South Africa 
With the transition from apartheid to democracy, the new government has been faced 
with the difficult task of bringing about transformation in the country. Following the 
establishment of new and non-racial forms of government at national, provincial and 
local level, the process of reconstruction and development has been a slow one (Shaw, in 
Shaw, Camerer, Mistry, Oppler and Muntingh, 1997). In 1998, four years after the 
democratic election, a report by the Presidential Review Commission (PRC) showed that 
the democratic government was having only a small measure of success with regard to 
the transformation of various state departments. Said the commission: 
.. .it is our view that the system of governance in the new 
Republic of South Africa is in a number of crucial respects 
not working well at this stage of the transition process. Too 
little progress has been made in remedying the inequalities 
and inefficiencies of the past (1998: 17). 
While there has been a proliferation of policy documents, initiatives and strategies 
dealing with the aims and objectives of government with regard to the transformation 
process, it has become evident that there exists a huge discrepancy in what has appeared 
on paper and what has been put into practice. According to the PRC (1998:16), the 












The PRe (1998) argued that the 'national machinery' of the government was too 
fragmented and that the wholeness of the government was weakened by structural and 
functional defects. Key among the weaknesses highlighted was the lack of clear vision 
and strategy direction. As explained by the Commission (1998:26), there exists a lack of 
consensus on a common shared vision as 'a plethora of visions have been developed by 
departments and provinces, often quite different from each other in content, context and 
direction ... ' In addition, while many of the departments and provinces have succeeded in 
embarking on some form of strategy planning, the PRC (1998:26) argued that 'there 
have been significant variations in how such plans have been developed, the degree of 
participation and buy~in by staff and external stakeholders, and the ways in which the 
policy outcomes have been implemented and evaluated.' The PRC further regarded the 
lack of skills and capacity as a hindrance to the process of setting new goals and 
priorities. As was explained, in many strategic planning processes, much of the work has 
been facilitated by outside consultants, and there exists little evidence of the skills being 
transferred to staff within departments or organisations. 
Another major weakness highlighted by the PRe (1998) was the lack of co~ordination 
and co-operation that exists within the various departments and provinces, and between 
the different spheres of government. It was argued that this lack created an incapacity to 
implement policies and programmes effectively. Furthermore, the PRe found that 
strategic plans, objectives and goals are frequently not adequately communicated to 
stakeholders and that this has often resulted in both confusion and the stifling of 
opportunities for mutually beneficial inter~sectoral collaborations. The Commission's 
report also revealed that it is evident that decisions taken at the highest policy levels are 











there also exists a lack of monitoring and evaluation systems for the measuring of 
performance and the evaluation of policy outcomes. This, as it was argued, makes it 
extremely difficult to objectively outline successes and failures and to provide feedback 
to policy-makers and implementers. 
Finally, another issue addressed by the PRC was the mismatch of budgets with 
administrative capacity. Said the Commission: 
Financial planning and budgeting is crucial because it is 
concerned with the allocation of scarce public resources 
(financial and human) in such a way that policy priorities 
are realised. If the policy and strategic planning processes 
are not fully synchronised with the budgetary and financial 
processes, the likelihood is that policies will be introduced 
without the necessary funds or capacity for their successful 
implementation ... (1998:73). 
The PRC report casts interesting light on many of the structural defects that have 
characterised post-1994 reform attempts by central government. Transformation and 
restructuring of the transport industry as a whole and of the taxi industry in particular, 
echoes many of the problems identified by the PRC. The Department of Transport, 
which plays a key role in the regulation of the taxi industry, has itself experienced 
difficulties with the transformation process. As was revealed by the PRC, the Department 
of Transport has seen 'significant downsizing of staff', from 1 400 employees in 1995, to 
770 in 1997, and a target of not more than 200 in 1999. Notwithstanding these 
reductions, the Department has a major role in co-ordinating the management of road 
traffic at local, provincial and national levels which, if success is to be achieved, requires 











inter-sectoral co-ordination is a recurring problem and is an impediment to integrated 
development programmes' (1998:16). Recognising the problems regarding the 
transformation process within the Department of Transport thus creates a better 
understanding of the difficulties the Department has in assuming its role in bringing 
about successful transformation in the taxi industry. 
7.6 Challenges for future regulation of the taxi industry 
It becomes clear in the South African context that the restructuring of the minibus-taxi 
industry is only possible if there exists a firm and binding commitment by all concerned 
parties to ensure the success of the transformation of the industry. Full-scale 
implementation of the government's Recapitalisation programme therefore depends on 
the ability of all relevant role players to set aside personal agendas, and to come together 
to form successful partnership arrangements where the ultimate objective is to see that a 
successful minibus-taxi industry takes its rightful place in the transport sector of the 
country. The challenge thus lies at the level of negotiating and entrenching the politics of 
co-management. 
Co-management, as described by Hauck and Sowman (2001), is essentially a 
management strategy where stakeholders are involved in a partnership agreement that is 
characterised by varying degrees of power-sharing and responsibility. It revolves around 
the notion of merging the interests of government, whose aim it is to achieve efficiency 
and sustainability, with the interests of others (such as local communities), who have 
concerns with regard to self-governance and active participation (cited in Hauck and 











industry, it becomes apparent that the state is but one key party who has the 
responsibility of ensuring successful transformation of the industry. With many members 
of the taxi industry unwilling to relinquish the industry to the government's exclusive 
control, the challenge for govemment is not only in rooting out the criminal elements 
with hidden agendas, but also in getting the industry to recognise the benefits of the 
restructuring process. This can be achieved through government providing incentives to 
facilitate and ensure co-operation which is based on the acceptance of and commitment 
to partnership agreements that are clearly defined. Of major importance then are the 
relationships between the parties and the communication that occurs within them. As Van 
der Reis, Miller and Servas (1993:3-1) state: 
Communication influences the way in which relationships 
develop. When relationships between individuals and 
groups go wrong, it is usually because of ineffective 
communication. Effective communication helps to build 
positive relationships. Healthy relationships that are built 
on principles of good communication can make the 
difference between an aggressive, unpleasant interaction or 
situation and a positive one. Effective communication 
supports positive relationships, being built on principles 
such as honesty, clarity, understanding, sensitivity and 
constructive listening. 
One relationship fraught with problems is the one between the members of the taxi 
industry and law enforcement agencies. Field research has emphasised that this 
relationship is often characterised by a lack of trust, lack of effective communication, 
hostility and resentment. Considering the history of corruption within the security forces 
during the apartheid era, it is not surprising that there have developed links of a criminal 











breakdown in the relationship. With regard to the taxi industry in particular, traffic 
authorities and police officers used to enforce the transport laws with a degree of 
hostility, discrimination and force. In democratic South Africa, the SAPS and the Traffic 
Department have experienced great difficulty in changing the negative perceptions many 
in the taxi industry have of them. There is the firm belief that corruption up to the highest 
levels continues to exist within the state structures. Their image has been tarnished by not 
only the role that they played in the enforcement of the apartheid laws, but also the 
continuous accusations of collusion and corruption against them. 
The transition the law enforcement agencies and the SAPS in particular have made in 
terms of shifting their focus from being accountable only to the state, as they were during 
apartheid, to the focus now including accountability to the community, has not been an 
easy one. The law enforcement agencies in the new South Africa have been closely 
scrutinised, severely criticised and perhaps unfairly stigmatised. This, in addition to the 
lack of respect many within the taxi industry have for laws and the people who enforce 
them, has made the task of effective law enforcement a very difficult one. Patel (in 
Minnaar and Hough, 1997) argues that there needs to be ' ... a boosting, reorientation and 
transformation of the investigative capacity of the South African Police Service (SAPS)', 
but recognises too that in addition to this, what is needed is a complete restructuring 
within the court system, as there is clearly a lack of effective communication in the 
relationship between the SAPS and the courts in South Africa. One working effectively 
without the benefit of the other would be a futile exercise. 
While the Recapitalisation programme aims to address all the problems within the 
industry, government's failure to effectively communicate the strategy to all concerned 











programme is unlikely to be successful without the co-operation of all the relevant 
parties. As opposition to the Recapitalisation programme continues and the government 
vows to continue its implementation process, the extent to which government 
restructuring efforts will be successful remams to be seen. While capitulation by 
government to the threats and demands by the taxi industry is not the answer, strong arm 
tactics will not aid the situation either. A delicate balance is needed, and the challenge for 
the democratic government lies in finding this balance. 
The taxi industry is clearly unstable and steps need to be taken to address the issues that 
affect so many lives. However, without a relationship of trust and effective 
communication, there will be little prospects for a peaceful resolution to the problems. 
When plans to restructure the industry are not clarified or filtered down to the people it 
would affect the most, there is cause for concern. Will the industry voluntarily yield to 
government intervention and allow for a transition free from conflict and violence? 
Despite government's good intentions, the Recapitalisation programme and attempts to 
implement it could have potentially devastating results. To avoid further conflict with 
regard to the restructuring of the taxi industry, all concerned parties, must come together 
with a common purpose of regulating and stabilising the taxi industry. 
7.7 Concluding remarks 
The South African minibus-taxi industry has come a long way. Withstanding the rigours 
of the apartheid polices, the competition from government subsidised buses and trains, 
and also the violence that has plagued it since the 1980s, the industry has managed to 











industry could flourish and improve the lives of all its members and not only a select few 
who hold positions of power. 
As South Africa moves further into its era of democratic governance, it moves further 
away from blaming conditions that exist within the country on the apartheid regime. 
While one cannot ever deny the role that the apartheid government and its policies played 
in getting the country to where it is today, at some point the democratic government 
becomes responsible for the conditions that continue to exist. That the government has 
difficulty in effectively dealing with the taxi industry and mending relationships whose 
very nature have proved to be instrumental to the flaring up of conflicts, attests to its 
failure to overcome the obstacles that threaten effective democratic governance. At 
present the obstacles to government regulation of the minibus-taxi industry appear to be 
enormous and there is no doubt that the road ahead towards implementation of regulatory 
measures will prove to be difficult. However, effective and efficient regulation is what is 
urgently needed for the eradication of the instability and the successful operation of the 
minibus-taxi industry. Only the future will tell whether the post-apartheid government 
will be able to harness both state and non-state capacity in pursuit of effective regulation 
of a highly competitive transport industry. As the historical narrative presented in this 
dissertation suggests, the obstacles in the way of taming naked competition with effective 
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The following questions were posed to the respondents. The manner in which the 
questions were phrased and the order in which they were asked during the interviews, 
varied. In some instances other questions were included, while others were omitted. Only 
the key questions appear here. 
A. Questions for members of the taxi industry 
ra) Biographical details: 
1. Name: ............................................................. . 
2. Age: (a) 20-29 D (b) 30-39 D (c) 40-49 IJ (d) 50 and over D 
3. Sex: (a) rvtale D 
(b) Female fJ 
4. Race: (a) African D (b) Coloured D (c) Indian D (d) White D (e) Other D 
5. Do you have any formal education? (a) Yes D 
(b) No D 
If yes, to what educational level? (a) Std. 5-7 
(b) Std. 8-10 
(c) Post-matric 
(d) Other 





D ................ .. 
(a) Driver D 
(b) Owner-driver D 











7. How many minibus-taxis do you own? (owners) ............................... . 
(b) General Questions 
1. How long have you been in the taxi industry? 
2. Why did you enter the taxi industry? 
(a) To make money 0 
(b) Only form of employment 0 
(c) Community Service 0 
(d) Other 0 
3. Is it easy to make money in the taxi industry? 
(a) Yes 0 
(b) No 0 
Why do you say so? 
(a) 0-5 years 0 
(b) 6-10 years 0 
(c) 11-15 years 0 
(d) Other 0 
4. If you were offered employment elsewhere, would you leave the taxi industry? 
(a) Yes D 
(b) No 0 
Explain. 
5. What do you think. is the biggest problem facing the industry today? 
(a) Crime and Violence 0 
(b) Corrupt traffic officials 0 
(c) Pirate Operators 0 
(d) Too few ranking facilities 0 
(e) Government's Recapitalisation programme 0 
OOOOm 0 
6. How would you describe your relationship with: 











6.2 The taxi association you belong to? 
6.3 Other taxi associations? 
6.4 The bus industry? 
Explain. 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad C 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad 0 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad 0 
7. What kinds of problems do you encounter in your dealings with each: 
7.1 Taxi owners! taxi drivers? 
7.2 The taxi association you belong to? 
7.3 Other taxi associations? 
7.4 The bus industry? 
8. How would you describe the relationship between the taxi industry and: 
8.1 The community? 
8.2 The police? 
8.3 The traffic police? 
8.4 Gangs? 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad 0 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad 0 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad 0 
(a) Good 0 (b) Okay 0 (c) Bad 0 
9. What kinds of problems do you think are experienced in each relationship: 
9.1 The community? 
9.2 The police? 
9.3 The traffic police? 
9.4 Gangs? 
10. In your opinion, who should regulate the taxi industry? 
(a) Taxi Associations 
(b) The State 
(c) Joint Committees 
(d) Other 




0 .............. . 
ee) Conflict and violence in the taxi industry 
1. What do you consider to be the main cause of taxi violence? 
(a) Money 0 
(b) Sharing of ranking facilities IJ 
(c) Pirate Taxis 0 
(d) Lack of proper law enforcement 0 












2. Who would you say are the major players involved in the violence? 
3. What types of weapons would you say are used in the taxi violence? 
4. Do you have concerns about your own physical safety? (drivers). 
(a) Yes 0 
(b) No IJ 
If yes, what kind of precautions do you take? 
5. Do you think that there are any parties that benefit from the ongoing violence? 
(External or Internal). Explain. 
6. How, in your opinion, has the violence impacted: 
6. 1 The industry? 
6.2 The commuters? 
6.3 The community? 
7. How effective has the response of the following been to the taxi violence? 
7.1 the State? (legislation). 
7.2 the SAPS? (enforcement). 
8. What, if any, would you say are the difficulties experienced by them in addressing the 
issue? 
9. What do you consider to be the solution to the violence in the taxi industry? 
10. How do you see your future in the industry? 
(dj The Recapitalisation Prov,ramme 
l. What do you think of the Recapitalisation Programme? Why do you 
say so? 
2. How do you see it impacting the industry? 
3. How successful would you say implementation will be? 
4. Are you in favour of the programme? Explain. 











B. Questions for law enforcement officials and the members from UMAC 
(aJ Background 
(SAPS and Traffic Department) 
1. In what capacity have you been involved with the taxi industry? 
2. Who were the parties that were involved? 
3. What are the difficulties that you experienced? How did you overcome the difficulties? 
(UMAC) 
1. Explain the conflict resolution and mediation process? 
2. What kinds of issues are dealt with? 
3. How long does such processes last? 
4. How successful would you say they are? 
5. What are the obstacles that you have to contend with? 
(b) Violence and conflict in the taxi industry 
1. What would you say are the main causes of the conflict in the taxi industry? 
2. What fuels the conflict? 
3. Who are the instigators/perpetrators of the violence? How difficult would you say it 
is to identify these people, arrest them and bring them to trial? 
4. In your opinion, are there any parties that benefit from the instability in the industry? 
In what way do they benefit? 
(c) The state's response to the conflict and violence 
1. How effective has the state's response been to the violence in the taxi industry? 
2. Have state strategies in dealing with the industry changed over time? How is it 
different from the apartheid years? 
3. How do you view the capacity of the state to contain the conflict and violence? 
4. What would you say hampers the state's ability to function/act effectively in regard to 











5. What are the difficulties that law enforcement agencies face in deating with the taxi 
industry? 
6. How would you describe the relationship between the taxi industry and the SAPS/the 
Traffic departmentINGO's? 
(d) The Recapitalisation Programme 
1. What do you think of the programme and how do you see it impacting the industry? 
2. Do you see it reaching full-scale implementation? Explain. 
3. What do you think about the opposition to the programme from members within the 
taxi industry? 
4. How should government respond to it? 
5. Do you think that all the members in the industry have full knowledge of the 
programme and how it will affect their lives? 
ee) Solving the problem 
1. What do you see as the solution to the violence? 
2. What would you say is the degree of commitment amongst state, local government, 
taxi associations and drivers to abide by a peace contract once one has been agreed 
upon? 
3. What are the prospects for a stable future within the transport industry as a whole? 
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